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ABSTRACT 
Financial sector development has been projected to play a very significant role in economic 
growth through the provision of improved quality and quantity of financial services. While 
financial development–growth nexus has received much attention in the literature, important 
research gaps still remain largely in areas such as financial–real sector interaction in growth 
trajectory, threshold effects, finance–volatility–shocks linkages; and legal system–
information asymmetry nexus. Knowledge of these relationships is extremely crucial in 
regulating the financial sector and conducting prudent macroeconomic policy more generally. 
Using sub–Saharan Africa (SSA) as a case, this thesis consists of four self–contained 
empirical essays each investigating a critical gap relying on several advanced econometric 
techniques. 
 
 
In the first essay, we examine the effect on economic growth when financial sector growth 
outstrips the solvency needs of the real sector. In this context, we find that more than two–
thirds of our sampled countries in SSA have experienced at least one episode of excessive 
credit growth relative to real sector needs. While financial development supports economic 
growth, the extent to which finance helps growth depends crucially on the simultaneous 
growth of real and financial sectors. The elasticity of growth to changes in either size of the 
real sector or financial sector is higher under balanced sectoral growth. We also show that 
rapid and unbridled credit growth comes at a huge cost to economic growth with 
consequences stemming from financing of risky and unsustainable investments coupled with 
superfluous consumption fuelling inflation. However, the pass–through excess finance–
economic growth effect via the investment channel is stronger. A good understanding of the 
optimal level of credit consistent with long run economic growth is needed as existence of an 
undisturbed equilibrated growth of real and financial sectors is a necessary condition for a 
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smooth economic growth. By introducing a previously missing link, our findings resolve the 
seemingly conflicting and highly contested results in the finance–growth literature. 
 
 
The second essay investigates whether the impact of finance on growth is conditioned on the 
initial levels of countries‟ income per capita, human capital and financial development. While 
financial development is positively and significantly associated with economic growth, our 
evidence suggests that, in almost all the threshold variables, below a certain estimated 
threshold, financial sector development is positively and insignificantly related to growth. In 
other words, below the threshold level of per capita income, human capital and the level of 
finance, economic growth is largely insensitive to financial development while significantly 
influencing economic activity for countries above the thresholds. The main conclusion drawn 
is that higher level of finance drives long run growth and so is the overall level of income and 
human capital.  
 
 
In the third essay, we disaggregate volatility into its various components in examining the 
effect of financial development on volatility as well as channels through which finance 
affects these volatility components. What emerged is that while financial development affects 
business cycle volatility in a non–linear fashion, its impact on long run fluctuation is 
imaginary. More specifically, well–developed financial sectors dampen volatility. The 
findings also revealed that while monetary shocks have large magnifying effect on volatility, 
their effect in the short run is minuscule. The reverse, however, holds for real shocks. The 
channels of manifestation shows that financial development dampens (magnifies) the effect 
of real shocks (monetary shocks) on the components of volatility with the dampening effects 
consistently larger only in the short run. A key implication emanating from this essay is that, 
strengthening financial sector supervision and cross–border oversight may be very crucial in 
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examining the right levels of finance and price stability necessary to falter economic 
fluctuations. 
 
 
In the final essay, the study re–interrogates the role of law in financial development in the 
light of evolving legal systems in SSA as well as how legal origin explain cross–country 
differences in economic volatility through its effect on information asymmetry. Our evidence 
suggests that legal origin significantly explains cross–country differences in financial 
development and economic volatility. More importantly, relative to civil law, English 
common law countries and those in Southern Africa have higher financial sector development 
both in terms of financial activity and banking efficiency on the back of lower volatility. 
While private credit bureau positively (negatively) affects financial development (economic 
volatility) with economically large impact for English legal legacy countries, the latter effect 
is contingent on the form of legal origin suggesting that, the establishment of information 
sharing offices per se may be insufficient in taming growth vagaries. The effectiveness of law 
is exceedingly relevant. At the policy front, maintaining more agile and effective legal 
systems that are responsive to changing financial landscape while forcing economic agents to 
improve information infrastructure is healthy for both financial sector development and 
macroeconomic stability. 
Keywords: Financial development, economic growth, volatility, shocks, law, threshold, 
GMM 
JEL Classifications: O16; C33; F4; F31; G1; K42; C32; O43 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the study 
 
A critical measure of economic prosperity and growth in countries is the growth rate of real 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and has been used as a close proxy of economic 
growth. This is because GDP measures the total market value of economic activities within a 
country and as such, an increase in economic activities means higher growth. Following this, 
extant studies – both theoretically and empirically – have been done to determine factors that 
drive economic growth and those that cause growth disasters. Theoretically, Schumpeter‟s 
(1911) pioneering work shows that the financial sector plays a significant role in influencing 
growth through the provision of improved quality and quantity of financial services. This 
finding suggests that, the level of financial development plays a crucial role in economic 
growth. Levine (1997; 2005) opine that financial development by far improves the production 
of ex ante information about possible investments, monitors investments and implementation 
of corporate governance, trading, diversification and risk management, mobilizes and pools 
savings as well as facilitate the exchange of goods and services. Thus, the growth–enhancing 
effect of financial development is based on its ability to mobilize productive savings and 
allocate resources efficiently. Furthermore, financial services improve productivity by 
promoting technological innovation (King and Levine, 1993b; Beck et al., 2000; Nguena, 
2012). 
At the same time, capturing the impact of these five functions depend on the quality of 
finance rather than quantity. The efficiency of financial systems cannot be taken for granted, 
especially as information gathering is one of their key functions. Asymmetric information 
and externalities in financial markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1992) can lead to sub-optimal 
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levels of financing and investment and an inefficient allocation of capital with dire 
consequences on economic growth. Market imperfections in the financial sector may be best 
addressed through appropriate oversight by public registries. But the effect of legal system is 
also crucial in this debate. The view is that since finance is attained by a series of 
contracts/agreements stipulated by regulatory and legal enforcement, the financial system 
cannot work effectively without a competent legal system as investors‟ and lenders‟ rights are 
not secured. Typical of this argument is the work (see La Porta et al., 1997, 2000; Levine, 
1997) on the impact of the legal system on financial development and operation, which 
argues that a well-functioning legal system improves the way the financial system allocates 
resources and hence promotes economic growth. 
The burgeoning empirical literature has documented the importance of financial deepening 
for growth. For instance, utilizing data on 71 countries over the period spanning 1960–1995, 
Levine et al. (2000) examine the effect of financial development on economic growth relying 
on liquid liabilities to GDP ratio, ratio of assets of deposit money banks to assets of deposit 
money banks plus Central Bank domestic assets; and credit issued to private enterprises to 
nominal GDP ratio as indicators of financial development. The authors found a positive 
nexus between financial development and economic growth in the countries investigated. 
 
Becsi and Wang (1997) argue that well–developed domestic financial sectors, such as those 
of developed countries, can significantly contribute to increasing savings and investment rate 
and ultimately economic growth. Following this assertion, most developing countries have 
instituted and redesigned their economic and financial systems aimed at improving financial 
sector development and growth. The development of the financial sector entails the 
institutionalisation of policies governing the sector. Thus financial development reacts to 
changes in the workings of the system and so is the effect of financial development on growth 
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overtime. For instance, Loayza and Ranciere‟s (2006) cross–country study found evidence of 
co–existence of a positive long run effect of financial depth on growth and a short run 
negative effect induced by financial volatility. Beck et al. (2014) opine that larger financial 
sector reduces long run volatility while improving growth albeit weakly overtime. While in 
the short run, expansion of financial sector stimulates growth at the cost of higher volatility, 
neither the size of the financial sector nor intermediation is associated with higher growth in 
the medium term. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) argue that financial development penalizes 
growth by triggering financial instability. More recently however, Adu et al., (2013) note that 
the overall effect of financial development on growth is highly sensitive to the choice of 
indicators. They found that while credit to the private sector and total domestic credit is 
growth–enhancing, broad money supply to GDP is growth–damaging. 
 
From the foregoing, it can be inferred that the ability of financial system to mobilize 
productive savings, allocate resources efficiently, smooth volatility and increase growth 
depends on how well financial intermediaries carry out their functions and this by far 
explains differences in growth rates across countries. Failure to empirically establish the right 
and healthy level of financial development, channels through which financial development 
affect growth volatility, how the legal system and information asymmetry play out in 
financial development and volatility have severe consequences. First, it presents problems of 
high systemic risk, sub–optimal allocation of capital and overheated economic capacity with 
the preeminent effect on economic growth. Second, financial development can dampen or 
magnify shocks to the economy depending on the nature of shock. Thus failure to empirically 
quantify the relative extent and effect of financial development on economic shock may have 
dire implications. 
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1.2 Statement of the problem 
The problem statement presented here is carved around four thematic areas in the finance–
growth nexus in accordance with identified gaps in the literature. These are finance–real 
sector growth nexus; threshold effects; shocks; and legal system–information asymmetry 
nexus. These problems are individually discussed below. 
 
a. Finance–real sector growth nexus: Following Schumpeter‟s (1911) work, extant studies 
have been done on the relationship between financial deepening and economic growth 
culminating in two possible directions: the “supply–leading” hypothesis and the “demand–
following” approach. The “supply–leading” hypothesis as noted by Patrick (1966) opines that 
the development of a robust financial sector contributes to economic growth. This view 
presupposes that institutionalisation of functional financial markets ahead of their demand 
will spur the growth of real or non–financial sector and consequently growth. On the other 
hand, the “demand–following” approach contends that the growth of real economic activities 
increases demand for financial services and consequently the development of financial sector. 
 
 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) elaborate the liquidity management role of banks. Financial 
intermediaries reduce low return investment due to premature liquidation and redirect funds 
into longer term, high yield projects, leading to faster growth. Levine et al.‟s (2000) cross–
country study show a positive relationship between financial intermediary development and 
economic growth while cautioning that such positive link is not only due to growth 
influencing financial development but also on account of the effect of exogenous component 
of financial development on growth. For instance, given that labour is an important input in 
production process, the fast–growing financial sector will attract much of the skilled labour 
who would contribute significantly to its growth at the expense of other sectors. 
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Consequently, the absence of efficient human resources will undoubtedly suffocate total 
output and growth. In this regard, the thesis will deepen our understanding on the effect on 
growth when finance is more than growth in real sector and vice versa. With this, the study 
will uncover the optimal level of financial development that supports the prevailing real 
sector characteristics. 
 
 
b. Threshold effects: Admittedly, the link between financial development and economic 
growth might be too complex than what the simple relationships portray (Rousseau and 
Wachtel, 2009). Extant literature has highlighted on the non–linearities in the financial–
growth nexus (Favara, 2003; Aghion et al., 2005; Arcand et al., 2012; Cecchetti and 
Kharoubi, 2012; Manganelli and Popov, 2013; Adeniyi et al., 2015) albeit inconclusive 
results. While theoretical studies (Saint–Paul, 1992; Berthelemy and Varaudakis, 1996; 
Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997) have espoused that the overall effect of finance on growth 
may be mediated by some key threshold variables below or above which the impact of 
finance changes signs. Yet, empirical studies have not rigorously examined the finance–
growth nexus in the face of threshold variables. More importantly, the precise impact of 
financial development on growth when economies‟ initial conditions such as their per capita 
income, human capital accumulation and the level of finance is below or above their 
respective threshold is unclear. 
 
c. Shocks: Volatility, regardless of its source, is a natural source of worry in a world of 
imperfect information. This holds with particular force in developed economies where the 
financial sectors are relatively well developed. Some studies (see for instance Caprio and 
Honohan, 1999) have long revealed greater forms of volatilities in high income countries on 
account of greater economic concentration. Legitimately as it is, if volatility matters in 
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developed economies, then it must pose an even greater source of concern for developing 
countries. 
 
While the empirical and theoretical literature has established a positive impact of financial 
sector development on economic growth (King and Levine, 1993a,b; Levine and Zervos, 
1998; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2000; Beck et. al., 2000), the potential links between financial 
development and growth volatility in developing countries and SSA in particular have been 
understudied despite the apparent shocks they face. Specifically, the channels through which 
financial development potential affects growth volatility even remain unknown how much 
more the manifestations of financial development on the relative types of shock. This 
necessitates further research efforts in this direction as it presents a serious challenge to 
policy makers in the conduct of monetary policy and mitigation of shocks in the face of 
financial development.  
 
d. Legal systems and information asymmetry: There has been a considerable volume of 
theoretical studies positing that information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers 
affects financial development via reduction in the efficient allocation of capital (Jappelli and 
Pagano, 2002). Indeed, lenders are most often left with issues of adverse selection on account 
of their lack of information on borrower quality particularly on risks associated with 
investment needing the borrower to mobilize financial resources. This concern is even more 
pronounced when lenders are intrinsically unable to control the direction of borrowers in 
post–credit grant. Given this understanding, a borrower may conceal returns from an 
underlying investment in order to reduce the possibility of default or amount of repayment at 
agreed times. This behaviour of borrower is paramount and evident in countries with legal 
weak system culminating in sub-optimal resource allocation, financing of unproductive 
projects thus exacerbating growth volatility. This dynamic therefore underscores the primary 
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motivation of this study as it seeks to empirically model the linkages between legal systems 
and information asymmetry and their effect on growth volatility. From a policy perspective, 
such an understanding will shed light on precise role of law which by far would guide 
decision on information sharing for enhanced growth.   
 
1.3 Research objectives 
The central objective of the thesis is to evaluate the interrelationships in the financial 
development–economic growth nexus in SSA. Specifically, the study explores the dynamic 
linkages between growth in finance and real sector; finance–growth nexus given threshold 
variables mediating the relationship; pass–through effects of financial development on shocks 
and ultimately growth volatility; as well as the role of law and information sharing in 
finance–economic volatility nexus. Specifically, the following seeks to achieve the study 
objectives: 
1. To investigate the overall effect on economic growth when the relative speed of 
growth in finance and real sector is disproportionate. This objective seeks to 
extensively analyze the effect of unbalanced growth in real and financial sectors on 
economic growth in SSA. 
2. To establish the precise nonlinearities in financial development–economic growth 
nexus in the presence of threshold effects. This objective explores the impact of 
finance on economic activity when countries‟ initial conditions are below or above 
important mediating variables within a sample splitting framework. 
3. To examine the effect of financial development on volatility components as well as 
channels through which finance affects economic volatility. Since financial 
development affects volatility through its various components, this research objective 
decomposes volatility into business cycle and long run component in examining the 
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link between financial sector development and volatility. It also establishes how 
financial development affects volatility components through its interaction with real 
and monetary shocks.  
4. To determine law–finance–volatility nexuses and how law shapes volatility through 
its impact on information asymmetry. In essence, beyond the effect of legal origin on 
financial sector development and economic volatility, this objective also unearths the 
impact of law on volatility through its influence on information sharing in the 
financial markets. 
 
1.4 Research questions 
The above discussion naturally yields the following research questions: 
1. Is the effect of financial development on economic growth contingent on the relative 
speed of growth in finance and real sector? 
2. To what extent is the overall impact of finance on growth threshold specific? 
3. What is the nature and channels through which financial development affects growth 
volatility? 
4.  How do the legal system and information asymmetry play out in financial 
development and volatility?  
 
1.5 Significance of the study and contributions to knowledge 
Indeed, literature on finance–growth nexus have increasingly been on direction on effect (De 
Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995; Levine et al., 2000; Masten et al., 2008; Khan, 2008; Mishra 
and Narayan, 2015), causality (Abu–Bader and Abu–Qarn, 2008; Odhiambo, 2004; Shan et 
al., 2001) and (non)linearity (Huang and Lin, 2009; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Shen and 
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Lee, 2006). Although there exist abundant literature on finance–growth relationship, we 
argue that the link is much more complex than previously thought. The exact effect of the 
relative speed of finance and real sector output on overall growth in the sub–region remains 
unknown. More so, the complex relationship between the finance and economic growth may 
be refereed by some important threshold variables below or above which the effect of finance 
on growth changes sign. Also, considering the shocks countries in SSA are exposed to, it is 
imperative to systematically examine how financial development relates with the various 
forms of shocks and how these impact of economic volatility. Apart from this, the extent to 
which SSA‟s legal system is evolving deserves some special analysis especially on how this 
impacts on information asymmetry and quality of financial deepening as well as growth 
volatility. 
 
The relevance of this study is self–evident in the light of its compelling contributions to 
existing literature. First, while extant literature have investigated the finance–growth nexus, 
to the best of my knowledge, the effect of unbalanced growth in real and financial sectors on 
overall economic growth has not been studied especially in SSA. Particularly, it explores 
dearth of empirical studies and introduces a previously missing but critical link in the 
finance–growth literature. In particular, the study presents empirical evidence from the lenses 
of developing countries of what would be the effect on economic growth when growth in 
finance and growth in real sector are disproportionate. This is a critical gap in the literature 
which on one hand will resolve the seemingly conflicting results in the finance–growth 
literature and on the other hand will also provide insights into the effects of unbridled 
financial development and crucial policy implications necessary for the conducting effective 
monetary policy aimed at propelling growth. Second, this study empirically examines the 
theoretical literature on nonlinearities in finance–growth which hitherto have not seen much 
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attention. Specifically, the study reveals the precise growth effect of finance under different 
threshold variables. Of immersed contribution is the estimation of the thresholds below 
(above) which finance hurts (enhances) long run growth and vice versa. Third, we show how 
financial development impacts on the different volatility components and whether finance 
amplifies or dampens the effects of real and monetary shocks on volatility. With this, we are 
able to proffer specific policy recommendations in taming the incessant economic volatility 
facing SSA and other developing economies of similar characteristics. 
 
The last contribution rests on the application of a variety of econometric techniques which 
have not seen considerable usage in the finance–growth literature constitutes an important 
evidential milestone in the studies. This is because the robustness of results by far depends on 
quality of the empirical strategy at various stages. Varying the estimation approaches is 
expected to produce fresh evidence that inspires the extension of frontiers of research in other 
areas within the sub–region. 
 
In the nutshell, it is anticipated that this thesis will provide the springboard on how to conduct 
an effective monetary policy in SSA so as to avert growth disasters and benefit from their 
financial deepening. Findings from this study are thus expected to inform policy guidelines 
aimed at attenuating growth vagaries. 
 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The entire thesis report which consists of six chapters is organized as follows: Chapter two 
conducts an extensive review of both the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth. It also presents fresh 
evidence by introducing a previously missing link in the finance–growth literature by 
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critically evaluating the effect of unbalanced growth in real and financial sectors on economic 
growth from the lenses of developing countries. Chapter three reviews the literature on 
threshold effects of finance on growth while empirically examining the impact of finance on 
economic growth under different threshold variables. In chapter four, the study re–examine 
the relationship between financial development and economic volatility with reference to the 
channels through which former affects economic volatility via the different components. 
Chapter five provides an empirical touch to role of legal origins in the level of finance and 
growth vagaries while revealing how law shapes information asymmetry in macroeconomic 
fluctuations. Chapter six concludes the research with some key implications and 
recommendations for policy. It also presents avenues for further research efforts. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, REAL SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The significance of the relationship between financial development and economic growth has 
received much attention both in growth and financial literature. Early writers combine the 
endogenous growth theory and the economics of financial systems to examine the 
interactions between the two. Theoretically, Schumpeter‟s (1911) pioneering work shows that 
the financial sector plays a significant role in influencing growth through the provision of 
improved quality and quantity of financial services. This finding suggests that, the level of 
financial development plays a crucial role in economic growth. Levine (1997; 2005) opine 
that financial development by far improves the production of ex ante information about 
possible investments, monitors investments and exerts corporate governance thereby enabling 
the financial system function efficiently. Thus, the growth–enhancing effect of financial 
development is based on its ability to mobilize productive savings and allocates resources 
efficiently. Furthermore, financial services improve productivity by promoting technological 
innovation (King and Levine, 1993b; Beck et al., 2000; Nguena, 2012). 
 
Becsi and Wang (1997) argue that well–developed domestic financial sectors, such as those 
of developed countries, can significantly contribute to increasing savings and investment rate 
and ultimately economic growth. Following this assertion, most developing countries have 
instituted and redesigned their economic and financial systems aimed at improving financial 
sector development and growth. The development of the financial sector entails the 
institutionalization of policies governing the sector. Thus financial development reacts to 
changes in the workings of the system and so is the effect of financial development on growth 
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overtime. Loayza and Ranciere‟s (2006) cross–country study found evidence of co–existence 
of a positive long run effect of financial depth on growth and a short run negative effect 
induced by financial volatility. Beck et al. (2014) opine that larger financial sector reduces 
long run volatility while improving growth albeit weakly overtime. While in the short run, 
expansion of financial sector stimulates growth at the cost of higher volatility, neither the size 
of the financial sector nor intermediation is associated with higher growth in the medium 
term. Calderon and Liu (2003) on the other hand argue that financial deepening propels 
growth through both capital accumulation and productivity growth. Consistent with Calderon 
and Liu (2003), Méon and Weill (2010) show that financial intermediary development exerts 
a positive effect on aggregate productivity contingent on the levels of economic and financial 
development. 
 
 
Given the growth–enhancing effects of financial development, some authors remain 
pessimistic and argue that development of the financial sector does not necessarily translate 
into higher growth and may even distort sustained path towards development. For instance, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) argue that financial development penalizes growth by 
triggering financial instability. More recently, however, Adu et al., (2013) note that the 
overall effect of financial development on growth is highly sensitive to the choice of 
indicators. They found that while growth of credit to the private sector and total domestic 
credit is growth–enhancing, increases in the ratio of broad money supply to GDP is growth–
damaging.  
 
Extant studies in the literature on finance–growth remain inconclusive and little is also 
known on the overall effect on growth via the interaction of the real and financial sector. 
Empirical studies are silent on the unbalanced sectoral effect on overall economic growth. 
While the supply–leading hypothesis asserts that development of the financial sector drives 
14 
 
growth, the central theme of this thesis is that the extent to which finance helps growth 
depends crucially on the simultaneous growth of real and financial sectors. Specifically, this 
thesis argues that a fast–growing financial sector retards output and overall growth by 
damaging investment rates, magnifying macroeconomic instability as well as exacerbating 
economic fragility and resource misallocation. The balanced growth path contends that all 
sectors grow at constant rate and so should the financial and real sector in order for the latter 
to have any positive effect on economic growth. Whenever the growth rate of one sector 
exceeds that of the other sector(s), total output suffers and to prevent overall reduction in 
sustained growth rates, the real sector should grow sufficiently large enough to maintain the 
demand as well consume all the financial resources supplied by the fast–growth financial 
sector. This chapter thus hypothesizes that financial development lowers growth if the growth 
in finance and real sector output is unbalanced. In other words, the threshold effect of 
financial development on growth depends on the relative speed of growth in finance and real 
sector. The chapter thus aims to critically investigate this relationship in sub–Saharan Africa 
(SSA) given the region‟s renewed interest in enhancing growth by boosting financial sector 
development. 
 
The study significantly contributes to existing finance–growth literature in so many ways: 
First, to the best of my knowledge, this perhaps represents the first attempt to specifically 
focus on SSA in its investigation of the overall growth effect when growth in finance and real 
sector is disproportionate. With this, it presents crucial findings on the effect of 
disproportionate sectoral growth on the economy from the lenses of developing economies. 
The second contribution is self–evident in the light of the robust techniques employed in the 
estimations. Needless to say, we proffer key policy implications based on the findings of the 
study. We found that while financial development is growth–enhancing, there exist threshold 
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effects beyond which further increases in credit hurts growth. By and large, growth rates 
suffer when growth in finance is not accompanied by growth in real sector. Specifically, 
excess finance destroys capital formation while exacerbating macroeconomic instability. This 
evidence we believe by far resolves the seemingly conflicting and highly contested results in 
the finance–growth literature and provides crucial policy implications for conducting 
effective monetary policy aimed at propelling growth. 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: the next section provides a background on the 
financial sector development and economic growth in SSA; Section 2.3 reviews an extensive 
literature on finance–growth relationship while Section 2.4 presents the testable hypothesis. 
Section 2.5 specifies the methodology while Section 2.6 discusses the findings. Section 2.7 
analyzes the policy implications and recommendations while Section 2.8 concludes the 
chapter.  
 
2.2 Stylized facts about finance–growth nexuses in SSA 
This section briefly discusses the growth trajectory and financial sector development in SSA 
where most of the countries‟ financial systems remain relatively underdeveloped and shallow 
in the CFA franc zone (David et al., 2014). The relative backwardness of the region‟s 
financial sector has been attributed to lack of institutional quality (Singh et al., 2009), 
informality, weak governance, political and economic instability (Beck and Honohan, 2007) 
and sparse population density (Allen et al., 2012). More recently, David et al., (2014) suggest 
financial integration as an important conduit to financial development especially in countries 
with better institutional quality.  
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More so, the region‟s financial intermediation and inclusion remain significantly lower 
relative to other developing and emerging economies reflecting a combination of number of 
factors. Andrianaivo and Yartey‟s (2009) study find that income level, creditor rights 
protection, financial repression and political risk significantly drive banking sector 
development in Africa. Rajan and Zingales (2003) on the other hand, suggest that trade and 
financial openness are a necessary condition for a genuine financial development. 
 
 
The region‟s impetus for industrial development is greatly influenced by several factors 
including whether countries are resource rich or poor, large or small in terms of land size, 
coastal or landlocked, financial sector development and more generally how they are 
governed both politically and economically. At the same time, the countries in the sub–region 
show a number of homogeneities which do not significantly differ from few other low 
income economies but bifurcates the region from most developed economies. These 
commonalities include a high share of agriculture and commodities and a low proportion of 
manufacturing in GDP; self-employment of a large percentage of the workforce; widespread 
informality of economic activities; weak linkages between some modern economic sectors 
and the traditional small–scale economy; and particularly low productivity and incomes 
(Altenburg and Melia, 2014). 
 
Mlachila, et al., (2013) argue that the robust growth rates recorded in the mid–1990s were 
partly on account of policy reversals, post–conflict recovery, foreign aid inflows and 
aggressive debt reliefs. Evidently, growth rate in SSA increased from 1.72% in 1980–1989 to 
1.90% in the 1990s. From the mid–1990s to late 2000s, an aggressive structural 
transformation defined as the shift of workers from low to high average productivity 
activities and sectors was pursued in several SSA countries and this led to a rise in growth 
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rate from the 1.9% to 4.74% between the period 2001 to 2009. However, IMF (2012) notes 
that such structural transformation and progress occurred at different speeds and different 
paths. For instance, agricultural labour productivity growth has been very weak among many 
low–income countries except in Burkina Faso and Malawi. The services sector also 
stimulated output, exports, labour productivity growth, and some countries like Kenya and 
Mauritius have even moved up the value added chain. 
 
Manufacturing remains the main driving force of economic growth, largely attributable to its 
higher productivity and scope for innovation (UNIDO, 2016). However, evidence abounds 
that growth of manufacturing value added as a proportion of GDP has not been impressive in 
Africa. Recent data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
suggest that industrial productivity – measured as percentage of manufacturing value added – 
consistently declined in Africa over the past two decades albeit not monotonically. Industrial 
value added which stood at 9% in 1990 declined to 7% in 2000 and further down to 4% in 
2014. At the same time, the percentage of manufacturing value added in Asia and the Pacific 
region increased from 37% in 1990 to 54% and 71% in 2000 and 2014 respectively. Africa‟s 
manufacturing value added remains very low and accounts for only about 1.6% of world 
industrial value added. Industrial and manufacturing sector has not improved over time as the 
proportion of African manufacturing value added in total GDP decreased from 12.8% in 1990 
to 10.1% in 2014. The manufacturing structure of the region is made up of more primary and 
secondary goods with low technological drive and this explains the region‟s poor industrial 
productivity. Nonetheless, the manufacturing sector output increased in few countries –
notably in Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania – albeit on a low base with slow 
productivity.  
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Figure 2.1: GDP growth rate and industrial value added (1980–2014) 
Data source: Authors‟ construct using World Development Indicators. 
 
 
Although some countries achieved a sustained growth rates, the poor growth performance of 
the sub–region mirrors the sluggish growth rates of many other countries. For instance, GDP 
growth slowed markedly in South Africa, inhibited by strikes in the mining sector, electricity 
shortages, and low investor confidence. This is not different from that of Ghana as GDP 
growth rate decreased from 14.05% in 2011 to 9.29% in 2012 before reaching 7.33% and 
4.18% in 2013 and 2014 respectively. This notwithstanding, growth rate generally picked up 
moderately in SSA in 2013, to an average of about 4.5% compared with 4.0% in 2012 before 
nose–diving to 4.23% in 2014 (see Figure 2.1). One could see some palpable link between 
industrial sector value added and growth rates. Taking this trend together one is left at first 
blush of a direct relationship between real sector output and economic growth on the back of 
the financial sector. Also worth mentioning is the region‟s growing equity markets. Indeed, 
development of capital markets in SSA has gained much prominence particularly in the 
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aftermath of the global financial and economic crises as several countries traditionally 
depended on the banking system. Hitherto, the preponderance and influx of these capital 
markets by far enriched the nascent financial landscape. 
 
Table 2.1 shows the averages of the financial development indicators together with some 
selected macroeconomic variables such as growth of GDP, real GDP per capita, broad money 
supply, inflation rate and some indicators of real sector growth. From Table 2.1, both the real 
sector indicators have increased from their initial point in 1980–1984 to relatively higher 
values in 2010–2014. For instance, manufacturing value added increased from 3.49% to 
4.36%. Similarly, industrial value added increased around the same period and both 
indicators registered positive growth rates expect for 1990–1994 where negative growth rates 
were recorded. This period was also marked with high inflation. Anecdotally, such abysmal 
real sector performance during the early 1990s culminated in a reduced growth rate and real 
GDP per capita where both indicators registered their all-time lowest. 
 
Table 2.1: 5–year averages of growth variables, financial development, real sector 
productivity and inflation 
Year 
GDP 
growt
h rate 
(%) 
Real 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(in 
US$) 
Domestic 
credit 
provided 
by 
financial 
sector (% 
of GDP) 
Private 
credit to 
private 
sector (% 
of GDP) 
Broad 
money 
(% of 
GDP) 
Manufactu
ring, value 
added 
(annual % 
growth) 
Industry, 
value 
added 
(annual 
% 
growth) 
Inflation, 
consumer 
prices 
(annual 
%) 
1980–1984 1.54 933.15 51.00 33.82 35.89 3.49 0.90 12.12 
1985–1989 1.91 861.21 57.48 40.16 36.06 2.25 1.54 8.00 
1990–1994 0.64 800.48 69.35 54.42 35.35 -2.31 -0.46 12.62 
1995–1999 3.24 787.65 72.31 59.42 35.46 2.47 1.68 7.31 
2000–2004 4.89 820.78 72.95 55.18 37.39 3.07 4.61 5.17 
2005–2009 4.77 943.16 72.91 61.34 43.64 2.84 1.77 7.62 
2010–2014 4.41 1,015.47 58.55 46.97 39.17 4.36 3.70 5.34 
Source: Authors‟ computation using World Development Indicators. 
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Indeed, recent sustained growth rates experienced in the sub–region partly spurs financial 
deepening with financial sector development playing a significant supporting function in the 
growth trajectory. While the financial sectors in SSA are underdeveloped, the banking 
systems dominate financial sector activities. The banking system is largely concentrated 
because of the narrowness of the market often dominated by foreign banks (Andrianaivo and 
Yartey, 2009). By leveraging on financial sector reforms introduced in the 1980s and 1990s,
1
 
the banking sectors have moved to strengthen their capital bases and improve risk 
management (Mlambo et al., 2012). Financial depth and coverage – respectively measured as 
broad money to GDP ratio and domestic credit provided by the financial sector (% of GDP) – 
increased steadily over the past few decades although its base remain a lackluster. For 
instance, both broad money supply and domestic credit consistently increased over the period 
1985–1989 to 2000–2004. Conversely, between 2000–2004 to 2010–2014, broad money ratio 
declined to 39.17% from the 43.64% over the previous period. Domestic credit also 
decreased by 14.36% over the past decade recording an average of 58.55%. Private credit has 
over the sample period non–linearly increased from 33.82% (1980–1984) to 46.97% (2010–
2014) as it declined to 55.18% (2000–2004) from 59.42% (1995–1999). Equally important, 
from Table 2.1 is the picture of palpable relationship between economic growth and financial 
development measures. However, the perceptibly lower growth rate is suggestive of a 
plausible occurrence and influence of major sectoral performance. Interestingly, both the 
financial and real sectors appear related to growth as for example, a decrease in the financial 
development indicators coincided with a lower real sector performance and a reduced growth 
rates. These patterns are noticeable over the periods spanning 2005–2009 and 2010–2014. 
This leaves ample room to investigate the likely effect on overall growth when the speed of 
                                                          
1
 These reforms included the liberalization of interest rates, restructuring and privatization of state-owned banks, 
abolishing of credit ceilings, introduction of a variety of measures to promote development of financial markets, 
including money and stock markets, and private banking systems, along with bank supervisory and regulatory 
schemes. Senbet and Otchere (2006) provide an excellent discussion of the financial sector reforms in Africa. 
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growth in finance is higher than that of the real sector output. This study is apt on the face of 
the vacillation observed in the growth in financial sector development.  
 
2.3 Finance–growth nexus: A review 
Early theoretical writers (Schumpeter, 1911; Kuznets, 1955; Patrick, 1966) on financial 
system development show divergent views on the link between financial sector and economic 
growth. Schumpeter‟s (1911) pioneering work on finance–growth nexus argues that a well–
developed financial system spurs growth in technological innovations by redistributing 
resources from less productive to more productive sectors. Kuznets (1955) proposes that 
financial markets only begin to grow as the economy approaches the intermediate stage of the 
growth process and develop once the economy matures. However, Lewis (1956) finds that 
financial markets first develop as a consequence of economic growth process and before 
driving real economic activity. These divergent views can be grouped into the so–called 
“supply–leading” and “demand–following” hypotheses. As noted by Patrick (1966), the 
supply–leading view hypothesizes that the development of a robust financial sector 
contributes to economic growth. Thus institutionalization of functional financial markets 
ahead of their demand spurs the growth of real or non–financial sector and consequently 
economic growth. On the other hand, the demand–following hypothesis contends that the 
growth of real economic activities increases demand for financial services and consequently 
the development of the financial sector. This view was originally espoused by Robinson 
(1952: 86) who argued that “where enterprise leads finance follows”. Economic growth 
produces an increased demand for financial services and that the development of the financial 
sector is an important conduit to drive economic growth.  
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Bencivenga and Smith (1991) elaborate the liquidity management role of banks. Financial 
intermediaries reduce low return investment due to premature liquidation and redirect funds 
into longer term, high–yield projects, leading to faster growth. Levine et al.‟s (2000) cross–
country study show a positive relationship between financial intermediary development and 
economic growth while cautioning that such positive link is not only due to growth 
influencing financial development but also on account of the effect of exogenous component 
of financial development on growth. Rioja and Valev‟s (2004a) study of 74 developing and 
developed countries show that finance has a strong positive influence on productivity growth 
in more developed economies. In low–income economies, the effect of finance on output 
growth occurs through capital accumulation. 
 
Hassan et al. (2011) show that gross domestic savings – a proxy for financial deepening – 
positively affects long run growth in all regions. They argue that a well–developed domestic 
financial sector significantly spurs growth through its impact on savings and investment. 
However, by using private credit provided by the banking sector, the authors find a negative 
relationship between financial development and growth in high income countries. While this 
finding is particularly inconsistent with Levine et al. (2000), Hassan et al. (2011) argues that 
private credit is only a suitable proxy for financial development in developing countries and 
not in developed countries since developing countries are more inclined to building their 
bank–based financial markets than the capital markets involving stocks and bonds.  
 
More recently, Mishra and Narayan (2015) depart from these traditional parametric 
approaches to examining financial development–growth nexus for 43 developed and 
developing countries over the period 1986–2012. Results from their study show that financial 
development positively (negatively) affects growth as long as a country‟s level of financial 
development is above (below) their cross–sectional averages. This evidence is somewhat 
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consistent with Calderon and Liu (2003), and Masten et al. (2008) who found that financial 
development contributes more to growth in developing countries than in developed countries. 
However, by employing a semi–parametric approach in examining the link between financial 
and economic development, Herwartz and Walle (2014) found that low–income economies 
obtain the least benefit from financial development while high–income economies enjoy 
almost three times as much benefit. In particular, the authors find a negative financial 
development–growth nexus in low and lower–middle income countries with large 
government sizes. Xu (2000) argues that a high degree of government regulation could be 
attributed to such a negative relationship in low income countries.   
 
By utilizing data on 71 countries over the period spanning 1960–1995, Levine et al. (2000) 
examine the effect of financial development on economic growth relying on liquid liabilities 
to GDP ratio, ratio of assets of deposit money banks to assets of deposit money banks plus 
Central Bank domestic assets and credit issued to private enterprises to nominal GDP ratio as 
indicators of financial development. The authors found a positive nexus between financial 
development and economic growth in the countries investigated. Kargbo and Adamu (2009) 
examined the relationship between financial development and economic growth in Sierra 
Leone for the period 1970–2008. Their results corroborate the finance–led growth hypothesis 
in Sierra Leone with financial development exerting a significant positive growth effect. 
More importantly the authors show that investment is an important conduit through which 
financial development affects economic growth.  
“Is finance a leading sector in economic development, or does it simply follow growth in real 
output which is generated elsewhere?” McKinnon (1988: 390). Empirical literature on 
finance–growth causality remains mixed. Some studies (Ghirmay, 2004; Christopoulos and 
Tsionas, 2004) find support for the supply–leading hypothesis while Odhiambo (2004) finds 
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that sustained increase in economic activities spur demand for improved financial services 
and that economic growth actually causes financial development in uni–directional order – a 
finding consistent with the “demand–following” hypothesis. Others (Blackburn and Hung, 
1998; Luintel and Khan, 1999; Khan, 2001) have found evidence of bi–directional causality 
of finance and growth. Recent findings from Hassan et al.,‟s (2011) panel study of low and 
middle income countries resolves the conflicting causality in the literature by showing that 
the direction of causality is region–specific. The authors find a bi–directional causality 
between finance and growth in all regions except for SSA and East Asia and the Pacific 
region. Hassan et al., (2011) further found a uni–directional causality running from growth to 
finance in the two poorest regions in their sample (SSA and South Asia) suggesting that in 
developing countries, growth leads finance on account of the high demand for financial 
services. These findings are consistent with Patrick‟s (1966) stage of development 
hypothesis. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Atindehou et al. (2005) found no causality in any 
direction suggesting that financial development and growth are completely independent. 
 
On the (non)linearity nexus between finance and growth, Deidda and Fattouh (2002) 
employed the threshold regression model to King and Levine‟s (1993a) data and found 
evidence of non–linear relationship. Some studies (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Shen and 
Lee, 2006; Law and Singh, 2014) have found an inverted U–shaped relationship implying 
that financial development is only good up to a point after which it becomes deleterious. 
However, Samargandi et al. (2015) show that such an inverted U–shaped relationship is only 
evident in the long run and not in the short run. Even the turning point for the reversed effect 
is far from being conclusive. For instance, Law and Singh (2014) suggest that financial 
development is growth–enhancing but not when private credit exceeds 88% of GDP 
compared to 90% in Cecchetti and Kharroubi‟s (2012), and 110% in Arcand et al.‟s (2012), 
25 
 
study. This notwithstanding, Samargandi et al. (2015) found that the threshold point is 
generally lower in middle income countries.  
 
Adeniyi et al. (2015) recently investigated the non–linearities in the relationship using 
Nigeria as a case study by including a square term of financial development in their 
autoregressive distributed lag growth model. Contrary to Cecchetti and Kharoubi‟s (2012) 
findings, Adeniyi et al. (2015) found a U–shaped relationship suggesting that financial 
development decreases growth up to a certain threshold above which growth increases with 
increasing financial development. Favara (2003) finds an S–shaped relationship between 
financial deepening and economic growth and concludes that at very low (high) levels of 
financial development, growth suffers (improves). Aghion et al. (2005) contends that the 
reason for the non–linearity of the finance–growth relationship might be that financial 
development helps catch up to the productivity frontier, but has limited or no growth effect 
for countries that are close or already at the frontier. 
 
2.4 Does the relative speed of growth in finance and real sector matter? 
The plethora of theoretical and empirical literature posits that the financial sector provides 
valuable and essential services to the real sector and economic growth more generally partly 
on account of its ability to allocate resources more efficiently. We explore the potential 
deleterious effect on growth when the speed of growth in finance and real sector is 
disproportionate and posit that such negative growth effect emanate from both investment 
and inflation channels. 
 
 
Indeed, during the growth process, improvement in the financial sector benefits real sector 
activities as this alleviates firms‟ binding financing constraint thus enhancing their access to 
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external credit to finance productive investments necessary for stimulating long run growth. 
The risk is that once firms are no longer financially constrained, further increases in credit 
become unwarranted as bad projects get funded and some credit may even be channeled to 
support excessive consumption culminating in higher inflation. Acharya and Naqvi (2012) 
note that given excess liquidity, financial institutions are more probable to extend credit to 
bad risks or under–pricing credit risk firms. Thus, beyond the solvent needs of firms, 
increases in finance is associated with little or no significant increases in real economic 
activity, deteriorates credit quality and making the financial sector more prone to solvency 
and systemic instability. To the extent that lending supports consumption, growth in private 
sector credit can potentially over–stimulate aggregate demand beyond output–consistent level 
thus causing economic overheating and inflation (IMF, 2014). We infer that financial 
development can potentially decrease economic growth when the relative speed of growth in 
finance and real sector is unbalanced and we proceed to formally demonstrate this. 
 
 
We build on the    model to capture the dynamic relationship between growth and financial 
development by introducing a two–sector – financial and real – model economy. Each sector 
has different factor proportions and combining with capital deepening leads to unbalanced 
economic growth. Assume the two sectors exhibit constant returns to scale production 
function and (non)arbitrary preferences over the goods produced in each sector. Both sectors 
employ a common capital   and labour  . Assume the process of   and   , ( )  ( )-   
  are 
taken as given and   is supplied inelastically. We let the final output be represented by   with 
the assumption that it is produced as an aggregate of the output of the financial and real 
sector respectively denoted as    and   . Thus,  
 ( )   (  ( )   ( ))        (2.1) 
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With sectoral production functions of the financial and real sectors respectively represented 
in equations (2.2) and (2.3): 
 
  ( )    ( )  ( )  ( )           (2.2) 
  ( )    ( )  ( )  ( )           (2.3) 
 
where   ( ) and   ( ) are the labour and capital employed in   = financial ( ) and real ( ) 
sectors while Harrold–neutral technology terms   ( )  is asymptotic following Acemoglu 
(2009). Therefore, the market clearing   and   are: 
 ( )    ( )    ( )                                    (2.4) 
 ( )    ( )    ( )                                    (2.5) 
By taking the final good as the numeraire in each period and denoting the prices of    and    
by    and   , wage and interest rate (rental rate of capital) by   and   respectively. Hence, 
under competitive product and factor markets, prices must satisfy equations (2.6) to (2.8) 
below: 
   ( )
   ( )
 
  (  ( )   ( ))    
  (  ( )   ( ))    
                                                                        (   ) 
 ( )  
   ( )(  ( )  ( ))
   
 
   ( )(  ( )  ( ))
   
                                  (   ) 
 ( )  
   ( )(  ( )  ( ))
   
 
   ( )(  ( )  ( ))
   
                                  (   ) 
We now respectively denote the capital share of the financial and real sectors as: 
   
 ( )  ( )
  ( )  ( )
                                                                                                  (   ) 
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 ( )  ( )
  ( )  ( )
                                                                                                (    ) 
 
Assume both sectors share a common technology that evolve exogenously according to the 
differential equations 
 ̇ ( )
  ( )
             with initial   ( )   . Technological progress at 
time t is balanced if  
 ̇ ( )
  ( )
 
 ̇ ( )
  ( )
. Similarly, the capital share is balanced if   ( )    ( ). 
We again assume that there is capital deepening and the real sector is relatively more capital–
intensive,   ( )    ( )  If   and   are allocated to the two sectors at constant proportions 
overtime, the real sector will growth disproportionately faster than the financial sector thus 
increasing demand for financial sector output. In equilibrium, real sector growth would force 
changes in equilibrium prices and a reduction in relative price of real sector output will drive 
reallocation of   and   to the financial sector. Indeed, this reallocation may not totally offset 
the higher increase in   .  
We respectively and explicitly specify the production functions for the financial and real 
sectors as: 
  ( )     ( )                        (2.11) 
  ( )   (   ) ( )                       (2.12) 
while final output is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator of the outputs of 
the two sectors: 
 ( )  [   ( )
   
  (   )  ( )
   
 ]
 
   
    (2.13) 
where    ,   ) is the elasticity of substitution between these two inputs in the production 
of the final good while   is the distribution parameter. Thus, equations (2.11) and (2.12) are 
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the sectoral production functions with the assumption that the two sectors share a common 
technology and   is the share of the economy‟s capital stock (which by assumption we define 
to broadly include human capital) used in the financial sector while the remaining share 
    is used in the real sector.     
 
 
If    ( )  1, then the outputs of the financial and real sectors are gross complements 
(substitutes) in the production of the final good. In the spirit of this study, we assume that 
    since the part of    is also used in the production of   . By taking the logs of equation 
(2.13) and differentiating with respect to time yields the aggregate growth rate in equation 
(2.14) below: 
 
 ( )  
   ( )
   
   ( )  (   )  ( )
   
   ( )
   ( )
   
  (   )  ( )
   
 
                                             (    ) 
 
We introduce the growth rates for   and sectoral growth rates as 
 ̇  ( )
  ( )
   ( ); 
  ̇ ( )
  ( )
   ( ) 
and 
 ̇( )
 ( )
  ( ) . For a balanced growth,   ( )    ( ) . We define their corresponding 
asymptotic growth rates as   
          ( ) and in a more explicit form   
          ( ) 
and   
 ( )          ( ).  
 
The question is whether resource allocation towards the real sector can spur growth in the rest 
of the economy and whether fast growing financial sector hurts economic growth through its 
impact on the real economy. The balanced growth path contends that all sectors should grow 
at constant rate. Lewis (1955: 276) advocates for balanced growth in the sense that “the 
various sectors of the economy must grow in the right relationship to each other, or they 
cannot grow at all”. Arguably, the process of economic development can become self–
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sustaining, self–reinforcing and cumulative only if this process is coordinated, integrated and 
balanced growth takes place in all the inter–related sectors of the economic system (Bhatt, 
1960). Thus, both the financial and the real sector should grow at the same speed in order for 
the latter to positively impact on economic growth. 
 
 
Thus, in our model, financial sector development causes economic growth which is consistent 
with the supply–leading hypothesis and follows directly from Schumpeter‟s (1911) assertion 
that credit to the real sector is the primary force driving economic growth and development. 
If we begin from a rather simplifying assumption that only credit to the real sector leads to 
economic growth and if financial market supports real sector development, credit to the real 
sector will spur growth. 
 
 
Given the constant proportion of each element and for a balanced growth, the ratio of   ( ) 
and   ( ) must be unit. If   ( )    ( ), the overall growth rate  ( )  falls through the 
effect on productivity of real sector in the aggregate production function stemming from 
excess finance. However, when   ( ) <   ( ), there would be increasing competition for 
financial resources hence a decrease in inefficient and riskier projects that get funded. The 
overall effect is that  ( )  increases. The conclusion here is that to ensure such positive 
growth effect, lending must support the real economy so that credit and real GDP grow in 
tandem, with a non–accelerating share of domestic credit to real sector and to GDP. 
 
 
To allocate resources efficiently and prevent macroeconomic and financial instability, the real 
sector should grow sufficiently enough to maintain the demand of financial resources 
supplied by the fast–growth financial sector. With this, the real sector would be able to 
finance profitable investment projects and attract and maintain efficient human resources. 
Thus, in this study, we hypothesize that financial development damages growth if the growth 
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in finance and real sector output is disproportionate. In other words, the threshold effect of 
financial development on growth depends on the relative speed of growth in finance and real 
sector. The next section clearly describes the empirical strategy employed in testing this 
hypothesis. 
 
2.5 Data and methodology 
2.5.1 Data 
To test our hypothesis, we construct a panel dataset of 29 SSA countries for the period 1980–
2014. The choice of these countries is based entirely on data availability for a sufficiently 
longer time period and a list of these countries is provided in Appendix 1. Annual data for all 
the variables were gleaned from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World 
Bank. We used credit provided by financial sector to the private sector as percentage of GDP 
to proxy the quality of financial development. Relative to the quantity–based measure, the 
private credit measures the value of credit advanced by banks and other financial 
intermediaries to the private sector as a share of GDP and disentangles credit to the private 
sector relative to credit issued to governments, government agencies, and public enterprises. 
Furthermore, it excludes credit issued by Central Banks. The financial credit on financial 
deposits as well as bank credit on bank deposits measure how financial institutions 
effectively transform mobilized deposits into credit. A high ratio of domestic credit to GDP 
indicates both higher domestic investment and higher development of the financial system.  
  
Indeed, SSA countries have comparative advantage in agriculture emanating from their 
abundant factor endowments, productivity and costs differences and from dynamic 
economies of scale (Collier and Venables, 2007; Eifert et al., 2005; Wood and Mayer 2001). 
It is therefore unsurprising that many agriculture–based countries have high agricultural 
shares in GDP and employment averaging 34% and 64% respectively (Hayami, 2005). Yet, 
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agriculture creates special challenges for financial institutions due to its spatial and risk 
characteristics (Meyer, 2011).  
 
Mhlanga (2010) notes that, the overwhelming failure of financial institutions combined with 
scant penetration by risk–averse commercial financial institutions have led to a widespread 
dearth of agricultural credit. Reflected in their efforts to track the progress of economic 
activities, Central Banks in many countries compile annual statistical bulletins, which contain 
information on commercial banks‟ lending to major real sectors of their economies. Relying 
on data from the Central Banks‟ bulletin, Mhlanga (2010) shows credit share to the various 
sectors in some selected SSA countries. With the exception of Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda, 
commercial banks in SSA lend less than 10% of their total credit to the agricultural sector. 
The case of Botswana is dire. On average, commercial banks in Botswana invest the least 
share of their credit into the agricultural sector where credit advance to the sector has never 
exceeded 1.5% of total credit. However, manufacturing and industrial sectors are seen as a 
sound destination for bank lending because they are insulated from the inherent challenges 
faced by the agriculture sector.  We therefore limit our attention to the manufacturing sector 
not only because they receive majority of the banks‟ credit relative to other sectors, but 
because they are now the backbone of economies‟ growth. Following from this, the 
development of the real sector is therefore proxied by growth in industrial sector value added 
which comprises value additions in manufacturing, mining, construction, electricity, water 
and gas where the value added is the output of the sector when all outputs are summed up and 
intermediate inputs subtracted. 
 
We define excess finance to refer to a situation where certain aspects of the financial system 
outstrip real sector activity. On hindsight, the idea of excess finance may suggest that SSA 
has reached its optimal level of finance which may of course be misleading given the 
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underdeveloped nature of the financial systems. As a caveat, excess finance does not refer to 
access to finance over and above the optimal level. In line with standard literature, we used 
real GDP per capita to proxy economic growth. Both GDP per capita and growth rate of real 
sector output are in real terms based on 2005 US$ constant prices. Our control variables are 
based on the standard neoclassical growth theory and include inflation, investment rate, 
government expenditure, labour and trade openness. The inflation variable is the annual 
percentage change in the consumer price index and used to proxy macroeconomic 
(in)stability. This is expected to negatively impact on growth. We use gross fixed capital 
formation as a percentage of GDP to proxy investment rates and this is expected to positively 
influence economic growth. Government expenditure expressed as a percentage of GDP 
measures final government consumption expenditure and used to measure government size. 
Labour is proxied by the percentage of economically active population aged 15 to 64 years. 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 2.2 below. 
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Std. dev 
Coeffici
ent of 
Variati
on 
25
th
 
PCT 
50
th
 
PCT 
75
th
 
PCT 
Skewnes
s 
Kurtosis 
Correlati
on 
Coefficie
nt 
Real GDP per 
capita 
1,241.27 1,804.98 1.45 321.79 479.23 973.88 2.36 7.65 –0.54 
[0.02]** 
Government 
expenditure 
14.88 6.31 0.42 10.64 13.79 17.52 1.57 7.15 –0.07** 
[0.03] 
Inflation 56.23 36.63 0.65 27.56 52.93 84.06 0.30 2.60 –0.31 
[0.04]** 
Trade 
openness 
71.15 36.48 0.51 44.86 61.09 89.22 1.10 3.83 –0.27*** 
[0.00] 
Labour 52.83 4.65 0.09 50.55 52.04 53.89 –1.24 30.73 0.25*** 
[0.00] 
Capital 
formation 
19.69 9.65 0.49 13.56 18.61 23.64 1.59 8.25 –0.17*** 
[0.00] 
Domestic 
credit 
25.60 29.66 1.16 12.04 19.57 33.52 2.39 13.48 0.91*** 
[0.00] 
Excess 
finance1 
0.23 33.85 147.17 -12.82 –1.06 12.67 0.82 8.70 1.00 
Private credit 19.52 21.72 1.11 8.77 14.61 22.72 3.78 19.68 0.59* 
[0.06] 
Excess 
finance2 
0.14 24.49 174.93 -16.93 -6.47 12.58 1.79 11.07 –0.42** 
[0.00] 
Real output 
growth 
25.37 13.83 0.55 15.99 22.03 32.03 0.94 4.29 –0.49*** 
[0.00] 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Excess finance1 is the average difference 
between growth rate in domestic credit and that of real sector output while excess finance2 is the average difference 
between growth rate in private credit and that of real sector output. The correlation coefficient of private credit is its 
correlation with real GDP per capita.  Similarly, the correlation coefficient of excess finance2 is its correlation with real 
GDP per capita. We do not report how excess finance2 and private credit correlate with the remaining variables because 
of space but they do not significantly differ from that of excess finance1. 
 
 
All the variables are averaged across the period 1980–2014 and presented in percentages. 
Average real GDP per capita over the sample is $1,241.27 reiterating the low income levels 
of the countries under consideration. In the case of income per capita, we interpret the large 
standard deviation as marked cross–country income differences within the sub–region. 
Domestic credit to GDP ratio is averaged 25.6% relative to real output which is averaged 
25.37% over the sample period. Government expenditure as a proportion of GDP is also 
averaged 14.88% and does not show substantial differences across the countries. We compute 
the coefficient of variation (CV) as the ratio of standard deviation to mean in order to 
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measure the relative dispersion of the variables. Excess finance is the most volatile variable 
given the high values of CV. Real GDP per capita is also exceedingly volatile and labour is 
least volatile. However, among the conditioning variables, inflation is the most volatile with 
an average value of 56.23% which is fairly higher than the median value (52.93%). This 
evidence reflects that majority of our sampled countries experienced episodes of 
hyperinflation over the period under consideration.
2
 All the variables are skewed to the right 
except the labour. While our sampled countries are gleaned from the same region, there still 
exist some variations in the macroeconomic indicators. We therefore present the values for 
the 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles to allow for cross–country comparisons. The average 
difference between growth in real sector and that of the financial sector is around 0.23% 
which is significantly higher than the 50
th
 percentile (–1.06) suggesting that excess finance is 
highly skewed to the right. This is also collaborated by the sign of the skewness. Thus, for 
most of the countries, growth in financial sector significantly outstrips that of the real sector 
of the economy. Among others, the value of the skewness and kurtosis of real GDP per 
capita, domestic credit and excess credit show non–normality and the distributions are 
leptokurtic. We present the correlation coefficient between excess finance and each variable 
in order to provide a cursory look at their relationships. Excess finance is positively 
correlated with labour and domestic credit. While it is strongly and significantly related to 
domestic credit, excess finance is negatively and significantly related with economic growth, 
capital formation and inflation. We present a scatter plot of financial development and 
economic growth in Figure 2.2 below.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 Given the mean inflation rate, 15 countries experienced rates below 56% while the remaining 14 exceeded the 
average. 
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Figure 2.2:  Financial development and economic growth (1980–2014) 
Source: Authors‟ construct using WDI. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates a plot of economic growth and financial development averaged 1980–
2014 with one observation of growth and financial development for each country. While 
financial development is relatively homogenous for most of the countries, some outliers are 
noticeable. For instance, Botswana recorded the highest GDP growth rate on the back of a 
lower financial development. South Africa on the other hand has the highest financial 
development with a relatively lower growth rate. This notwithstanding, the nexus between 
financial development and economic growth looks non–linear, largely positive for low and 
intermediate levels of financial development and negative for high levels. Given this 
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understanding, it is instructive to note that the rather non–linear relationship and inverted U–
shaped in particular may largely be driven by excess finance through the financial sector 
credit boom which interacts with real sector and economic growth more generally. In order to 
provide cursory evidence on the interrelationship between financial sector development, real 
sector and economic growth, we qualitatively identify patterns of credit expansion by the 
financial sector in order to examine the hypertrophy of finance. And as argued by Barajas et 
al., (2010), credit booms need to be recognized as definite events separate from the normal 
increments in the volume of credit. 
 
2.5.2 Identifying episodes of credit boom 
 
SSA‟s credit expansion has not been unusually buoyant by international comparison. This 
notwithstanding, most SSA countries have experienced a decade–long rapid increase in 
private credit. IMF (2015) notes that real credit to the private sector grew fivefold over the 
period 2003–2014 with an average annual progression of 16% culminating in doubling the 
region‟s credit–to–GDP ratio. To some extent, the rising credit growth to GDP ratios is 
indicative of financial deepening but increases in credit above stylized trends have also been 
identified as an important early warning indicator of banking crises (Drehmann and Juselius 
2013). In this section, we determine episodes of credit boom albeit some caveats. We refer to 
credit boom to denote unusually faster pace of credit growth to the private sector by the 
financial system relative to the typical cyclical expansion. Although the region‟s financial 
development is low compared to other emerging economies but in relation to its real growth, 
it is high for SSA‟s level of development. 
 
Indeed, what constitutes rapid credit growth deviation and how the “normal” growth trend 
should be determined are both contested and subject to several interpretations (Gourinchas et 
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al., 2001; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; Mitra et al., 2011: Claessens et al., 2012). Following 
Decressin and Terrones (2011), we express the credit growth in logarithmic form and 
conditions that, a country experiences a credit boom when the deviation in (log) domestic 
credit from its long run trend exceeds the standard deviation of the cyclical component. We 
respectively denote the deviation from long run path in country i at time t and the 
corresponding standard deviation as     and  (  ). We provide a more robust estimate of the 
credit trend by employing the Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter – originally introduced by 
Hodrick and Prescott (1980) – which allows for the identification of credit boom incidence.3 
The filter includes a parameter,   which determines the smoothness of private credit series 
and identifies the trend series    that minimizes the sum for a given value of   specified as: 
 
   
*  +   
 
[(∑(     )
   ∑((       )
   
   
 
   
 (       ))
 ]                          (    )         
 
 
Typical of annual time series data, we set the smoothing parameter       in line with 
Mendoza and Terrones (2012). By applying the boom threshold factor, we further define a 
credit boom as an episode where the country has at least one contiguous date that satisfies the 
credit boom condition       (  ), where   is the boom threshold factor. Following from 
Mendoza and Terrones (2008; 2012), we set the baseline value of   at 1.65 because 
Prob (      (  )       satisfies the 5% tail of the standardized normal distribution 
(Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; 2012). 
 
                                                          
3
 Indeed, the HP filter provides reasonable and elegant way of detrending a range of commonly encountered 
economic time series. This notwithstanding, the HP approach has recently come under attack (see Hamilton, 
2017). 
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We identify those countries where credit has grown much faster than the cyclical trend over 
the last decades. In this study, we identify credit boom as deviations from the domestic credit 
trend that exceed the typical cyclical expansion by a threshold factor of 1.65. We set the date 
of the peak of the credit boom (  
 ) at a point where the value of       (  ) is highest 
among the set of contiguous dates that satisfy the credit boom condition. Some studies (see 
for instance Gourinchas et. al., 2001) relied on ad hoc threshold factor to identify boom 
episodes. However, apart from its likelihood to potentially exclude a large number of 
countries, the use of this approach is not instructive because rapid credit growth in financially 
underdeveloped countries is largely driven by financial deepening. Besides, thresholds for the 
credit–to–GDP are often hard to determine let alone interpret (Dell‟Ariccia et. al., 2012). 
 
By relying on the credit–to–GDP ratio rather than credit itself, our approach relates credit 
developments to the size of the economy and accounts for the pro–cyclical nature of credit. 
Thus, our methodology inextricably links the financial and real sectors of the economy. 
Admittedly, our use of aggregate measure however captures only bank–based credit to the 
private sector. Indeed, while non–bank financial institutions constitute an appreciable 
proportion of the financial system thus advancing some amount of credit to the private sector 
in SSA, rapid credit growth emanating from non–bank financial institutions may be 
overlooked. We present findings on the credit boom incidence in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.3 
below.  
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Figure 2.3: Country–by–country credit boom incidence 
Source: Author‟s construct 
 
 
From the Figure above, it is clear that seven countries do not record a credit boom over the 
period and such countries are seen to have sound regulatory supervisions. For instance, 
although the country has seen rapid growth and development of its banking market over the 
last decade, Mozambique is not episodic largely because the Central Bank oversees an active 
interbank money market and open market operation. Bank supervision also imposes strict 
impairment recognition rules and has rules for large credit exposures. Country–by–country 
analysis reveals that out of the 29 countries, more than two–thirds experienced at least one 
episode of credit boom. 
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Gambia alone recorded three episodes of credit boom. At the peak of its boom in 1985, the 
average expansion in private credit reached 11% above the domestic credit trend.
4
 Credit 
growth rate was on the crescendo against the slow pace of financial sector growth and real 
sector need. In fact, the 1985 boom peak is unsurprising. Evidence provided by the Central 
Bank of the Gambia shows that the main aim of Gambia‟s Economic Recovery Programme 
(ERP) in August 1985 was to bring discipline and equilibrate the economy‟s financial sector. 
Specifically, the ERP was primarily directed at regaining control of liquidity and excessive 
credit expansion by the banking system.
5
 With no minimal capital requirement for entry, 
Gambia‟s banking system has been inefficient resulting from the heavy regulatory 
framework, the oligopolistic market structure and the small banking market (Agu, 2014). 
 
Botswana and Cote d‟Ivoire show homogeneity both in terms of incidence and time of peak.  
For instance, both countries experienced boom in 1992 and 1993 with peak period in 1992. 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone each experienced 1 boom over the period and both incidences 
occurred in 1994. Same can be observed for Togo and Democratic Republic of Congo. 
However, the recent episode in the sub–region occurred in Central African Republic in 2013 
and this had a magnitude of 2% above the credit trend.  
 
South Africa has a relatively developed financial sector. In the early 1990s the banking sector 
volatility created scope for consolidation through the mergers of several banks and the 
introduction of the Banks Act (94 of 1990) led to an industry growth spurt with a number of 
new banking licenses being issued paving way for new entrants into the domestic banking 
system (Matemilola et. al., 2015). Consequently, the banking sector became more 
                                                          
4
 For countries with multiple episodes, we show only the peak incidence (   
 ) from among the multiple 
contiguous dates that satisfy the credit boom condition. See Appendix for the rest of the boom periods. We do 
not report the magnitude of the boom but these ranges from 1 to 11% above the cyclical component of the 
domestic credit in each episodic country. 
5
 See http://www.sesrtcic.org/files/article/30.pdf 
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competitive. It is therefore unsurprising that the country experienced a boom in 2001. Rapid 
expansion in unsecured lending is an important development in the South African banking 
industry and considered to be the second–biggest weakness of the banking industry (PwC, 
2013). 
 
IMF (2015) defines credit boom by relying on an ad hoc threshold of a 20% point increase in 
credit–to–GDP ratio in a single year and proceed to identify episodic countries in SSA. It 
identifies 24 countries that have experienced at least one credit boom episode. Our findings 
are consistent with IMF (2015) where among others countries like Central African Republic, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone and Togo are episodic. IMF (2015) further shows that the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Ghana and Lesotho are among the 7 countries where credit expansions have exceeded 
the region‟s average. The case of Ghana is interesting. Growth rate in gross loans and 
advances increased from 17.5% in September 2006 to 45.6% in September 2007. During the 
same period, real private sector growth and household credit respectively increased from 
17.3% to 51.7% and 7.6% to 66.6% (Bank of Ghana, 2015). 
 
Table 2.3: Credit boom incidence 
Descriptor 
No 
credit 
boom 
Credit boom episodes 
Total 
1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2009 2010–2014 
Number of 
incidence 
7 6 18 9 1 34 
Percentage of 
incidence 
– 18% 53% 26% 3% 100% 
 
 
Overall, our study results reveal 34 credit boom episodes over the entire period. The 
frequency of episodes increased from 18% in the 1980s to 53% in the 1990s (see Table 2.3). 
Majority of the episodes in the 1990s occurred in the early and late 1990s and these periods 
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also saw reductions in value additions of the real sector and economic growth (see Figure 
2.1). Majority of the credit booms tend to be synchronized regionally and centered on the 
reforms period that saw massive restructuring of the financial sectors in the 1980s and 1990s. 
This finding is akin to Dell‟Ariccia et al., (2012). The authors study reveals that the 
proportion of countries experiencing a credit boom at any given time has seen a rapid credit 
growth in response to the financial liberalization and deregulation of the 1980s. In particular, 
a third of the booms either follows or coincides with financial liberalizations. There is also 
evidence that financial reforms are predictors of credit boom. Decressin and Terrones (2011) 
found that financial sector reforms – usually aim to foster financial deepening – are linked to 
sharp increases in credit growth and has between 59 to 69% likelihood of triggering credit 
boom. 
 
More booms occur in relatively underdeveloped financial systems as observed in SSA partly 
reflecting the regions‟ country composition and historically volatile macroeconomic 
dynamics (Dell‟Ariccia et al., 2012). While credit is essential for investment, innovation and 
economic growth, the current narrow financial and real sectors have highlighted the risks of 
lending booms‟ excessive indebtedness of firms and effect on economic growth in the sub-
region. Economists have since recognized that financial sector conditions and dynamics in 
the private sector could have a compelling effect on real sector and macroeconomic outcomes 
more generally. Rapid credit growth on the back of weak real sector and poor supervision 
increases probability of default, and in turn higher costs of external financing (Kiyotaki and 
Moore, 1997). 
 
Taking Ghana as a case, the recent 2015 Financial Stability Report of the Bank of Ghana 
reveals that non–performing loans (NPLs) of the banking industry increased from 12.1% in 
September 2014 to 13.5% in September 2015. Private sector credit contributed 97.4% of the 
44 
 
total banking sector‟s NPLs as at September 2015 compared with 93.1% in September 2014. 
In fact, the highly disproportionate level of NPLs associated with the private enterprises was 
driven mainly by indigenous enterprises. Although these enterprises received about 61% of 
credit to the private enterprises, they accounted for 79.1% of NPLs as at September 2015.
6
 
The likely effect is that the rising NPLs on banks‟ balance sheet can potential trigger bank 
insolvency. Evidence from Ghana reveals a severe downturn of the financial sector due to the 
slump of the real sector of the economy which stifled creativity and sustained finance along 
the entire value chain. And as noted by Bernanke and Gertler (1995), rising corporate 
leverage could induce severe slow–downs by amplifying and propagating adverse shocks to 
the real economy. The end result is lower investment, cash flow and overall output. Across 
the entire region, a significant proportion of the credit boom episodes are associated with an 
expansion of domestic credit beyond the trend with an attendant knock–on effect on real 
sector.  
 
There is evidence that leverage at the firm level sharply increases during episodes of credit 
boom (Mendoza and Terrones, 2008). Overleveraged firms tend to focus on generating 
adequate cash flow to service their debts rather than pursuing continued productivity growth. 
Markedly, the episodes of credit boom in the 1980s culminated in a reduction of growth rates 
from 1.91% in 1985–1989 to 0.64% in 1990–1994. Also, economic growth decreased from 
4.89% (2000–2004) to 4.41% in 2010–2014 in the face of credit boom. At the same time, 
firms and households with excessive debts may also be more susceptible to unexpected 
adverse demand shocks and are therefore more probable to fall into financial distress 
following a shock. In South Africa for instance, while household loans account for 44% of 
bank lending, rapid growth in private sector credit between 2003 and 2006 boosted household 
                                                          
6
 At the same time, indicators of profitability for the banking industry deteriorated in banks‟ earnings 
performance for the period ended September 2015. The industry net interest income, returns on assets and 
equity significantly declined. See Bank of Ghana (2015). 
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debt to 83% of income in 2008. Subsequently, the African Bank was placed under curatorship 
after recording losses from unsecured lending (IMF, 2014b).  
 
While a significant proportion of the boom episodes occurred before the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis, among the incidence that happened in the 2000s, 60% occurred prior to the 
crisis thus providing some circumstantial evidence of boom–crisis–growth nexus. This 
evidence is unsurprising because credit booms are often cited as the culprit of financial crises 
(Eichengreen and Arteta, 2002). Our evidence suggests that while domestic credit 
significantly increased in periods prior to the crisis, industrial sector output of the economy 
slowed from 6.7% in 2003 to 3.7% in 2006 with a concomitant reduction in growth rate (see 
Figure 2.1). Coricelli et al., (2010) note that while moderate levels of debt permits the 
financing of new technologies or capacity of real sector with the potential of stimulating 
economic growth, excessive credit growth and debts adversely affects growth by damaging 
total factor productivity. This blueprint provides some qualitative evidence on the 
relationship between financial development, real sector output and economic growth. 
Anecdotally, this nexus suggests that the reduction in growth rates may be the resultant effect 
of the unbalanced growth in the financial sector development and that of the real sector. In 
the next section, we outline the empirical strategy in examining the unbalanced growth 
effects without explicitly modeling domestic credit boom episodes as these are intrinsic to the 
financial sector. 
 
 
2.5.3 Empirical strategy 
 
Empirically, regression models are used to study the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. Following this, we specify equation (2.16) below where 
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economic growth depends on the level of financial development and other conditioning 
variables. 
     (            )                           (2.16) 
 
where     is log of income per capita of country i at time t;       is financial development; 
    is a vector of control variables;     is the error term while t and i are time and country 
indices respectively. 
To examine the effect of financial development on growth, we set out a baseline model where 
economic growth depends on its one period lag to check countries‟ conditional convergence 
effect, financial development and the set of controls estimated in equation (2.17) below; 
                     (           )                          (2.17) 
 
where       is the growth lag representing the initial conditions thus testing for the 
convergence effect as espoused by the neoclassical growth model;       and       
respectively denote the growth rate in finance and real sector output;    is the country–
specific fixed effects;    is the time effects while     is the idiosyncratic error term. The 
remaining variables are as previously defined. 
 
In this study, we estimate equation (2.17) above by employing the system generalized 
methods of moments (GMM) dynamic pooled estimator. Unlike the traditional cointegration 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques, this approach resolves the econometric 
problems inspired by endogeneity of the lagged dependent (     ) and the unobserved 
country–specific effects eminent in growth models. Our main parameter of interest is    
which measures the effect of excess finance on growth and forms the basis of our hypothesis. 
We investigate the channels through which excess finance affects economic growth by 
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including a multiplicative interaction term of the difference between growth in finance and 
that of real sector output and investment and household consumption. From equation (2.17), 
we specify our general system GMM framework as: 
    ∑                  (           )    (            )                      (    )
   
 
                     
                
 
where   is the vector of parameters associated with each explanatory variable;   is the 
maximum lag in the model;       is excess finance while        is the vector of transmission 
channels. The other variables remain as previously defined. 
 
In order for the equation to be estimable, there is a restriction on the serial correlation of the 
error term which requires it to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. This condition 
has both economic and statistical meaning. Economically, it means that the instrumental 
variables only affect growth through their effect on the explanatory variables. Statistically, 
the condition means that our set of explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. In other 
words, they can be affected by current and past realizations of GDP per capita – our proxy for 
economic growth – but must be uncorrelated with the future realizations of the error term. 
Thus, from equation (2.18), we write an arbitrary time period T for a random country i as: 
                                                                                                        (    ) 
 
where   is a vector of   ‟s,   ‟s and  ‟s;    is a vector containing the initial conditions and 
all the explanatory variables ( ‟s) while    is a T × 1 vectors of unity. 
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By employing the dynamic pooled panel, we compute the linear GMM estimators of   with a 
general form equation specified in equation (2.20) below: 
 ̂  [(∑  
  
  
 
)  (∑   
 
 
)]
  
(∑  
  
  
 
)  (∑  
 
  
 
 
)                            (    ) 
        (∑  
 
  
 
  )
  
                                                                               
 
  
  and   
  are transformations of    and    respectively;    is a matrix of instrumental 
variables while    is the country–specific weighting matrix. 
 
Whereas the traditional cross–sectional estimators follow directly from traditional growth 
studies, our panel estimator makes use of the pooled cross–country and time series properties 
while utilizing additional information provided by the variations in the level of economic 
growth and its intrinsic drivers. Thus, the added information from this property by far 
provides more precision in the estimations as well as correcting for biases beset with existing 
studies on the finance–growth nexus. Following from this approach, equation (2.17) can be 
estimated using the first difference or system GMM and consequently, from equation (2.17), 
we rewrite the economic growth model as: 
                                                                                                       (    ) 
 
Since the unobserved country–specific (  ) effect contained in     may be correlated with 
other explanatory variables, we first difference equation (2.21) to eliminate this effect thus 
giving equation (2.22) below: 
        (    )    (    )  (    )                                                                            (    ) 
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By assuming uncorrelated error terms and weak exogeneity property of the explanatory 
variables, for our GMM dynamic panel estimations, we use the following moment conditions: 
 ,     (    )-     for s ≥ 2, t = 3, ……., T     (2.23) 
 ,     (    )-     for s ≥ 2, t = 3, ……., T                 (2.24) 
 
However, using the first difference GMM is not without weaknesses. For instance, Blundell 
and Bond (1998) argue that this form of GMM estimation has very poor finite properties both 
in terms of bias and precision especially when the explanatory variables are persistent 
overtime as their lagged values are weak instruments and predictors of endogenous changes. 
Thus, the appropriate technique capable of yielding consistent and unbiased estimates is the 
system GMM which rests on the combination of the system regression in differences with the 
regression in levels (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Blundell and 
Bond (1998) further show that the system GMM is superior to the first difference GMM 
estimator in that the instruments in the levels equation remain good predictions for the 
endogenous variables even in the presence of highly persistent variables like inflation and 
output. To permit the workings of the system GMM, Blundell and Bond (1998) propose the 
use of extra moment conditions that rely on stationarity property of the variables. It is also 
imperative to note that the additional condition imposed by the system GMM may require 
deviations from long run averages to be uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This condition 
particularly holds in this study since all the countries in our sample may not show much 
variation in economic conditions given their rather low income level and hence are more 
likely to be in steady state. The additional moment conditions for the regression in levels are 
therefore given as follows: 
 ,             (      )-     for s = 1              (2.25) 
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 ,             (      )-     for s = 1              (2.26) 
 
Thus, relying on the moment conditions in equations (2.23), (2.24), (2.25) and (2.26) and 
invoking the GMM technique yield consistent and efficient estimates which are invariably 
contingent on the validity of the instruments. We address the validity of the instruments by 
using two formal tests: serial correlation test and Sargan‟s test for over–identifying 
restriction. While the serial correlation test examines the null hypothesis that the error term is 
serially uncorrelated (whether first, AR(1) or second order, AR(2)), the Sargan‟s test 
examines the exogeneity of the instruments with the null hypothesis that over–identifying 
restrictions are valid. 
 
2.6 Empirical results 
We regress economic growth on its initial real GDP per capita and other controls selected in 
line with the standard growth theory and other indicators of financial development, excess 
finance and multiplicative interaction terms measuring transmission channels of excess 
finance effects on economic growth. We include time and country effect dummies to 
eliminate time–related shocks and country–level heterogeneity in growth trajectory. We 
estimate five models by sequentially introducing the set of explanatory variables to determine 
the robustness of the regressors to model specification. Table 2.4 presents findings on the 
relationship among financial development, real sector and economic growth relying on a 
balanced panel dataset spanning 1980–2014. 
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Table 2.4: Finance, real sector growth and economic growth based on GMM 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Initial GDP per capita –1.016 (0.421)** –0.991(0.171)** –0.984(0.472)** –1.098(0.482)** –1.920(0.375)*** 
Government expenditure –0.018(0.033) –0.026(0.027) –0.014(0.033) –0.007(0.006) –0.047(0.036) 
Trade openness 0.044(0.014)*** 0.039(0.021)* 0.041(0.016)** 0.081(0.030)** 0.088(0.026)** 
Labour 0.048(0.023)** 0.013(0.064) –0.034(0.011)*** –0.068(0.025)** –0.035(0.020)* 
Capital formation 0.048(0.017)** 0.053(0.023)** 0.028(0.013)** 0.035(0.016)** 0.045(0.023)** 
Inflation –0.001(0.005) –0.003(0.025) –0.007(0.003)** –0.006(0.002)** –0.005(0.002)** 
Domestic credit 0.021(0.006)*** 0.034(0.011)*** 0.051(0.016)** 0.018(0.004)* 0.012(0.006)** 
Domestic credit squared – –0.058(0.012)*** – – – 
Excess finance – – –0.009(0.002)*** –0.007(0.002)** –0.006(0.003)** 
Industrial output – – – 0.029(0.018)* – 
Channels:      
Excess finance  Capital 
formation 
– – – – –0.020(0.010)** 
Excess finance  Inflation – – – – 0.009(0.002)* 
Diagnostics:      
Observations 986 986 986 986 986 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of countries 29 29 29 29 29 
AR(1) z – value [p–value] –2.697 [0.007] –2.742[0.006] –2.708[0.007] –2.756 [0.006] –2.860 [0.004] 
AR(2) z – value [p–value] –1.343 [0.179] –1.544[0.123] –1.367[0.172] –1.508 [0.132] –1.286 [0.198] 
Threshold value  29%    
Sagan chi-square [p-value] 27.823[0.241] 26.923[0.261] 26.568[0.275] 25.977[0.228] 24.303[0.202] 
Wald chi-square [p-value] 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. All variables are in logs. Excess finance here is the difference between growth rate in domestic credit and that of real sector 
output. The threshold value is the value after which financial development negatively affects economic growth.
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Column 1 reports the drivers of economic growth in addition to the unique effect of financial 
development on long run growth. Lagged real GDP per capita is included as an explanatory 
variable, as in the standard Barro growth model. Consistent with standard growth models, the 
coefficient of the initial growth variable is negative and significant suggesting a conditional 
convergence. The implication is that, each country in the sample is converging to its own 
steady state income per capita. This is valid irrespective of the model specification. The 
coefficient of government expenditure – our proxy for government size – is negative in all 
models suggesting that increase in size does not support economic growth. However, this 
effect is insignificant. This finding is plausible and may perhaps reflect that quality in 
government expenditure matters for economic growth relative to size. Trade openness, labour 
and capital formation positively and significantly affects growth. Consistent with Fischer 
(1993), inflation negatively affects growth. With regard to effect of financial development, 
the coefficient of domestic credit is positive reflecting that the development of financial 
sector propels long run growth. This is largely insensitive to model choice suggesting that the 
growth–enhancing effect of financial development is robust (Columns 1 to 5). This finding is 
particularly akin to a large body of literature including Levine et al.‟s (2000) and Masten et 
al. (2008). 
 
We investigate threshold effects in the finance growth–growth nexus in Column 2 by 
including the square term of domestic credit.
7
 The differencing sign of the level of domestic 
credit and its square term reveals a non–linear relationship between financial development 
and economic growth. Specifically, the inverted U–shaped nexus suggest that too much 
fimance is not healthy for growth. This finding is consistent with Cecchetti and Kharroubi 
(2012), Shen and Lee (2006) and; Law and Singh (2014) but inconsistent with Adeniyi et al. 
                                                          
7
 Using the “nl” function in Stata, we fit an arbitrary non–linear regression function by least squares and this 
produces 0.556 and 0.035 as the coefficient for the level financial development and standard error respectively.  
Similarly, the coefficient for the square term is -1.034 with a standard error of 0.074. 
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(2015). The divergence we attribute to Adeniyi et al.‟s (2015) single country–usage which is 
far from reflecting the entire region on account of their rather small sample.  
 
Given the threshold effect, what is the optimal level of financial development consistent with 
long run growth? By taking the partial derivative of the growth equation with respect to 
domestic credit and setting the result to stationary/zero, our finding reveals that the effect of 
financial development on economic growth becomes negative when domestic credit to GDP 
ratio exceeds 29%. Countries where this threshold was reached and in some cases exceeded 
over the period spanning 1980–2014 were Cote d‟Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Senegal, Sierra Leone and South Africa. By controlling for the quadratic term, the 
coefficient of level domestic credit in Column 2 increased relative to the baseline estimation 
(Column 1) on account of the addition of highly correlated square term which clearly violates 
the multicollinearity assumption. All the other variables maintain their signs and significance 
except for labour which turns insignificant. This study hypothesizes that such non–linear 
relationship is the resultant effect of the relative speed in finance and real sector growth. To 
test this hypothesis, we include the relative growth difference of domestic credit and real 
sector output – excess finance – in the model and result is presented in Column 3. The 
coefficient of domestic credit remains positive and significant at 5% while that of excess 
credit is negative and significant at 10%. In particular, a percentage rise in excess finance 
decreases economic growth by 0.9%. Confirming our hypothesis, this finding suggests that 
excess finance negatives the positive effect of other growth determinants. Further findings 
from our study suggest that when domestic credit growth outstrips real sector growth by 
0.23%, an increase in credit from the 25
th
 percentile of the distribution to the median 
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domestic credit, economic growth increases by 3.06%.
8
 However, with a balanced sectoral 
growth, economic growth is expected to increase by 3.19% when domestic credit increases 
from the 25
th
 percentile value (12.04%) to the median value (19.57%).
9
 Our evidence is also 
akin to Ductor and Grechyna (2013). By defining excess finance as the average difference 
between financial and real sector output growth under which aggregate output falls, the 
authors construct a panel data of 33 OECD countries and show that for a sustained economic 
development, simultaneous growth rates of real and financial sectors is required. 
 
Up to this stage we do not include industrial share as a regressor. We contend that changes in 
growth emanating from excess finance may be due to some changes in industrial output 
following exogenous factors not attributable to financial sector dynamics.  By controlling for 
industrial share in Column 4, the coefficients of domestic credit (excess finance) remain 
positive (negative) and significant at conventional levels although both coefficients are 
relatively lower than that of the baseline estimation (Column 3). Increases in the size of the 
industrial sector enhance economic growth given the positive coefficient of the industrial 
output. This finding is consistent with Manyika et al., (2012). They argue that higher 
industrial sector permits growth in agriculture and allows other sectors to become more 
productive, provides materials and tools to build and operate quality infrastructure and 
creates new products that open new service growth opportunities and continue to drive trade. 
Healthy real sector by far drives growth momentum of developing countries. 
 
                                                          
8
 We obtain the expected growth rate first by calculating the percentage increase from the 25
th
 percentile to the 
median value [
            
     
]      which is 62.54% and then multiplying the percentage increase by 0.051–
0.009(0.23) where 0.23 is the average excess finance. 
9
 We obtain the expected growth gains first by calculating the percentage increase from the 25
th
 percentile to the 
median value and multiplying the result by the coefficient of private credit. That is, [
            
     
]         
       . 
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In this specification, when the relative speed of growth in finance and real sector is 
proportionate, growth is expected to increase by 1.13% when credit growth increases from its 
25
th
 percentile value (12.04%) to the median value (19.57%). However, when domestic credit 
growth exceeds real sector output growth by 0.23%, economic growth is expected to rise by 
1.03%. When domestic credit growth outstrips real sector growth by 0.23%, an increase in 
real sector size from the 25
th
 percentile of the distribution (15.99%) to the median size of real 
sector (22.03%), economic growth increases by 1.02%.
10
 With a balanced sectoral growth, an 
increase in the size of real sector from the 25
th
 percentile of the distribution (15.99%) to its 
median distribution (22.03%), economic growth increases by 1.10%.
11
 
 
Our findings are particularly consistent with Ductor and Grechyna (2015) who find that the 
main channel through which financial development harms growth is unbalanced growth 
between private credit and real output. In other words, the rapid growth of financial 
development thwarts the positive impact of financial development on economic growth when 
the growth in finance is unaccompanied by development of the real sector. Our evidence 
shows that although financial development promises an unequivocal positive effect on 
growth, such growth effects is contingent on the relative speed of growth in finance and real 
sector as an unbalanced sectoral growth does not promote long run economic growth.  To the 
extent that disproportionate growth in finance and real sector negatively affects economic 
growth, a number of crucial policy insights can be gleaned from these findings. How does 
excess finance impact on economic growth in SSA? We examine the channels through with 
excess finance affects growth by including the multiplicative interactive terms of capital 
                                                          
10
 We obtain the expected growth rate first by calculating the percentage increase from the 25
th
 percentile to the 
median value [
            
     
]      which is 37.77% and then multiplying the percentage increase by 0.029–
0.009(0.23) where 0.23 and 0.029 is respectively the coefficient of size of the real sector and the average excess 
finance. 
11
 We obtain the expected growth gains first by calculating the percentage increase from the 25
th
 percentile to 
the median value and multiplying the result by the coefficient of real sector size. That is, [
            
     
]  
             . 
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formation and inflation. From Column 5, the coefficient of the interaction of excess finance 
and capital formation is negative and significant at 5%. Consistent with our hypothesis, this 
evidence suggests that excess finance drags growth by damaging investment rates where a 
percentage rise in excess finance significantly reduces growth by 2% via capital formation 
channel. The manifestation is that credit growth over and above the optimal level required by 
firms permits the financing of unproductive investments and as a consequence shifting 
resources away from efficient investments thus fueling undesired growth. Indeed, when the 
credit growth exceeds real sector demand, bad and risky investments get financed on the back 
of hypertrophic credit. This heightens both returns and growth volatility with the preeminent 
effect on overall economic growth. Thus, given the direct effect of capital formation, excess 
finance indirectly negates the growth–enhancing effect of growth owing to the build–up of 
capital. This finding is consistent with Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015). The authors note that 
by disproportionately benefitting low productivity investments, an exogeneous increase in 
financial sector growth harms total factor productivity. Our evidence also collaborates with 
Li (2006) who finds investment as an important channel through which financial market 
development affects economic growth. Beyond damaging capital formation, further results 
reveal that excess finance increases macroeconomic instability by magnifying inflation. The 
coefficient term of inflation and excess finance is 0.009 suggesting that a percentage rise in 
excess finance decreases growth by 0.9% through its effect on inflation. In terms of its 
manifestation, excess supply of credit permits higher private consumption expenditure 
(relative to investment) thereby increasing aggregate demand and general price levels. This 
finding is in synch with Barro (1995). The author finds that economic growth slows down 
due to a reduced proclivity to invest in response to rising inflation. This notwithstanding, the 
negative effect of inflation of growth is associated with cash–in–advance models where 
money is complementary to capital (Stockman, 1981).  
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Lesotho presents an interesting case worth considering.  The country has experienced rapid 
private sector credit growth in recent years. However, available evidence reveals that 
Lesotho‟s economy is characterized by a higher share of credit to the household. In fact, more 
than half of private sector credits are used to support household consumption relative to 
investment. Available figures from the Central Bank of Lesotho show that lending to 
household has been persistently increasing since 2009. Lending for household consumption 
rose from 52.3% in 2010 to 56.2% in 2011 relative to investment credit of 47.7% and 43.8% 
in the same period (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2013). The rise in household consumption 
credit coincided with increased inflation from 3.6% to 5.0%. It is therefore not surprising that 
annual GDP growth rate declined from 5.7% in 2010 to 4.2% in 2011. 
 
Friedman (1977) has long argued that higher inflation rates reallocate scarce resources to 
unproductive activities thus reducing output growth. Apart from this, faster inflation spurs 
inflation uncertainty which distorts economic efficiency thus reducing total employment. 
However, the growth–damaging effect of excess finance is stronger via capital formation 
compared to inflation. To the extent that inflation in itself drags growth and further 
heightened by excess finance, the inverted U–shaped nexus between financial development 
and economic growth can best be explained by the disproportionate rate of growth in finance 
and real sector output.  
 
With regard to models adequacy, the p–values of the Wald chi square statistic shows that all 
the models are jointly significant at 1%. Our tests for over–identifying restriction support the 
validity of the instruments used for all the models given our failure to reject the null 
hypotheses for the Sagan‟s tests. The tests for first and second order–correlation reveal the 
absence of first–order serial correlation. However, given the rather high (low) p–values (z–
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values), we fail to reject the no serial correlation of order two at conventional levels. These 
findings provide coherent and consistent estimates on the back of valid instruments.  
 
2.6.1 Sensitivity analysis 
This section provides sensitivity analysis in determining whether our results are robust to, 
first, the main financial development proxy and second the estimation approach. In this 
pursuit, we use private credit to the private sector as the main proxy for financial 
development. Unlike the private credit which includes all credit to various sectors on a gross 
basis except credit to the central government, domestic credit provided by the financial sector 
refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by financial corporations, such as 
through loans, purchases of non–equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts 
receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. This is a more broad measure of financial 
development as it includes credit provided by non–bank institutions. With regard to the 
estimation approach, we use the fixed effect instrumental variable (FEIV) technique to 
examine the relationship between financial development and economic growth. We estimate 
the fixed effect model by considering the following baseline model: 
       
 
    
 
                                                                                                              (2.27) 
where vector     houses K regressors without a constant term while vector    contains a 
constant and a set of time t invariant country–specific variables which may either be 
observable or unobservable. Thus, the underlying heterogeneity is represented by   
 
 . If    is 
not observable but correlated with    , then the least squares estimator of vector   will be 
biased hence producing inconsistent estimates. Given this, we re–write our baseline model in 
equation (2.27) as: 
       
 
                                                                                                                                                                    (2.28) 
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where      
 
  and represents all the observable effects. We control for simultaneity in the 
finance–growth nexus because there is a strong likelihood of financial development being 
endogenous to economic growth. We therefore use legal origins of the countries as candidates 
for the instrumental variables. This measure has been extensively used in the finance–growth 
literature.
12
 This approach is based on the presumption that legal origin affects economic 
growth only through financial development (La Porta et al, 1998a, b; Levine et al., 2000; 
Aghion et al., 2005). The existence of well–functional legal systems shapes information 
asymmetry, quality of financial development and overall contracting efficiency which by far 
explains differences in country‟s growth trajectory. 
 
Table 2.5 presents the results based the alternative indicator of financial development – 
private credit – and using the FEIV approach. For brevity, we do not report results on the first 
stage regression but the findings largely show a positive (negative) relationship between 
financial development (excess finance) and economic growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Our sample countries fall under three (3) legal origins namely the English, French and the Portuguese 
Common laws. Our reference legal origin is Portuguese. See Appendix 1 for countries‟ respective legal origin. 
For some discussion on these legal origins and systems, see Asongu (2011a, b). 
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Table 2.5: Finance, real sector growth and economic growth based on FEIV 
Dependent variable: 
Real GDP per capita 
1 2 3 4 5 
Initial GDP per capita –2.712 (0.501)* –2.210(0.493)** –2.471(0.521)* –2.730(0.397)* –2.114(0.281)* 
Government expenditure –0.032(0.029) –0.041(0.031) –0.018(0.041) –0.004(0.006) –0.060(0.071) 
Trade openness 0.039(0.016)** 0.058(0.019)** 0.034(0.019)*** 0.050(0.026)*** 0.065(0.014)* 
Labour 0.035(0.013)** 0.017(0.014) –0.027(0.012)*** –0.053(0.013)* –0.022(0.009)** 
Capital formation 0.050(0.015)** 0.041(0.013)** 0.019(0.010)** 0.027(0.011)** 0.031(0.010)* 
Inflation –0.006(0.005) –0.002(0.030) –0.005(0.002)** –0.009(0.003)** –0.007(0.001)* 
Private credit 0.015(0.006)*** 0.022(0.011)*** 0.018(0.009)** 0.011(0.004)* 0.009(0.006)** 
Private credit squared – –0.074(0.012)*** – – – 
Excess finance – – –0.011(0.002)*** –0.008(0.002)** –0.009(0.003)** 
Industrial output – – – 0.019(0.010)*** – 
Channels:      
Excess finance  Capital 
formation 
– – – – –0.031(0.008)* 
Excess finance  Inflation – – – – 0.007(0.002)* 
Diagnostics:      
Observations 986 986 986 986 986 
R–squared 0.512 0.547 0.553 0.571 0.594 
Number of countries 29 29 29 29 29 
Threshold value  27%    
p-value of F–statistics 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. All variables are in log. Excess finance here is the difference between 
growth rate in private credit and that of real sector output. The threshold value is the value after which financial development negatively affects economic growth. 
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Results from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 above are qualitatively similar both in terms of effects and 
significance but not in terms of magnitude of effects. From Table 2.5, the coefficients of the 
lagged dependent variable remain negative and significant. Government size is also negative 
and insignificant even in the model controlling for transmission channels. Trade openness is 
also a robust determinant of growth although the coefficients are lower relative to Table 2.4. 
Capital formation, inflation and labour do not show much variation in terms of direction of 
effect but not the level of significance. With regard to our main variable of interest, the 
coefficient of private credit and its quadratic term is respectively positive and highly 
significant (Column 2) suggesting that increases in private credit boost economic growth 
which is consistent with Levine et al.‟s (2000) and Masten et al. (2008). While this holds, 
financial development does not always support growth. The coefficient of the quadratic term 
is negative relative to sign of private credit in levels. The differencing in signs collaborates 
with our earlier finding and reveals an inverted U–shaped relationship. The threshold value at 
which further increases in private credit damages growth is 27% which is relatively lower 
than the earlier finding. This evidence nonetheless confirms studies by Cecchetti and 
Kharroubi (2012), and Arcand et al., (2012). 
 
By relying on the difference between growth rate in private credit and real sector output to 
proxy excess finance, we find a robustly negative and significant effect of excess finance on 
economic growth albeit reduced magnitude relative to domestic credit proxy in Table 2.4. 
Here, a percentage rise in excess finance reduces growth by 1.1%. The difference in 
magnitude of effect perhaps reflects the broad definition of domestic credit as opposed to 
narrow–based private credit. Given the average difference between domestic credit growth 
and that of the real sector (0.14%), the proportion of growth loss due to excess finance is 
expected to reduce to about 0.62% when the 25
th
 percentile of the distribution of excess 
finance (–16.93%) decreases to its median value of –6.47%. However, with a balanced 
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sectoral growth, economic growth is expected to increase by 1.93% when private credit 
increases from the 25
th
 percentile value (8.77%) to the median value (14.61%). Controlling 
for industrial share also reveal growth is maximum when the growth rate in finance and real 
sector output is proportionate. The key implication drawn here is statistically and 
economically not different from our earlier evidence which by far confirms our hypothesis: 
growth in financial development not accompanied with growth in real sector output does not 
propel economic growth. Controlling for industrial share to account for variations in real 
sector output not attributable to the financial sector does not significantly alter the results 
(Column 4). The coefficient of real sector size is positive and statistically significant where a 
percentage point increases in industrial size increases growth by about 2%. Consistent with 
our earlier evidence, this finding is expected as growth in real sector size increases the 
economies‟ productively capacity thus propelling growth. Manifestation of excess finance on 
growth impact largely stems from the deleterious effect on capital formation and heightening 
of macroeconomic instability with their attendant ramifications for economic growth. 
Consistent with the system GMM estimates, the elasticity of capital formation to excess 
finance is higher than that of inflation as we reach the same conclusion: excess finance hurts 
growth by misallocating resources and financing unproductive investments and undesired 
household consumption.  
 
2.7 Policy implications and recommendations 
Based on the findings from our empirical analysis and given the overall objective of this 
study, we highlight the policy implications of our results to guide policy. As discussed 
earlier, in an attempt to improve their growth performance through the financial sector, 
countries in SSA implemented some financial reform measures with view to eliminating 
financial repression and increasing financial deepening. But financial reforms can also be 
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associated with credit boom where credit growth deviate from the normal cyclical trend 
although what constitutes deviation from normal trend and how it is measured still remains 
inconclusive. Our study revealed 34 credit boom episodes over the entire period with a rising 
frequency in the 1980s to 1990s.  
 
Majority of the credit boom occurred during the financial reforms period that many SSA 
countries embarked on. It is not surprising that intrinsically similar economies in the sub–
region can experience divergent economic performance for purely endogenous reasons. 
Indeed, domestic factors as well as differences in Central Bank‟s monetary policy regimes 
matter. The differences in boom incidence across our sample suggest that local, structural, 
institutional and domestic policy paths are crucial. Specifically, much of the booms occur in 
countries with soft or hard pegs exchange rate regimes involving currency boards,
13
 loose 
monetary policies and lax supervision although the latter is characteristic of many developing 
countries. For countries like the Central African Republic where they maintain a de facto 
exchange rate anchor to the U.S. dollar, monetary policy is often directed at maintaining a 
fixed exchange rate at the expense of effectively responding to rapid credit growth. There is 
also a transmission channel. In fixed exchange rate regimes, domestic cost of borrowing 
reduces in response to a lower global interest rate thus prodding domestic credit growth – a 
consequence of loose monetary policy – beyond the level needed by firms. 
 
The level of financial sector supervision has a bearing on the enforcement of bank regulation 
and the effectiveness with which supervisory discretion is applied to deal with hypertrophic 
finance and early symptoms of credit boom. Central Banks are best placed to act as lender of 
last resort and supplying adequate liquidity to the financial and real sectors of the economy. 
                                                          
13
 Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo are in West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU); Cameroon, Central African Republic in Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
(CEMAC); Congo, Dem. Rep in stabilized arrangement, Botswana in crawling peg; managed arrangement are 
The Gambia, Nigeria, Rwanda. 
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The use of open market operations and direct application of the reserve requirement are 
powerful tools in regulating the credit growth. Practically, the Bank can raise (lower) the 
reserve requirement when there is too much (little) liquidity and credits in the economy. 
What is needed here is a good understanding of the optimal level of credit consistent with 
long run economic growth. A supervisory role of Central Banks can help it obtain crucial 
information about whether a situation is likely to culminate in excess finance and thus require 
their intervention. Without this information, the Central Bank may either intervene too 
aggressively or fail to do so when its intervention is best needed. Central Banks in SSA can 
therefore strengthen their research department in this regard through prudential banking 
supervision and conduct of more robust studies. Identifying the healthy credit levels could 
help a country‟s susceptibility to credit booms, macroeconomic and financial instability as 
well as ways of reducing their susceptibility. 
 
The rather low levels of financial development in SSA may not lead to financial and banking 
sector crises although there is evidence that rapid credit growth may be a pre–curser to crisis 
(Borio and Lowe, 2002; Laeven and Valencia, 2010; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; 
Dell‟Ariccia et al., 2012). We argue that, not all booms necessary end up in crises but the 
remnant of credit boom is an excess supply of financial resources relative to the needs of the 
real sector. Indeed, we found that financial development spurs economic growth but too 
much finance is not growth–enhancing. Excess finance negatively affects economic growth. 
Existence of an undisturbed equilibrated growth of real and financial sectors is a necessary 
condition for a smooth economic growth. Whether we control for the size of the real sector or 
not, the elasticity of growth to changes in either the size of the real sector or domestic credit 
is higher under balanced sectoral growth. Technological advancement in the real sector 
expands the economy‟s productive capacities while a balanced growth in the financial sector 
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permits the efficient use of these new capacities. Traditional theory of informational 
overshooting suggests that as long as the production capacity is not reached, the economy 
grows together with its financial system. And to the extent that this limit is unknown, rational 
agents continuously learn about it with optimistic expectations until the economy eventually 
reaches the limit (Rob, 1991; Zeira, 1994, 1999). Our evidence in this study however does 
not find economies in SSA to overshoot because the region may be far from its production 
frontier largely as a result of untapped resources.  
 
An alternative view of the existence of excess finance may rely on negative externalities 
resulting from overdeveloped financial sector (Rochet and Woolley, 2009; Philippon, 2010). 
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis raised some legitimate concerns about financial deepening 
and financial development, given that the crisis originated in advanced economies, where the 
financial sector had grown both very large and complex. However, in the case of SSA, we do 
not see the possibility of the credit boom resulting in financial crisis and the negative 
externalities of overdeveloped financial systems on account of the narrow and 
underdeveloped financial markets. Rather, what we observe is fragile economies resulting 
from risky and sustainable investments coupled with superfluous consumption on the back of 
rapid and unbridled credit growth far outstripping the solvency needs of firms. Excess finance 
may reflect both the micro and macroeconomic inefficiencies in credit allocation and size of 
the real sector. Thus, in the case of SSA, lending booms could be the resultant natural 
consequence of financial and economic development consolidation. It is therefore crucial for 
policymakers to identify the point beyond which further increases in financial development 
become a great cause for concern. There is also the need for policymakers to continuously 
conduct needs assessment of real sector credit demand and leverage sustainability levels, both 
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in order to prevent excess finance and to identify those firms or sectors of the economy that 
need to undergo a deleveraging exercise. 
 
Undoubtedly, the financial sector makes a critical contribution to the quantity and quality of 
capital formation by directly contributing to productivity growth through its own share of 
output and indirectly through its contribution to the efficiency of the capital stock. Apart from 
this, financial markets promote competition in the ownership of quality investments and 
allow entrepreneurs and firms to effectively manage risk. An equally important function of 
the financial sector is to improve the efficiency with which saving and investment are 
allocated in the economy. This in turn determines quality of the capital stock and its 
contribution to productivity and long run economic growth. 
 
But our study shows that the process of financial development can involve substantial trade–
offs, particularly when rapid financial development is not accompanied by real sector growth. 
The proportionate growth in the real sector balances the supply and demand of financial 
resources thus improving the allocative efficiency. As such, only growth–enhancing projects 
get funded. In an upturn, better growth prospects improve creditworthiness of borrowing 
firms and financial institutions respond with an increased supply of credit. Our findings 
however suggest that the relatively abundant credit does not necessarily promote investment 
rates. This is because financial institutions may lower lending standards during episodes of 
higher credit growth. As a consequence, collateral value decreases and excess finance may be 
used to finance unproductive investments and personal consumption thus exacerbating 
growth vagaries through higher inflation and bad investments. Although the coefficients of 
the transmission channels are generally lower in the sensitivity analyses compared to those 
obtained from the system GMM estimations, what is vivid from our findings is the consistent 
higher elasticity of investment to excess finance compared to consumption. Our evidence 
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reveals that the pass–through excess finance–economic growth effect via investment is much 
stronger than the growth responsiveness of excess finance to changes in consumption as the 
elasticity of investment channel is between 2.22 to 4.43 times higher than that of inflation. 
The increase in consumption associated with rapid credit growth is often more pronounced in 
the non–tradables sector. Interestingly, excess finance effect on growth via inflation is 
subdued. This finding particularly has important implication for real sector growth. Not only 
do those needing credit for higher productive investment get denied but those who actually 
get financial resources owing to their political influences invest in bad projects where returns 
are low at best. The resultant effect is a constrained real sector output relative to credit 
growth with an attendant undesirable economic growth impact.  
 
The rather high rate of inflation in SSA should also be a concern. Higher rates of inflation 
reduce savers‟ real rates of return and lower the real rates of interest that borrowers pay. This 
increases people‟s appetite for borrowing with fewer savers. And where the financial sector 
responds by increasing credit, such funds are used to finance private consumption 
exacerbating inflation. On the other hand, credits may be rationed and perhaps be politically 
driven and once inflation is exceedingly high, a potential consequence is that the financial 
system fails to provide the needed investment capital, resulting in a lower capital formation 
and levels of real sector growth. At the same time, high rate of inflation can potentially 
trigger an endogenous macroeconomic instability and theory predicts that this instability 
should as well be transmitted to real activity. 
 
We can also draw crucial lessons from the impact of monetary policy. Financial sector 
growth is more likely to reflect an inverse relationship between the monetary policy stance 
and cost of capital: the more accommodative monetary policy is the lower the cost of capital 
and the faster the growth of the financial sector. If the level of financial development and 
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financial sector are inversely related such that underdeveloped financial sectors have rapid 
financial development, then monetary policy may be counter–cyclical especially since it is 
most accommodative when aggregate growth is low. 
 
There is also some political economy dimension to this: prejudice lending – where credit may 
be allocated to favoured groups and to those with networks rather than commercial criteria. 
Fafchamps (1999) empirically examines the effect of network and ethnicity on banks‟ credit 
to manufacturing firms in Kenya and Zimbabwe. The author finds a negative relationship 
between individuals with little or no association with bank staff and bank credit and that what 
matter most for bank credit is largely a personal interaction with an insider. Those who access 
credit this way may use it to finance unproductive activities while those who actually need 
credit may not have access. And firms that are denied credit are probably more fragile and 
pruned to fail. Given the rather weak institutions in the sub–region, this effect is uncommon 
and investment–growth effect is dire. Politically motivated credits are also not healthy for the 
financial performance of those very financial institutions. These classes of borrowers are 
often not screened properly and their credit documentations are inadequate. Financial distress 
banks caused by political pressures to lend to some players in the private sector including 
parastatals and politically influential borrowers and by further politically preventing banks 
from enforcing repayment (Brownbridge et al., 1998). The end result is a rising NPLs and 
such firms do not generate high profits to service their debts due to their lack of ingenuity. 
Consequently, financial markets channel more resources into loan recovery thus increasing 
endogenous market frictions by way of higher transaction costs. However, Choi et al., (1996) 
opine that when the severity of an economy‟s financial market frictions is endogenous, it is 
possible for the friction to be perceived more or less severe. If the perception of the friction is 
more (less) severe, financial markets provide less (more) capital for investment. The result is 
a reduced (enhanced) level of real economic performance. Efforts must therefore be made to 
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advance credit to innovative firms in dire need. In the case of Lesotho, an increase in credit 
extension was also supported by Partial Credit Guarantee Fund which was consciously 
designed by the Government and commercial banks to provide guarantee on Micro, Small 
and Medium Enterprises that do not have access to credit and ensure that banks recover 
portion of their money in an event of a default.  
 
To check the overall financial sector‟s credit growth, first, countries could consider 
developing a legal framework to guide the extension of credit which among others sets the 
conditions for sustainable credit advancement to the private sector and at the same time clean 
the real sectors‟ excess finance on the back of reckless lending. South Africa is a shining 
example with the enactment of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. Second, Central Banks in 
SSA need to aggressively comply with the Basel III framework which creates the 
countercyclical capital buffer designed to sanction the macro–financial environment in which 
banks operate. The Basel III establishes tougher capital standards through more restrictive 
and stringent capital definitions, higher risk-weighted assets, additional capital buffers and 
higher requirements for minimum capital ratios. Apart from this, it further creates liquidity 
standards to limit illiquid asset and restrict unstable sources of funding. A broader macro–
prudential goal of sound financial system that supports real sector growth can be achieved 
when a clear approach that progressively imposes a capital buffer for the financial sector 
during periods of credit boom reflected in private sector credit exceeding its long term trend. 
On the other hand, there would be no need to intervene or set the countercyclical capital 
buffer when real and financial sector growths are proportionate and credit growth aligns with 
long run trend.  
Boosting real sector growth also requires firms to develop a detailed understanding of 
specific emerging markets opportunities, as well as the needs of their existing clients. They 
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will also require agile approaches to the development of strategies using critical scenario 
planning and research. The challenge for the real sector and industry in particular however 
will be on how to advance their footprints in a more nuanced approach that go beyond 
rhetoric. For instance, population is undoubtedly a useful labour input in production process 
and given the abundance of labour in SSA, it is natural for labour–intensive industries to 
almost always follow the path of low wages labour often with low skills. However, the 
changing global landscape presents key opportunities for industries in SSA to develop 
innovative ways of increasing productivity. A key priority of firms should be on skills and 
capacity of their workers and to develop a granular understanding of their operations, 
investment in research and development as well as expertise in product design for the 
complex supply and value chains.  
 
Supporting industries requires a well–grounded policy based on comprehensive 
understanding of the diverse industry fragments of the economy as well as the intrinsic 
factors affecting them. For instance, the inadequate supply of energy is a major challenge 
facing the industrial sectors of several SSA countries including Ghana, South Africa, Gambia 
and Malawi. Given that energy crisis is an important source of output fluctuations (Alagidede 
and Ibrahim, 2016), energy policies of Governments need to focus on ways of generating 
enough capacity that do not only meet the demand of the real sector but provides reserve 
capacity to support other sectors of the economy. A formidable strand of innovation, 
information technology, and optimal finance enhances real sector productivity and bringing a 
renewed dynamism to the sector. 
 
Apart from making conscious efforts to depoliticize operations of the real and financial 
sectors, Governments can set up business advisory services to provide important business 
advice to firms and entrepreneurs on sustainable investment opportunities. There is also a role 
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for the financial institutions to play. Banks can leverage on their expertise to critically 
support firms with their business plans so as to tailor firms‟ credit need with the expected rate 
of return. In all these, a sound coordination is needed to ensure that all sectors grow in 
proportional reciprocity.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
The significance of financial sector to an economy cannot be overemphasized with rising 
interest in both growth and financial literature on the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. The general consensus is that improved financial sector 
development promotes growth by efficiently allocating resources. However, little is known 
on the effects of real sector output growth in the finance–growth literature. The case of SSA 
is interesting given the region‟s renewed interest in propelling growth on the back of its 
nascent financial sector. In this study, we evaluate the economic growth effects when the 
growth in financial development and that of the real sector is unbalanced relying on data for 
29 SSA countries over the period spanning 1980–2014. We find that financial development 
positively affects growth albeit non–monotonically with inflection points ranging between 27 
to 29%. Overall economic growth effect is contingent on the relative speed of growth in 
finance and that of real sector output. In particular, financial development damages economic 
growth when the improvement in the financial sector is not accompanied by higher real sector 
growth. Maximum growth is attained with a balanced sectoral growth. However, excess 
finance negates the positive effects of financial development by damaging capital formation 
as bad investments get financed and at the same time exacerbating macroeconomic instability 
through increased aggregate demand. Financial boom are generally not growth–enhancing 
likely because it harms what is ought to spur growth while at the same time magnifies the 
effect of macroeconomic instability. Our findings remain robust to estimation techniques and 
72 
 
largely in synch with theoretical literature suggesting the interdependence of real and 
financial sectors in growth process. To ensure a sustained growth, we recommend 
strengthening of the institutions to exercise proper oversight of the financial sector, 
enactment of laws and adopting the countercyclical capital buffer to guide credit growth and 
establishment of business advisory centers to encourage real sector ingenuity. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THRESHOLDS IN FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT–ECONOMIC GROWTH NEXUS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The importance of financial development to economic growth has been given much credence 
in the literature. Indeed, early writers on this relationship have used financial systems in the 
context of endogenous growth theory in investigating such nexus. One of such foremost 
writers is Schumpeter (1911) who first highlighted the significant role of financial sector 
development in economic growth through the provision of efficient financial services. This 
evidence has been supported by other empirical literature (see King and Levine, 1993a, b; 
Levine et al., 2000; Hassan et al., 2011, Masten et al., 2008). Interestingly, while both theory 
and the available empirical evidence have almost settled on the importance of financial 
development in countries‟ economic growth trajectory, the specific nature of effect is less 
than clear. Evolving theoretical studies have espoused that there may be potential thresholds 
in the relationship between finance and growth. Admittedly, studies on the nonlinearities is 
far from being conclusive (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Shen and Lee, 2006; Law and 
Singh, 2014; Adeniyi et al., 2015; Favara, 2003). What is missing from these studies is the 
role of mediating variables in refereeing the impact of finance on growth. Theory contends 
discontinuities in this relationship largely as a result of host of factors that sets the stage at 
which finance spurs or harms growth (see for instance Saint–Paul, 1992; Berthelemy and 
Varaudakis, 1996; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997). More specifically, the initial level of 
income per capita, countries‟ initial human capital and the initial level of financial 
development have been proffered as key potential threshold variables mediating how finance 
affects growth. However, despite the nascent theoretical evidence projecting the crucial role 
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of these threshold variables, empirical efforts have not been rigorous in examining these 
effects.  
 
More so, the existing empirical studies on the threshold effects have relied on rudimentary 
threshold estimation techniques in determining the existence of nonlinearity in finance–
growth nexus by imposing exogenous thresholds in ad hoc approaches involving the 
inclusion of quadratic terms of finance in the growth regression. Our aim in this chapter is to 
fill this literature gap by rigorously examining nonlinearities in the link between financial 
development and economic growth using sound techniques involving an asymptotic theory 
for nonlinearity estimations that permits the determination of threshold within a confidence 
interval. We do this relying on data for 29 sub–Saharan African (SSA) countries over the 
period 1980–2014. This study contributes significantly to the literature in so many ways. 
First, we use the sample splitting and threshold estimation developed by Hansen (1996; 2000) 
which is better than earlier approaches employed in previous studies. Indeed, apart from not 
assuming a prior functional form of the relationship, our approach does not require 
exogenous specification of the threshold values of the conditions mediating the finance–
growth nexus. Second, apart from estimating the threshold values, our approach permits the 
classification of the observations in relation to whether or not they exceed the threshold 
values so that the exact effect of finance on growth is determined for both when countries are 
below and above the threshold. With this we are able to settle the highly contested threshold 
evidence produced by earlier studies as we show how obscuring initial values of host 
countries‟ condition may culminate in incorrect conclusions in the link between finance and 
economic growth particularly in SSA. By and large, our findings reveal that while financial 
development significantly affects growth, the values of the threshold variables crucially 
mediates this effect. Specifically, when the initial levels of per capita income, human capital 
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and financial development are below the threshold, overall economic growth is largely 
insensitive to financial sector development suggesting that countries‟ initial level of income, 
human capital and financial development are necessary conditions in spurring long run 
economic growth. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides an extensive review 
of the literature on nonlinearities in finance–growth nexus while section 3.3 presents the data 
and empirical strategy. Section 3.4 outlines the threshold estimation approach while 3.5 
discussed the findings on the nonlinearities. Section 3.6 highlights key implications for policy 
while section 3.7 concludes the study. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
A growing body of theoretical literature shows a strong relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. Evidence abound that a functional financial sector 
encourages savings, ameliorates information asymmetry and provides opportunity for 
diversifying risk in addition to efficiently allocating resources (King and Levine, 1993a; 
Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991). While theoretical studies 
have settled on the impact of finance on economic growth, empirical studies on the 
relationship is far from being conclusive although majority of the literature suggest a positive 
link (Khan, 2008; Khan and Senhadji, 2000; King and Levine, 1993a, b; Levine et al., 2000). 
 
Xu (2000) finds that the low or lower middle income countries in his sample display negative 
effects of financial development on GDP growth and investment, while the reverse is true for 
the high income countries. Contrary to Xu (2000), De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) obtains a 
similar weak relationship in high income countries which they attribute to the fact that 
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financial development in such advanced economies occurs beyond the banking system, while 
their proxy for financial development is bank credit to the private sector as a percentage of 
GDP.  
 
Huang and Lin (2009) examined a sample of 71 high and low income countries in cross-
section instrumental variable threshold estimations and found evidence of positive 
relationship between finance and economic growth although the nexus is nonlinear. Contrary 
to Xu (2000) and Rioja and Valev (2004a, b), the effect of finance on growth is more 
important for low income economies. By relying on panel data spanning 1961 to 1995 for 74 
developed and developing countries, Rioja and Valev (2004a, b) find that the effect is 
positive and significant only in countries with high and intermediate income levels, with no 
apparent impact in low income countries. However, Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) reveal that 
the impact of finance on growth is weaker in more recent period spanning 1990–2004 
compared to 1960–1989. Their argument is that the rapid growth of credit and widespread 
liberalization in the 1990s resulted in both inflationary pressures and a deteriorating banking 
system that eventually caused financial crises, thus taking away the growth–enhancing effect 
of finance. With regard to the transmission channels through which finance impacts on 
growth, Rioja and Valev (2004a, b) find that in middle and high income countries, this occurs 
mainly through the enhancement of productivity, while in the low income economies it 
happens predominantly through the accumulation of capital. 
 
One important weakness of these studies is their assumption of linear functional form in 
estimating the link between finance and growth. Recent empirical literature posits that such 
relationship is far from being monotonic and that the overall effect on growth is conditioned 
on the attainment of a certain unique threshold. Studies like Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012), 
Shen and Lee (2006) and Law and Singh (2014) have found an inverted U–shaped 
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relationship implying that financial development is only good up to a point after which it 
becomes deleterious. However, Samargandi et al. (2015) show that such an inverted U–
shaped relationship is only evident in the long run and not in the short run. Even the turning 
point for the reversed effect is still disputed in the literature. For instance, Law and Singh 
(2014) suggest that financial development promotes growth but not when private credit 
exceeds 88% of GDP compared to 90% in Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) and 110% in 
Arcand et al.‟s (2012) study. These notwithstanding, Samargandi et al. (2015) conclude that 
the threshold point is generally lower in middle income countries.  
 
More recently, Adeniyi et al. (2015) assess nonlinearities in the relationship by including a 
square term of financial development in their autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) growth 
model. Contrary to Cecchetti and Kharoubi‟s (2012) findings, Adeniyi et al. (2015) found a 
U–shaped relationship suggesting that financial development decreases growth up to a certain 
threshold above which growth increases with increasing financial development. Favara 
(2003) however finds an interesting S–shaped relationship between financial deepening and 
economic growth and concludes that at very low (very high) levels of financial development, 
growth suffers (improves). Aghion et al., (2005) contends that the reason for the nonlinearity 
of the finance–growth relationship might be that financial development facilitates the catch 
up to productivity frontier, but has limited or no growth effect for countries that are close or 
already at the frontier. 
 
At the theoretical front, there is a growing consensus that these threshold effects are 
motivated by the initial levels of per capita income, human capital and financial sector 
development. One of such theoretical works is Saint–Paul (1992). By relying on the initial 
level of per capita income, the author analyzes a mechanism which may give rise to multiple 
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equilibria in financial and economic development where agents can choose between two 
technologies. The first is flexible and allows productive diversification but at the same time 
has low productivity. The second technology is rigid, more specialized and productive. The 
model argues that when financial institutions are less developed, risk diversification is carried 
out through the selection of less specialized and less productive technologies. With this form 
of technology, there is less risk exposure and incentives to develop financial markets are 
limited and can lead to “low equilibrium”. In the “high equilibrium”, financial markets are 
well developed with specialized technology. In these economies, agents choose more risky, 
higher yielding technologies and the impact of finance on growth is higher. However, the 
transition from the “low equilibrium” to a “high equilibrium” one is mediated by the initial 
level of income per capita that function as a threshold variable above which financial sector 
development is healthy for economic growth. 
 
Zilibotti‟s (1994) model also espouses the initial level of per capita income as a potential 
threshold variable in finance–growth nexus. The model establishes the idea of “thick” and 
“thin” markets. There exists positive impact of finance on growth for economies with “thick” 
markets above the per capita income threshold with low intermediation cost, improved capital 
allocation and sustained growth. While for economies below the threshold of per capita 
income, there are “thin” markets with limited capital, the higher cost of financial 
intermediation prevents investors from using efficiently available capital stock and financial 
development to have significant impact on economic growth. 
 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) also identify the initial level of per capita income as a 
mediating factor in the relationship between finance and economic growth. They formally 
model the dynamic interactions between financial development and growth where a country 
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passes through a development cycle from a primitive stage to a developed fast growing stage. 
At early stage, growth is slow and the financial sector only mobilizes savings and diversifies 
risk. However, as the income levels begin to increase, the financial intermediaries become 
more sophisticated and perform costly functions of monitoring investment and screening for 
cost effective innovations. Finally, during the maturity state, the country‟s financial system 
fully develops with a relatively stable and higher growth. Moreover, during the early stages 
of financial development, only a few relatively rich individuals have access to financial 
markets. However, with aggregate economic growth, higher number of people accesses the 
formal financial system, with spill-over effects on economic growth. The main thrust of their 
model reveals that the relationship between financial development and growth varies 
depending on the level of per capita income. 
 
Apart from per capita income, the work of Azariadis and Drazen (1990) has also shown the 
initial level of human capital as a crucial threshold variable in growth models. They 
emphasize that an economy can attain a sustained level of growth only when it has exceeded 
the minimum threshold level of human capital. Their model predicts that, in the absence of an 
adequate level of human capital, countries transition into poverty traps. More specifically, if 
the human capital development is below a certain threshold level, the economy is 
characterized by a neo-classical growth model with no apparent traces of sustained economic 
growth. However, where the level of human capital exceeds the threshold, the economy will 
be characterized by an endogenous growth model where long run economic growth is 
sustained. 
 
Galor and Zeira (1993) theoretical model indirectly highlights the importance of human 
capital in finance–investment–growth relationships. Their model proposes the initial level of 
wealth as a potential threshold variable and emphasizes that only those individuals with 
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initial wealth greater than the threshold level will invest in their human capital and participate 
in the financial markets. As such, the initial wealth distribution matters for long run 
distribution of income, aggregate output, investment as well as the level of income per capita. 
In the long run, there will be a divergence of wealth between high income skilled labor and 
the low income unskilled one. The rich/educated will converge to the high income steady 
state owing from increases in skilled labour wage while the poor/uneducated will converge to 
the low income steady state. The greater the number of people above the initial 
wealth/education threshold, the higher will be the country‟s per capita income. However, 
there will be no investment increase in human capital in poor countries with unequal income 
distribution. 
 
Berthelemy and Varaudakis (1996) argue that the initial level of human capital is a crucial 
threshold variable in finance–growth nexus as far as the human capital accumulation is 
positively associated with the level of educational development. Their theoretical model 
exhibits multiple steady state equilibria where economies with low educational development 
(and human capital) are trapped in low level underdevelopment equilibrium and thus unable 
to enjoy the benefits of financial sector development. Consequently, these countries have low 
savings and “quiet” financial sector stemming from weak competition. Conversely, 
economies with high human capital are characterized by well-developed financial sector 
development and as such enjoy relatively higher savings and income. By employing the 
regression tree technique, Berthelemy and Varaudakis (1996) empirically examine whether 
the initial level of human capital mediates the effect of financial development on economic 
growth. The authors find that the initial level of human capital proxied by the level of 
secondary school enrolment is a central threshold variable that influences the unequivocal 
effect of finance on economic growth. 
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Beyond the level of human capital acting as a threshold variable influencing finance and 
growth, Acemoglu and Zilibotti‟s (1997) study highlight the initial level of financial 
development as a potential threshold variable mediating the finance and growth nexus. The 
main thrust of their study is that, projects with relatively higher rates of return require large 
initial investment. Apart from this, they are frequently indivisible and the financial sector has 
to maintain a certain minimum size before sufficient funds can be pooled to finance these 
projects. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) therefore opine that the impact of financial 
deepening on economic growth may be huge in developed countries with higher income per 
capita and greater financial development. 
 
Deidda and Fattouh (2002) present simple two–period overlapping generations model with 
risk–averse agents and costly financial transactions which establishes possible nonlinearity in 
financial development and economic growth relationship. They test for the threshold effect in 
relation to countries‟ initial per capita income. After splitting the sample into low and high 
income groups and controlling for initial level of human capital, the authors found that 
initially high income countries grow slower. Further findings also suggest that higher levels 
of financial development are associated with higher growth rates but only hold for countries 
with higher incomes. Replicating the results relying on the initial level of financial 
development shows a non–monotonic relationship between initial financial depth and 
economic growth in high income countries. 
 
Indeed, the majority of existing studies suggest a nonlinear relationship between finance and 
economic growth. As a deficiency however, these studies suffer from two important 
weaknesses. First, they rely on rudimentary threshold estimation techniques to determine the 
existence of nonlinearity in finance–growth nexus either by imposing exogenous thresholds 
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in an ad hoc techniques or endogenous thresholds that involve specifying specific linear 
function for identifying the below and above threshold values and effects. Second, beyond 
establishing the threshold effects, the majority of these earlier studies have failed to 
rigorously stem–the–tide by empirically investigating whether these thresholds are mediated 
by the initial levels of per capita income, human capital and financial development. One 
exception is the work of Berthelemy and Varaudakis (1996) where the regression tree 
technique was used to empirically examine whether the initial human capital operates as a 
threshold variable in finance–growth relationship. However, apart from its inability to show 
statistical significance of the estimates, this technique does not reveal the confidence intervals 
within which the threshold estimates lie. 
 
In the current study, we avoid these problems by using Hansen‟s (1996, 2000) sample 
splitting and threshold estimation technique. This approach controls for the asymptotic theory 
that permit the estimation of the thresholds, their confidence intervals and the level of 
statistical significance. We estimate three separate sets of thresholds variables focused on the 
initial level of per capita income, the levels of human capital and financial development. The 
thrust of this study is that financial development enhances growth only after exceeding a 
distinct threshold levels of initial income per capita, initial human capital and initial financial 
sector development. In other words, we proffer that the differences in the direction of effect 
stems from countries‟ heterogeneous income levels, human capital development and financial 
markets. The next section discusses the data and empirical strategy in pursuing the aim of this 
chapter. 
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3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
We construct a panel dataset of 29 SSA countries for the period 1980–2014. The choice of 
these countries is based entirely on data availability for a sufficiently longer time period and a 
list of these countries is provided in Appendix 1. We use the annual data sourced from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. We use two measures of financial 
development: private and domestic credits. Unlike the private credit which includes all credit 
to various sectors on a gross basis except credit to the central government, domestic credit 
provided by the financial sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by 
financial corporations, such as through loans, purchases of non–equity securities, and trade 
credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. These indicators 
thus have clear advantage over measures of monetary aggregates, in that it more accurately 
represents the actual volume of funds channeled to the private sector. Therefore, the ratios of 
private and domestic credits to GDP are more directly linked to investment and economic 
growth. 
 
In line with standard literature, we used real GDP per capita based on 2005 US$ constant 
prices to proxy economic growth. Our control variables are based on the standard 
neoclassical growth theory and include inflation, investment rate, government expenditure, 
labour and trade openness. The inflation variable is the annual percentage change in the 
consumer price index and used to proxy macroeconomic (in)stability. This is expected to 
negatively impact on growth. We use gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP to 
proxy investment rates and this is expected to positively influence economic growth. 
Government expenditure expressed as a percentage of GDP measures final government 
consumption expenditure and used to measure government size. Labour is proxied by the 
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percentage of economically active population aged 15 to 64 years. We also include our 
threshold variables (initial level of income per capita, initial level of human capital and initial 
level of financial development) as control variables. The introduction of the threshold 
variables as slope covariates permits the identification of possible differential effect of 
finance on growth as such measurement highlights the theoretical arguments that a country 
has to develop critical threshold of income, human capital and financial sector development 
before financial development positively and significantly impact on economic growth. 
Following from standard literature, we proxy human capital by the secondary school 
enrolment. However, as a robustness test, we also use the primary pupil–teacher ratio in line 
with Ibrahim et al., (2015). Relative to the enrolment which is a quantity–based measure, this 
proxy measures the quality of the training pupils‟ receive stemming from teacher contact 
hours. The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 3.1 below. 
 
Table 3.1: Summary statistics 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Coefficie
nt of 
Variation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Real GDP per capita 1,241.27 1,804.98 1.45 2.36 7.65 
Government expenditure 14.88 6.31 0.42 1.57 7.15 
Inflation 56.23 36.63 0.65 0.30 2.60 
Trade openness 71.15 36.48 0.51 1.10 3.83 
Labour 52.83 4.65 0.09 –1.24 30.73 
Capital formation 19.69 9.65 0.49 1.59 8.25 
Secondary school enrolment 
(% gross) 
28.19 11.02 0.39 2.03 7.91 
Primary pupil teacher ratio 38.03 19.85 0.52 4.11 11.58 
Private credit 19.52 21.72 1.11 3.78 19.68 
Domestic credit 25.60 29.66 1.16 2.39 13.48 
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The variables presented in Table 3.1 are averaged over the sample period (1980–2014) and 
presented in percentage terms. The average real per capita GDP is $1,241.27 which reveals 
the low income status of the countries under study. Government size is estimated at about 
15% of GDP and do not register much variations across the countries relative to trade 
openness which has a mean of 71.15%. The average percentage labour force and inflation 
respectively stands at 52.83 and 56.23% reiterating the evidence that majority of the countries 
under consideration have experienced episodes of hyperinflation.
14
 With regard to secondary 
school enrolment, our descriptive statistic shows an average of 28.19% relative to 38.03% of 
the primary pupil teacher ratio suggesting that over the sample period, the mean quality of 
education at the primary level is exceedingly higher than gross secondary school enrolment. 
Our financial development indicators show higher mean domestic credit (25.6%) compared to 
private credit (19.52%). We estimate the relative variations of the variables using the 
coefficient of variation (CV) computed as the ratio of standard deviation to mean. Our 
findings reveal that real GDP per capita is the most volatile variable while the composition of 
labour is least volatile. The primary pupil teacher ratio is not only higher than the secondary 
school enrolment but also show much variation across the countries. Similar pattern is also 
observed for both financial development indicators where domestic credit exhibit severe 
fluctuations relative to private credit. Interestingly, all the variables are skewed to the right 
except the labour which is negatively skewed. The values of the skewness and kurtosis reveal 
that the distributions of our variables are far from being normal as they are largely 
leptokurtic.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Given the mean inflation rate, 15 countries experienced rates below 56% while the remaining 14 exceeded the 
average. 
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3.3.2 Empirical strategy: Identifying nonlinearities: A threshold estimation approach 
 
Indeed, the assumption of a linear functional form of finance–growth nexus is a major 
deficiency of existing studies. More specifically, the earlier studies obscure the possibility of 
initial per capita income, initial human capital and initial of level of financial development 
moderating the relationship between finance and growth in a manner that initiates stern 
discontinuities in the nexus. Our main argument is that financial development may not 
influence growth below a certain value of the threshold variables and that the overall effect is 
conditioned on the initial level of per capita income, human capital and financial 
development. In this section, we set out the procedure in identifying the threshold values and 
how finance affects growth below and above these values. Specifically, we identify three 
potential threshold variables namely the initial level of per capita income, initial level of 
human capital and the initial level of financial development. While our earlier findings in 
chapter two provide evidence of the growth–enhancing effect of financial development even 
after controlling for covariates, like other studies (King and Levine, 1993a, b, Xu, 2000), we 
ignore the likelihood that the overall finance–growth nexus may be mediated by these 
threshold variables. We therefore specifically model this possibility that the growth effect of 
finance is refereed by the initial levels of per capita income, human capital and financial 
development. Second, we depart from presuming a smooth finance–growth relationship by 
testing for the distinct thresholds. Indeed, several authors (see for instance Arcand et al., 
2012; Adeyini et al., 2015; Ductor and Grechyna, 2015) have included quadratic terms in 
examining nonlinearities in the impact of finance on growth. However, the exact inflection 
points are usually not known and thus these results are far from being instructive. We 
therefore control for this by directly altering our linear growth model and testing for definite 
discontinuities in the relationship using the Hansen‟s (1996, 2000) threshold model relying 
on data sorting process. Our choice for Hansen‟s (1996, 2000) hinges on its usage of the 
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asymptotic theory in estimating the thresholds hence making it the appropriate tool. The 
Hansen (1996, 2000) threshold technique relies on the least square estimation of the 
regression parameters which is superior to the traditional regression tree and quadratic 
approaches because the form of nonlinearities of our chosen approach is not imposed and the 
statistical significance of all thresholds identified can empirically be verified. 
 
We begin by specifying a baseline model where economic growth depends on its one period 
lag, financial development and a set of controls estimated in equation (3.1) below; 
 
                                                                             (3.1) 
 
where     is economic growth of country i at time t;       is the growth lag representing the 
initial condition;      is financial development;     is a vector of control variables;    is 
country–specific fixed effects;    is time effects while     is idiosyncratic error term. 
 
From equation (3.1), our observed sample is *        +   
 where    and    is real–valued and 
   is an  –vector. Our threshold variable    is taken as a continuous distribution and the 
parameters from our estimated baseline model vary depending on the value of   . We 
estimate two regime threshold models in a single equation of the form: 
   (                       )  *    +
 (                       )  *    +              (   ) 
 
where   is a vector of economic growth;    is a set of financial development indicators;    
is the vector of threshold parameters;   is a vector of conditioning variables as previously 
defined;  ( )  is the indicator function of dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
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condition is satisfied and 0 otherwise;   is the threshold variable while   is the threshold 
value with subscript   as country index. 
 
In these estimations, our threshold variables are the initial per capita income, initial human 
capital and initial level of financial development. We compactly write equation (3.2) as: 
    
      
 
  ( )                                                                                          (   ) 
 
where            while      . It is imperative to note that      as     while     
is fixed hence         as    . Our equation (3.3) is further specified in matrix notation 
expressing     vectors of   and   by stacking    and    respectively and the     
matrices   and    by stacking the vectors   
 
 and   ( )
  respectively. Given these notations, 
we re–estimate equation (3.4) below: 
                                                                                                     (   ) 
The regression parameters     and   are estimated using least squares where the least 
squares estimators ( ̂  ̂ and  ̂) minimises the sum of squared errors (SSE) of equation (3.4) 
defined as: 
    (     )  (         )
 
(         )                                  (   ) 
On this score, we restrict the threshold value   to a bounded set [   ]   . The least squares 
estimators ( ̂  ̂ and  ̂) are estimated using the concentration approach where  ̂ is the value 
that minimises     ( ) and can therefore be uniquely estimated as 
 ̂        ⏟  
    
    (  ) 
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where      ⋂  *            + while the slope estimators are therefore estimated as 
 ̂   ̂( ̂)  and  ̂   ̂( ̂) . We test the hypothesis that         using the following 
likelihood ratio (LR) test:
15
 
   ( )   
    ( )      ( ̂)
    ( ̂)
 
The    is rejected for large values of    (  ). Indeed, the reliability of   by far depends on 
where it lies within the confidence interval which is commonly constructed using the 
inversion of Wald or t–test statistics. However, Hansen (2000) and Dufour (1997) note that, 
when the asymptotic sampling distribution depends on unknown estimators, the Wald statistic 
has weak finite sample performance especially when the parameter has a region with failed 
identification. Given the threshold model, when     , our threshold value   is not 
identified. Hansen (2000) newly developed threshold modelling addresses this by 
constructing an asymptotic confidence level ( )  for   using the    ( )  set at  ̂  
*     ( )   +. 
 
3.4 Findings on the estimated threshold values and finance–growth nexus 
This section discusses the threshold values and how financial development affects economic 
growth given the threshold variables. In the subsequent Tables, our first row is the estimated 
threshold value of the respective threshold variable, the 95% confidence interval which 
shows the level of precision of the estimated threshold value and its associated bootstrap p–
values. Since our estimations allow one threshold  ,   is not identified under the null 
hypothesis of no threshold effect. We therefore bootstrap the p–values which are 
asymptotically correct (Hansen, 1996) in order to examine the relevance of the sample split. 
The significance of a p–value for a value of    suggest the need for a sample split based on 
                                                          
15
 Where     is the true value of   . 
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the threshold variable   . The p–values are computed using the bootstrap approach with 2000 
replications and 15% trimming percentage.  It is imperative to note that the Hansen (1996; 
2000) identifies a single threshold that is significant at 10% or better. In regime 1, we present 
the results on the effect of finance on growth for countries below the threshold values offered 
in the second rows, the value of the     and the number of countries trailing behind the 
threshold values. The regime 2 however shows the relationship between finance and growth 
when countries exceed the identified threshold values of the threshold variable. 
 
Table 3.2: Results when per capita income is the threshold variable 
Threshold variable: Per capita income 
 
Dependent variable: 
Real GDP per capita 
Financial development indicators 
Private credit Domestic credit 
Threshold value 
 
95% Confidence interval ( ̂) 
 
Bootstrap p–value 
0.62164   $621.64 
 
[0.690,     0.870] 
 
0.0001 
0.62164   $621.64 
 
[0.690,     0.870] 
 
0.0000 
Regime 1 
Coefficient of financial development 
below the  threshold 
 
   
 
Number of countries below the threshold 
0.312 (0.158)* 
 
 
0.721 
 
11 
0.201 (0.137) 
 
 
0.693 
 
11 
Regime 2 
Coefficient of financial development 
above the threshold 
 
   
 
Number of countries above the threshold 
0.515 (0.125)*** 
 
 
0.753 
 
18 
0.211 (0.091)** 
 
 
0.701 
 
18 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. Values in (  ) are the standard errors. 
 
 
From Table 3.2 above, the threshold of initial per capita income is estimated at 0.62164   
$621.62 and lies within a confidence interval of 0.690 and 0.870 where about 38% of the 
countries fall below this threshold. In regime 1, we find that private credit is positively 
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related to growth even below the threshold. Specifically, a percentage increase in private 
credit spurs economic growth by 0.312% for countries with an initial per capita income 
below $621.64. However, this effect is slightly significantly at 10%. Interestingly, by using 
domestic credit as an indicator of finance, our finding reveals a positive coefficient of finance 
although this effect is flatly insignificant for countries below the threshold.  In regime 2 
where we estimate the impact of finance on growth, we find that economic growth increases 
by 0.515% following a 1% rise in private credit for countries above the threshold. Further 
results also suggest that financial development proxied by domestic credit positively and 
significantly influences growth for countries with initial per capita income above $621.64. 
These findings provide further evidence that development of the financial sector has a 
positive impact of overall growth rates especially for countries that have attained a certain 
income level to necessary to trigger growth. Our findings are consistent with Berthelemy and 
Varaudakis‟s (1996) theoretical work postulating that development of the financial sector 
largely has no significant impact on growth if a country‟s per capita income is below a certain 
threshold level. Interestingly, although financial development spurs growth, the impact of 
private credit is exceedingly higher than domestic credit and measures about 2.4 times greater 
in countries above the threshold. While this holds based on our sample evidence, what is 
apparent is that higher growth is registered for countries above the threshold relative to those 
below the minimum per capita income level. For instance, for those above the threshold 
income level, growth–enhancing effect of private credit is at least 1.7 times higher than those 
below the threshold. The values of the     are also higher in regime 2 suggesting that at least 
70% of the variation in economic growth in countries with initial per capita income above 
$621.64 is explained by our set of independent variables. Greenwood and Jovanovic‟s (1990) 
argue that at the early stages of countries‟ level of development, financial sector 
intermediaries play an imperfect role of resource allocation, risk pooling and diversification 
92 
 
but as per capita income increases, the financial sector begins to be sophisticated thus 
performing costly functions with higher returns. And as postulated by theory, average growth 
rate increases.  
 
Indeed, as argued earlier, apart from the initial income level, theoretical evidence suggests 
that the impact of finance on growth may be also mediated by the initial level of human 
capital. Our empirical investigation of this claim is presented in the Table 3.3 below where 
secondary school enrolment and primary pupil–teacher ratio are used as proxies of human 
capital. 
 
The mediating variable of initial human capital proxied by secondary school enrolment shows 
a threshold of 0.11   11% that referees the impact of finance on growth. This threshold 
variable lies within a confidence interval of 0.052 and 0.192 where 9 out of the 29 countries 
fall below this threshold. In regime 1, we find that for countries below the human capital 
threshold, financial development has no significant effect on economic growth and in the case 
of domestic credit, the coefficient is rather negative albeit insignificantly. Our sensitivity 
check on this relationship using initial primary–pupil teacher as a measure of human capital, 
we find a threshold of 18% for human capital as the threshold value at the effect of finance on 
growth may switch signs. Given this threshold, our finding shows that about 66% of the 
countries are above this threshold. On the finance–growth nexus below the minimum 
threshold, although the coefficients of private and domestic credits are both positive, none of 
them is statistically significant revealing that for countries with an initial pupil–teacher ratio 
below 18%, economic growth is insensitive to changes in financial development. 
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Table 3.3: Results when human capital is the threshold variable 
 
Dependent variable: 
Real GDP per capita 
Threshold variable: 
Human capital (proxied 
by secondary school 
enrolment) 
Threshold variable: 
Human capital (proxied by 
primary pupil–teacher 
ratio 
Financial development indicators 
Private 
credit 
Domestic 
credit 
Private credit 
Domestic 
credit 
Threshold value 
 
 
95% Confidence interval ( ̂) 
 
 
Bootstrap p–value 
0.11   11% 
 
[0.052,     
0.192] 
 
0.0000 
0.11   11% 
 
[0.052,     
0.192] 
 
0.0001 
0.1802  
 18.02% 
 
[0.127,     
0.301] 
 
0.0000 
0.1802  
 18.02% 
 
[0.127,     
0.301] 
 
0.0000 
Regime 1 
Coefficients of financial 
development below the  
threshold 
 
   
 
Number of countries below 
the threshold 
0.301 
(0.178) 
 
 
0.522 
 
9 
–0.222 
(0.147) 
 
 
0.517 
 
9 
0.401 
(0.264) 
 
 
0.613 
 
10 
0.195 
(0.115) 
 
 
0.599 
 
10 
Regime 2 
Coefficients of financial 
development above the 
threshold 
 
   
 
Number of countries above 
the threshold 
0.558 
(0.231)** 
 
 
0.691 
 
 
20 
0.211 
(0.106)* 
 
 
0.640 
 
 
20 
0.541 
(0.200)** 
 
 
0.634 
 
 
19 
0.333 
(0.118)** 
 
 
0.603 
 
 
19 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. Values in (  ) are the standard errors. 
 
In regime 2 where we estimate the impact of finance on growth when countries exceed the 
initial secondary school enrolment threshold, we find that financial development positively 
and significantly affect growth irrespective of the measure of finance. Specifically, economic 
growth increases by 0.558% following a percentage rise in private credit. This finding is 
robust to different indicator of finance as the coefficient of domestic credit is positive and 
significant for countries with initial secondary school enrolment above 18%. This evidence 
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does not differ even with the use of initial pupil teacher ratio as a measure of human capital 
relative to enrolment. For countries with initial pupil–teacher ratio above 18%, both the 
coefficients of financial development indicators are positive and statistically significant at 
5%. In particular, growth increases by 0.541 and 0.333% for a percentage increase in private 
and domestic credits respectively. These findings further provide unequivocal growth–
enhancing effect of finance on growth for countries with quality human capital. While this 
holds, we find that the impact of private credit is higher than the domestic credit for both 
measures of human capital. By relying on secondary school enrolment and pupil teacher ratio 
as measures of human capital, the impact of private credit on economic growth is about 2.6 
and 1.6 times higher than domestic credit respectively. The values of the    are 
comparatively higher in regime 2 suggesting that beyond the threshold values of both human 
capital indicators, majority of the variations in growth are explained by variations in our set 
of independent variables. In the next section, we discuss the impact of finance on economic 
growth given the initial level of financial development. We fix   at the LR estimate and split 
the sample into two based on the initial values of private and domestic credit and 
mechanically invoke the analysis on each sub–sample. Results from threshold effects are 
presented in Table 3.4 below. 
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Table 3.4: Results when financial development is the threshold variable 
 
Dependent variable: 
Real GDP per capita 
Threshold variable: 
Financial development 
(proxied by private credit) 
Threshold variable: 
Financial development 
(proxied by domestic credit) 
Financial development indicators 
Private credit 
Domestic 
credit 
Private 
credit 
Domestic credit 
Threshold value 
 
 
95% Confidence interval ( ̂) 
 
Bootstrap p–value 
0.081   8.10% 
 
 
[0.070,     0.196] 
 
 
0.0001 
– – 
0.135   13.5% 
 
 
[0.079,    0.191] 
 
0.0001 
Regime 1 
Coefficients of financial 
development below the  
threshold 
 
   
 
Number of countries below 
the threshold 
0.410 
(0.256) 
 
 
0.621 
 
 
8 
0.119 
(0.078) 
 
 
0.593 
 
 
8 
0.391 
(0.225) 
 
 
0.671 
 
 
12 
0.113 
(0.057)* 
 
 
0.653 
 
 
12 
Regime 2 
Coefficients of financial 
development above the 
threshold 
 
   
 
Number of countries above 
the threshold 
0.505 
(0.126)*** 
 
 
0.661 
 
 
21 
0.211 
(0.099)** 
 
 
0.605 
 
 
21 
0.611 
(0.282)** 
 
 
0.679 
 
 
17 
0.220 
(0.103)** 
 
 
0.670 
 
 
17 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. Values in (  ) are the standard errors. 
 
 
Starting with private credit, the threshold is estimated at 8.10% and falls within a confidence 
interval of 0.070 and 0.196 where 8 out of the 29 countries lie below this threshold. In regime 
1 which shows the impact of finance on growth when the initial private credit is less than the 
threshold, our findings shows that although the coefficient of private credit is positive, its 
effect is flatly insignificant. The same conclusion is reached with domestic credit. Overall, 
our evidence presented here reveals that financial sector development is ineffective in 
promoting economic growth when the initial private credit to GDP is lower than the 
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threshold. Apart from using private credit as a mediating variable in finance–growth nexus, 
we estimate the threshold effect of domestic credit at which the impact of finance changes 
sign. Our domestic credit threshold is estimated at 0.135   13.5% and lies within a 
confidence boundary of  ̂  = [7.9%, 19.1%] with a bootstrap p–value of 0.0001. Given the 
estimated threshold, we notice that in regime 1, both coefficients of private and domestic 
credit are positive suggesting that financial development enhances economic growth. 
However, only the effect of domestic credit is slightly significant at 10%. For the majority of 
countries above this threshold, we find that financial development is positively and 
significantly related to growth irrespective of the measure of finance. Specifically in regime 
2, we find that for countries with initial private credit to GDP above 8.10%, a percentage 
increase in private and domestic credit significantly increases growth by 0.505 and 0.211% 
respectively. Similarly, for countries with initial domestic credit exceeding 13.5%, higher 
financial development propels economic growth where a 1% increase in private and domestic 
credit increases economic activity by 0.611 and 0.220% respectively. Given this evidence, 
what is clear from the relative elasticity of growth to finance is that, although both indicators 
promote growth, the growth–enhancing effect of private credit is at least 2.78 times higher 
than the effect of domestic credit when the latter is used as the threshold variable. Similarly, 
by relying on the domestic credit as the mediating factor in finance–growth relationship, we 
find that above the threshold, the impact of private credit is about 2.39 times higher than 
domestic credit. Overall, our evidence suggests that below a minimum finance threshold, 
financial sector development weakly influences economic growth and as economies develop 
their finance sector above the threshold, economic activity positively and significantly 
respond to further increases in finance. Our data is thus akin with the call that financial 
services fuel growth by increasing the rate of capital accumulation as well as facilitating the 
efficiency with which countries employ capital. 
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3.5 Policy implications and recommendations 
This section discusses the key policy implications and recommendations based on the 
findings. Indeed, the importance of the financial sector to economic growth cannot be 
overlooked. In this study, we find support for the view that development of the financial 
sector spurs growth partly through its ability to allocate resources efficiently.  
 
The main transmission channels are that financial sector development ameliorates 
information asymmetry, diversifies risks, efficiently and effectively allocating resources for 
productive investment thus accelerating overall economic growth. Given this conclusion 
however, there are theoretical studies positing discontinuities in the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth. Starting with the level of initial per capita 
income as a mediating variable in finance–growth nexus, we deduce that although financial 
development positively affects economic activity in SSA, this effect is only significant for 
countries with initial per capita income above $621.64. What is also observed is that, even 
though private and domestic credit improves long run growth, growth elasticity to financial 
development is higher for private relative to domestic credit. A key implication emanating 
from this is that for economies in SSA to register the growth–enhancing effect of finance, it is 
important for countries to first improve their income levels. As long as a country‟s per capita 
income is above the threshold, finance drives growth. This is rightly so because as income 
levels increase, agents begin to demand for more financial services thus improving financial 
intermediation thereby increasing the impact of finance on growth. This presents a feedback 
effect where higher per capita income increases finance which in turn spurs overall economic 
growth. Thus financial development disproportionately benefits countries with higher income 
with no apparent significant effect on relatively low income economies in the sub–region. It 
therefore suggests that policies aimed at reducing the rather high rates of poverty in the sub–
region potentially improve the finance–growth relationship. 
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Building the human capital is also crucial in mediating the overall impact of finance on 
economic growth. Indeed, countries show variations albeit not significantly in the level of 
their human capital stock proxied by secondary school enrolment and pupil–teacher ratio at 
the primary schools. By refereeing the finance–growth effect using the stock of human 
capital, our key finding suggests that although finance positively impacts on growth, the 
significance of that relationship is only determined by countries‟ initial human capital. Thus, 
the impact of finance on economic activity might not be the same in countries with different 
human capital development. Specifically, our evidence shows that at low human capital, 
growth is insensitive to the role of finance but after exceeding a threshold level of human 
capital accumulation, increases in financial development significantly drives growth. One 
plausible elucidation is that, for countries with low human capital level, innovation and 
technological advancement is constrained and level of participation in financial sector 
activities (and inclusion) is minimal thus hindering the development of the financial sector 
with a concomitant effect on growth. However, as economies‟ human capital accumulation 
speeds up, agents‟ risk taking behaviour may increase thus raising investment and credit 
demand and an expanded financial system. Ultimately, the greater financial sector 
development therefore facilitates investment through financial intermediation. Apart from 
influencing agents‟ risk–taking attitude, higher human capital permits innovation and 
technology thus improving financial sector efficiency in financial intermediation which are 
crucial for accelerating faster economic growth. Following from this finding, it is imperative 
for countries in SSA to encourage school enrolment while reducing the pupil–teacher ratios. 
In all these, it is important for education policy makers to improve on the curricular in such a 
way that inspires ingenuity and teacher motivation. 
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While financial development promotes growth, the initial level of finance significantly matter 
in mediating the impact of finance on economic activity. In other words, below a certain 
threshold, the intrinsic drive of the financial sector insignificantly affects growth. An 
underdeveloped financial sector may be associated with high transaction cost, rigidities and 
sub-optimal resource allocation with consequential effect on overall growth. However, as the 
financial sector continue to develop above a threshold, growth increases suggesting that 
countries with relatively high financial sector development enjoy higher growth. A key 
implication is that the link between economic growth and finance is contemporaneous and 
financial development importantly impact on economic activity. Thus, within this framework, 
policies that alter the efficiency of financial intermediation invariably provide a first order 
stimulus on overall level of growth. At the policy level, countries in SSA need to design 
strategies to enhance credit allocation, competition and regulations in order to make it 
possible for the financial development to stimulate economic growth as these appear to be 
necessary condition for long run growth. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The impact of financial development on economic growth has received much attention in 
recent literature. The general conclusion is that development of the financial sector is 
positively related to the level of growth. However, theoretical studies have espoused 
discontinuities in the relationship. More importantly, the relationship between finance and 
economic activity is well mediated by the level of initial per capita income, human capital 
and existing financial development. While this is well documented at the theoretical front, 
empirical literature is silent on the nonlinearities in finance–growth nexus caused by the 
threshold variables. Beyond examining the impact of financial development on economic 
growth for 29 SSA countries over the period 1980–2014, in this study, we further investigate 
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whether the impact of finance on growth is conditioned on the initial levels of countries‟ 
income, human capital and financial sector development. Our overall finding is that, financial 
development is positively and significantly associated with economic growth. However, the 
growth–enhancing effect of finance is higher when measured with private relative to 
domestic credit. We re–examine the threshold effect of finance in the face of the threshold 
variables. Our evidence suggests that, in almost all cases, financial sector development is 
positively related to growth albeit insignificantly below the estimated thresholds. In other 
words, below the threshold level of per capita income, human capital and the level of finance, 
economic growth is largely insensitive to financial development. The only exception is the 
impact of private credit on growth below the income threshold where the impact is slightly 
significant. Similar trend is also noticed when domestic credit mediates the finance–growth 
nexus. The main conclusion drawn is that higher level of finance is a necessary condition in 
long run growth and so are the overall level of income and countries‟ human capital. 
 
 
Our results are of crucial importance to policymakers with regard to the optimisation of the 
level of income, human capital and financial development that needs to be vigorously 
improved to ensure higher potential benefits for the economy through the financial sector. 
The evidence presented here reveals that predetermined components of countries‟ structural 
characteristics are a good predictor of long run economic growth and that the level of 
countries‟ income, human capital development and finance shape the ability of financial 
sector development in ameliorating information asymmetry, diversifying risk and efficiency 
with which resources are allocated. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND SHOCKS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
According to the IMF‟s (2016) Regional Economic Outlook for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
global growth stood at 3.1% in 2015 and is expected to marginally increase to 3.2% in 2016. 
While global growth largely remains unchanged, composition with SSA performance is bleak 
and less favourable. Economic activity in SSA has weakened markedly with large country-
level variations. Growth for the region as a whole decreased to its all-time lowest in 15 years 
to 3.5% in 2015, and average growth for the region in 2016 is projected to further fall to 3%. 
The report highlights that, the most vulnerable SSA countries are the region‟s oil exporters. 
For them, the commodity terms of trade index dropped by 20% of GDP in a matter of a few 
years, after recording steady gains of about 45% during 2000 to 2014. Evidently, the 
macroeconomic effect is huge. IMF (2016) found that a negative terms of trade shock of this 
size on average generates a slowdown in annual growth of 3 to 3.5 percentage points for 
several years after the shock. 
 
 
With the exception of the region‟s middle-income countries (such as South Africa), both 
financial market depth and institutional development of the region remain lower compared to 
other developing regions. Given this understanding, there still remain substantial avenues for 
further financial development which could yield as much as 1.5 percentage points of 
additional economic growth on average for countries in SSA (IMF, 2016). Evidence abound 
of the positive relationship between financial development and economic growth (King and 
Levine, 1993a, b; Levine et al., 2000; Khan, 2008; Méon and Weil, 2010; Hassan et al., 
2011). While the empirical and theoretical literature has established a positive impact of 
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financial sector development on economic growth (King and Levine, 1993a, b; Levine and 
Zervos, 1998; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Beck et. al., 2000), the potential links between 
financial development and economic growth volatility in developing countries and SSA in 
particular have been understudied despite the apparent rampant shocks. Specifically, the 
channels through which financial development potentially affects growth volatility even 
remain unknown how much more the manifestations of financial development on the relative 
types of shock. More so, the extent of the growth volatility–financial development nexus is 
very mute in the literature. Meanwhile growth volatility, regardless of its source, is a natural 
source of worry in a world of market imperfections. This holds with particular force in 
developed economies where the financial sectors are relatively well-developed. Some studies 
(see for instance Caprio and Honohan, 1999) have long revealed greater forms of volatilities 
in high income countries on account of greater economic concentration. Legitimate as it is, if 
macroeconomic volatility matters in developed economies, then it must pose an even greater 
source of concern for developing countries that are still struggling to meet basic needs.  
 
 
Empirically, what we know so far on the financial development–growth volatility is 
inconclusive although some studies (Denizer et al., 2000; Easterly et al., 2002; Tiryaki, 2003; 
Beck et al., 2006; Tharavanij, 2007; Kunieda, 2008) have found some link between financial 
development and macroeconomic volatility. Apart from the limited studies, the few existing 
works relied on standard deviation to measure volatility with no apparent distinction among 
the different volatility components. This thesis argues that this approach is far from being 
informative as financial sector development and shocks impact on aggregate growth volatility 
via its business cycle and long run components. Growth volatility declines either a 
consequence of a change in the nature of shocks or a change in how economies react to 
shocks. However, majority of the cross-country literature on business cycles has rather 
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concentrated on documenting “stylized facts” without attempting to interrogate some 
disaggregated causal nexuses. More importantly, these studies have failed to decompose 
volatility into its various components thereby obscuring how finance uniquely interacts with 
each component and leaving out much of the richness of the volatility–finance–shocks 
relationships as much of the real world interactions can best be explained with disaggregated 
models of economic fluctuations.
16
  
 
 
This apparent and significant gap in the literature necessitates further research efforts in this 
direction as it presents a serious challenge to policy makers in the conduct of monetary and 
stabilization policies in the face of financial sector development. From academic and policy 
perspectives, there are two central questions this paper seeks to address. Do economies with 
higher levels of financial development experience more or less volatility? What are the 
channels through which financial development affects volatility components?  
 
 
This chapter can be thought of as a re–examination of the standard paradigm relating finance 
and macroeconomic stability. It makes two significant contributions to literature. First, this 
chapter employs the spectral approach in extracting business cycle and long run components 
of growth volatility. Relative to previous studies,
17
 this approach which provides instructive 
illustration on volatility, to the best of my knowledge has not been used in developing 
country context. Second, by decomposing volatility and in contrast to earlier studies (see for 
instance Tharavanij, 2007; Lopez and Spiegel, 2002), we further explore how financial 
development impacts on volatility component via effect on shocks.  
                                                          
16
 Our focus is not on the length of business cycles but rather on the cross-country volatility. It is imperative to 
note that financial sector development does not necessarily affect cycle length. In the face of higher uncertainty, 
investment irreversibility and indivisibility, economic recessions are expected to persist over a long time relative 
to boom and entrepreneurs will adamantly believe the economy is recovering and begin to take positive 
investment decisions. 
17
 Apart from standard deviations, band-pass filter and GARCH family have recently been used to estimate 
volatility (see Silva, 2002; Tharavanij, 2007; Hegerty, 2014; Hartwell, 2014). 
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Findings from the cross-country regressions show that while financial sector development 
affects business cycle volatility in a non-linear fashion, its effect on long run fluctuation is 
only imaginary. More specifically, well-developed financial sector dampens volatility at the 
business cycle. However, in the long run, unbridled financial development may magnify 
fluctuations. Further findings show that while monetary shocks have large magnifying effect 
on volatility at the long run business cycle, their effect in the short term is minuscule. The 
reverse however holds for real shocks. Our main conclusion is that irrespective of the 
component, volatility caused by monetary shocks is more important and persistent than those 
caused by real shocks and financial underdevelopment and factors driving fluctuations are 
largely internal. With regard to channels of manifestation, our evidence reveal that whether in 
the short or long term, financial development dampens (magnifies) the effect of real shocks 
(monetary shocks) on the components of volatility with the dampening effects consistently 
larger only in the short run.  
 
The rest of the chapter is as follows: the next section provides a review the theoretical 
underpinnings and hypothesis while section 4.3 reviews the empirical literature. Section 4.4 
outlines the data and empirical strategy while section 4.5 presents the findings. Section 4.6 
highlights the policy implications while section 4.7 concludes the study. 
 
4.2 Contextualizing financial development, shocks and volatility linkages 
The high growth volatility that many developing countries experience has reignited the 
debate on whether and to what extent output variations relate to the development of the 
financial sector. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) note that credit market imperfections increase 
the effect of temporary shocks thus exacerbating their persistence. Theoretically, Bacchetta 
and Caminal (2000) present a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model with asymmetric 
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information in the credit markets. The idea is that information asymmetry is reflected in the 
evolution of agency costs. In their model, asymmetric information only matters whenever the 
level of internal funds and collateralizable assets is sufficiently low. In equilibrium lenders 
find it optimal to restrict the amount of credit only to those firms that can self-finance a low 
proportion of desired investment. They posit two co-existing firms: affluent firms with 
abundant cash flow and poor firms with little cash flow and the latter suffer from credit 
rationing. Thus, given decreasing returns to scale in production, credit-constrained firms 
exhibit higher diminishing marginal productivity. Their theoretical model finds that 
information asymmetry affects the relative output movements if it impacts on the allocation 
of funds between the credit-constrained and unconstrained firms culminating in a 
composition effect.
18
 This composition effect exacerbates the impact of a positive shock 
whenever the level of internal funds available to credit-constrained firms increases relative to 
the total amount of funds. Thus, whether asymmetric information amplifies or dampens 
output fluctuations depends on whether there is a redistribution of funds in favour or against 
credit-constrained firms. Fazzari et al., (1988) show that fixed investment is dependent on 
firms‟ liquidity, which would not be the case under perfect capital markets. Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti (1997) also underscore an important link between financial development and 
volatility by highlighting the role of diversification risk reduction. They show that when there 
are indivisible investment projects, in the early stages of development, diversification is 
impossible. As wealth accumulates overtime, however, diversification becomes possible 
spurring investment thereby reducing investment risk and volatility. There is also 
groundswell micro-level evidence on the behaviour of firms that are more likely to be subject 
to information asymmetries (see for instance Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).  
                                                          
18
 See Bernanke and Gertler (1989) on how condition of borrowers‟ balance sheets influences output dynamics 
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Aghion et al., (1999) develop a theoretical macroeconomic model on the basis of micro-
foundations combining financial market imperfections with unequal access to investment 
opportunities. Their model shows that countries with underdeveloped financial systems tend 
to be more volatile and experience slower growth. They show that, low levels of financial 
development and the separation of savers from investors lead to vacillations in the macro-
economy with the economy converging to a cycle around its steady-state growth trajectory. 
Conversely, under well-developed financial sector, economies converge to a stable growth 
path along which volatilities are only due to exogenous shocks. Aghion et al., (1999) model 
suggests that supply and demand for credit tend to be cyclical when the financial sector is 
underdeveloped. Specifically, investors are more probable to be credit constrained when the 
economy is hit by a bad shock. The reverse holds when the economy sustains a good shock. 
 
Beck et al., (2006) build on Bacchetta and Caminal (2000) model with an endogenous 
financial intermediation and two conditions for the existence of a bank-lending channel of 
monetary policy: (i) firms cannot substitute bank lending with alternative finance sources, 
and (ii) the monetary authority can affect the supply of credit. Beck et al., (2006) consider 
only unanticipated productivity and monetary shocks and assume that agency costs do not 
influence output volatility hence providing no role for financial intermediaries influencing 
these shocks. The relative output effect of a shock that leads to a change in the relative wealth 
effect ratio of low and high entrepreneurs which is larger under asymmetric information than 
under perfect capital markets. The underlying intuition is that a well-developed financial 
sector alleviates the cash flow constraint for low entrepreneurs (or credit constrained firms) 
thus dampening the impact of shocks on the production function while magnifying the effect 
on monetary shock. On the impact shock on volatility, their model show that the effect of real 
(monetary) volatility on output and growth volatility is larger (smaller) under asymmetric 
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information than under well-developed financial system and increases (decreases) in agency 
costs. 
 
Aghion et al. (2005) examine how credit constraints affect the cyclical behaviour of 
productivity-enhancing investment and thereby, volatility and growth. They find that a lower 
degree of financial development is associated with stronger sensitivity of both the 
composition of investment and mean growth to exogenous shocks, and a stronger effect of 
volatility on growth. Aghion et al. (2007) model of long run growth and business cycles 
reveal that the share of long term investment is counter-cyclical especially under perfect 
capital market. However, this effect becomes pro-cyclical with an imperfect capital market. 
Since long term investment promotes more productivity relative to short term investment, it 
implies that the cyclical dynamic of the composition of investment dampens fluctuations 
when financial markets are perfect, but amplifies them under tight credit constrained 
environment.  
 
The theoretical underpinnings above mimic the proposition that if two economies vary in 
terms of volatility, the spectrum of the country experiencing low fluctuations will 
disproportionally lie underneath at the business cycle. This is particularly evident if the lower 
fluctuation largely emanates from a positive spill-over from improved business practices that 
falters output overtime. And if financial sector development mitigates business cycle 
volatility, then economies with well-developed financial systems will have their spectrum 
disproportionally lower at the business cycle component relative to those with 
underdeveloped financial sector. According to Gertler (1988) and Levine (1997), financial 
intermediaries decrease the costs of acquiring information and aid in reducing transaction 
costs. In doing so, the financial sector help to ameliorate information asymmetries, improves 
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corporate governance and efficiently allocates resource. However, its long run effect is still 
unclear. In fact Aghion and Banerjee‟s (2005) model is capable of spawning endogenous 
fluctuations under credit constraint economy where long run fluctuation is only a possibility 
for countries with underdeveloped financial systems and low level of financial 
intermediation. In their model, financial underdevelopment interacts with interest rate (or real 
exchange rate in open economy) resulting in volatility which can be persistent. Borrowing 
and investments are higher during boom period increasing the debt burden of firms resulting 
from higher interest rate thereby thwarting firm‟s wealth and investment capacity which may 
well fall below the economy‟s total savings. The economy eventually goes into recession 
driving down interest rates. In financially developed economies, firms invest up to the 
expected capacity of their projects because they face no credit constraints. However, in less 
developed financial economies, firms entirely depend on retained earnings for investments 
and do not experience long run fluctuations expected for those economies with intermediate 
financial systems. Leveraging from the foregoing, we hypothesize that financial sector 
development only affects volatility at the business cycles while shocks impact on both long 
run and business cycle volatility components and are dampened or magnified depending on 
their nature. More specifically, because financial deepening makes available credit for 
investment and consumption, shocks that only affect the real sector via terms of trade are 
dampened whereas shocks that directly affect the monetary and financial sector via inflation 
are magnified. 
 
4.3  Financial development, shocks and volatility: An empirical review of literature 
Empirically, literature on financial development–volatility nexus provide only mixed results 
on whether financial deepening lowers fluctuations. We classify empirical studies into four 
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distinct groups as follows. The first group focuses on the overall effects of financial 
development on volatility. Denizer et al., (2000) estimated fixed effects regressions with 
panel data and found that countries with well-developed financial sectors experience lower 
fluctuations in output, consumption and investment growth suggesting the proportion of 
private credit best explains volatility. Similar findings are found by Easterly et al.,‟s (2000). 
Beck et al., (2012) analyze micro and macro data from 32 developed economies and find that 
increased levels of financial innovation between 1996 and 2006 were associated with both 
increased levels of economic growth, and increased levels of economic volatility and 
idiosyncratic bank fragility. Indeed, these studies assume a linear functional relationship 
between finance and volatility which may be untenable on account of recent evidence. While 
a burgeoning financial sector can dampen growth volatility, excessive and rapid expansion 
can also propagate fluctuations. The empirical analysis of Easterly et al., (2002), Arcand et 
al., (2012) and Dabla-Norris and Srivisal (2013) suggest that financial development acts as a 
shock absorber against volatility but only up to a point; beyond which further increases in 
financial systems exacerbate shocks thereby increasing volatility. Rajan (2005) remarked that 
excessive financial sector development increases its capacity to bear risk, but also increases 
the actual level of risk taken, raising systemic risk and exposing the entire financial sector to 
vulnerabilities. Kunieda‟s (2008) study provides an elaborate insight into the non-linear 
relationship. The author shows that financial development has a hump-shaped effect on 
growth volatility. In early stages of financial development, growth is less volatile and as the 
financial sector develops, the economy gets highly volatile but subsequently becomes less 
volatile once again as financial sector matures.  
 
The second group provides evidence of varying effect of financial development on volatility 
at different point in time. For instance, Loayza and Ranciere (2006) found a beneficial long 
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run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth that co-exists with a 
mostly adverse short run relationship. Similarly, Lopez and Spiegel (2002) found a negative 
long run relationship between financial development and volatility. Controlling for factors 
that may influence fluctuations in economic activity, Tiryaki (2003) study reveals that 
although the long run volatility of the business cycle component of growth is dampened in 
countries with more developed financial system the short term response is mixed. 
Specifically, the author found that investment (consumption) volatility falls (rises) as 
financial systems develop but its effect on output volatility is insignificant. These findings 
appear to reconcile the seemingly contradictions in the literature on financial intermediation 
and growth volatility nexus.  
 
The third group traces the effects of financial development in mitigating adverse shocks. 
Aghion et al. (2005) examine how credit constraints affect the cyclical behaviour of 
productivity–enhancing investment and thereby, volatility and growth. They find that a lower 
degree of financial development is associated with stronger sensitivity of both the 
composition of investment (long term versus short term investment) and mean growth to 
exogenous shocks, and a stronger effect of volatility on growth. Beck et al. (2006) use the 
volatility of the terms of trade and inflation as proxy for real and monetary volatility, 
respectively. They find evidence that financial development dampen the effects of real shock 
proxied by terms of trade volatility while amplifying the positive impact of monetary shock 
on growth volatility in less developed countries. Raheem (2016) extended the work of Beck 
et al. (2006) by including efficiency of financial sector indicators. The author found that 
“more finance” strongly dampens effect on output growth volatility, “better finance” 
(efficiency measures) indicators have weak smoothening impact on output growth volatility. 
The interaction between financial development indicators and sources of shocks indicate that 
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the output volatility reduction stemming from shocks is enhanced in the presence of “better or 
quality finance”. 
 
By relying on semi structural vector auto-regressions, Loayza and Raddatz (2006) find that 
while international trade openness always magnifies the impact of a shock, its magnitude is 
considerably smaller in countries with high level of financial development. Similarly, the 
level of financial depth is negatively associated with terms of trade shocks. Caprio and 
Honohan (2001) however argue that the extent to which financial sector development absorbs 
or propagates shocks crucially depends on regulatory and supervisory framework. 
 
The fourth group highlights the effect of financial development at the industry level and also 
explores the channels through which finance impacts on volatility. Raddatz (2003) estimated 
the effect of financial development on volatility based on sensitivity differences to financial 
conditions across industries. The results presented reveal that firms with larger cash flow 
needs are more volatile in financially underdeveloped countries. The main conclusion drawn 
is that changes in financial development can potentially generate important productivity 
differences in aggregate volatility. Braun and Larrain (2005) found that industries that are 
more dependent on external finance are hit harder during recessions. In particular, more 
dependent industries are more strongly affected in recessions when located in countries with 
poor financial intermediation. This finding is collaborated by Larrain (2004) whose study 
reveal that firms experience lower volatility of industrial output in more financially 
developed countries suggesting that financial development by far relaxes financial constraints 
by smoothening adverse cash flow shocks. 
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4.4 Data and methodology 
4.4.1 Data 
We test our hypothesis by constructing a panel dataset of 23 SSA countries for the period 
1980–2014. 19  The choice of these countries is based entirely on data availability for a 
sufficiently longer time period. Annual data for the variables were gleaned from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank and Analyse Africa. We used credit to the 
private sector as percentage of GDP to proxy the quality of financial development. Credit to 
the private sector as a proportion of GDP is the widely used measure of financial 
development (see for instance Arcand et al., 2012; Levine et al., 2000; King and Levine, 
1993a) since it accounts for credit advanced to the private sector that propelling the 
utilization and allocation of funds to more efficient and productive activities. Arguably, 
monetary aggregates are not good proxies since they only resonates the extent of transaction 
services offered by the financial sector relative to its ability to relocate funds from depositors 
to investors (Ang and McKibbin, 2007). The inflation variable is the annual percentage 
change in the consumer price index while terms of trade is the net barter terms of trade 
computed as the ratio of export to import price. With regard to the shock variables, monetary 
and real shocks are respectively proxied by inflation and terms of trade volatilities estimated 
by means of generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) developed 
by Bollerslev (1986). Relative to the traditional approaches, our choice of this approach rests 
on its ability to harvest past values and behaviour of the series. By restricting the vector of 
terms of trade and inflation (    ) to depend on the log of its one–period lag, we estimate the 
GARCH (1, 1) model as follows: 
 
                                                          
19
 The countries are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Afr. Rep., Chad, Congo, Rep., Cote 
d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Togo. 
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                  (4.1) 
                   ~ iid N(0,   )  
           
                 (4.2) 
where     ,    0 and    0 
 
Therefore, our conditional variance    captures the mean (   ), information about the 
previous volatility,     
  (ARCH term) and the past forecast error variance,      (GARCH 
term). Thus, our GARCH model allows the error term to have a time varying variance 
conditional on the past behaviour of terms of trade and inflation hence reflecting the real 
volatilities. Figure 4.1 below plots terms of trade and inflation volatility. 
 
Figure 4.1: Real and monetary shocks 
Source: Author‟s construct using WDI. 
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Notice that monetary shock is more persistent relative to real shocks. As suggested by 
Friedman (1977) and Darrat and Lopez (1989), inflation variability is an important 
determinant of economic volatility. We also include government expenditure and trade 
openness to assess their contribution to economic fluctuations. While trade openness is taken 
as the ratio of sum of exports and imports to GDP, government expenditure expressed as a 
percentage of GDP measures final government consumption expenditure and used to measure 
government size. Table 4.1 and below presents the summary statistics of the variables. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Std. dev 
Coeffic
ient of 
Variati
on 
25
th
 
PCT 
50
th
 
PCT 
75
th
 
PCT 
Skewnes
s 
Kurtos
is 
Real GDP 
per capita 
1,405.88 1,964.41 1.40 377.72 546.91 1061.84 2.07 6.11 
GDP growth 
rate 
3.65 5.58 1.53 1.45 3.98 6.05 -1.13 20.10 
Government 
expenditure 
15.44 6.60 0.43 11.24 14.17 18.13 1.55 6.76 
Inflation 55.60 36.13 0.65 27.80 51.01 83.36 0.37 2.74 
Inflation 
volatility 
1.97 0.73 0.37 0.41 0.72 1.33 -1.91 6.97 
Trade 
openness 
71.91 35.34 0.49 45.81 63.63 92.26 0.94 3.54 
Foreign aid 53.25 5.02 0.09 50.80 52.42 54.32 -1.46 28.91 
Terms of 
trade 
volatility 
1.15 0.17 0.15 0.68 1.21 1.98 0.07 3.37 
Domestic 
credit 
21.64 23.63 1.09 9.77 15.34 24.88 3.45 16.40 
Private credit 18.91 15.53 0.82 9.23 15.03 23.81 2.28 9.52 
Note: PCT denotes percentile. 
 
All variables are averaged over the sample period and suggest that real GDP per capita 
$1,405.88 reaffirming the rather low income levels of the sample countries. Average real 
GDP growth rate is estimated at 3.65% with a standard deviation of 5.58. Private credit to 
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GDP ratio is averaged 18.91% relative to domestic credit of 21.64%. The mean government 
size as a percentage of GDP is also averaged 15.44%, fairly higher than the median (14.17%). 
To allow for relative comparison of the variables in terms of fluctuations, we estimate the 
coefficient of variation (CV) as the ratio of standard deviation to mean. GDP growth rate and 
per capita income are the most volatile variables given their rather high CV although the 
former is exceedingly higher. Foreign aid is the least volatile with an average of 53.25%. All 
the variables are skewed to the right except the GDP growth rate, inflation and development 
assistance. Financial development proxies are also positively skewed and so is real GDP per 
capita. We report the correlation coefficients which show the level of association between the 
variables (Table 4.2 below). The correlation coefficient reveals a positive association 
between financial development proxies and economic growth. However, the correlation 
between domestic credit and real GDP per capita is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. With the exception of government expenditure, inflation and trade 
openness, terms of trade shock negatively associated with all the variables albeit with some 
insignificance. Similarly, inflation volatility is negatively associated with economic growth 
proxies and aid although its relationship with the latter is insignificant. Both the monetary 
and real shocks have strong positive and statistically significant correlation with business 
cycle and long run volatilities. 
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Table 4.2: Correlation coefficients 
Variables 
Real 
GDP 
per 
capita 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
Government 
expenditure 
Inflation 
Trade 
openness 
Domestic 
credit 
Private 
credit 
Foreign 
aid 
Terms 
of 
trade 
Terms 
of trade 
shock 
Inflation 
shock 
Business 
cycle 
volatility 
Long 
run 
volatil
ity 
Real GDP 
per capita 
1.00             
GDP growth 
rate 
0.88* 
[0.00] 
1.00            
Government 
expenditure 
-0.13 
[0.51] 
-0.02 
[0.65] 
1.00           
Inflation 
-0.04* 
[0.02] 
-0.11*** 
[0.07] 
0.40 
[0.33] 
1.00          
Trade 
openness 
0.31* 
[0.01] 
0.10* 
[0.03] 
-0.81 
[0.41] 
0.22 
[0.61] 
1.00         
Domestic 
credit 
0.05 
[0.31] 
0.49* 
[0.00] 
0.16* 
[0.00] 
0.07*** 
[0.05] 
0.04 
[0.21] 
1.00        
Private credit 
0.64*** 
[0.06] 
0.79* 
[0.00] 
0.23 
[0.11] 
-0.51*** 
[0.09] 
0.31 
[0.41] 
0.61** 
[0.04] 
1.00       
Foreign aid 
-0.41 
[0.12] 
-0.61 
[0.23] 
0.55 
[0.31] 
0.11 
[0.40] 
0.66* 
[0.00] 
0.31*** 
[0.09] 
0.49** 
[0.04] 
1.00      
Terms of 
trade 
0.81 
[0.17] 
0.63 
[0.40] 
0.25 
[0.71] 
0.71** 
[0.02] 
-0.55* 
[0.00] 
0.62* 
[0.00] 
0.50** 
[0.03] 
0.47*** 
[0.07] 
1.00     
Terms of 
trade shock 
-0.81** 
[0.00] 
-0.63*** 
[0.05] 
0.09 
[0.52] 
0.71** 
[0.01] 
0.53** 
[0.04] 
-0.72** 
[0.02] 
-
0.41*** 
[0.05] 
-0.33 
[0.59] 
-0.95* 
[0.00] 
1.00    
Inflation 
shock 
-0.62** 
[0.04] 
-0.59** 
[0.06] 
0.34 
[0.52] 
0.89* 
[0.00] 
0.31 
[0.20] 
0.56** 
[0.04] 
0.47** 
[0.01] 
-0.12 
[0.38] 
0.43 
[0.27] 
0.50** 
[0.07] 
1.00   
Business 
cycle 
volatility 
-0.67** 
[0.02] 
-0.84* 
[0.00] 
-0.31 
[0.20] 
0.47*** 
[0..09] 
0.76* 
[0.00] 
-0.68* 
[0.01] 
-0.59** 
[0.03] 
0.47 
[0.65] 
0.71** 
[0.04] 
0.76* 
[0.00] 
0.55* 
[0.03] 
1.00  
Long run 
volatility 
-0.55 
[0.06] 
-0.67 
[0.80] 
0.52** 
[0.08] 
0.31* 
[0.00] 
0.78** 
[0.04] 
-0.52* 
[0.00] 
-0.65** 
[0.02] 
0.10 
[0.30] 
0.22** 
[0.03] 
0.51* 
[0.00] 
0.47*** 
[0.08] 
0.64 
[0.31] 
1.00 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Values in [ ] are the p-values. 
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Figure 2 below presents a scatter plot of economic growth proxied by real income per capita 
versus financial sector development measure of private credit both averaged over 1980–2014 
for the 23 sampled countries. From the Figure, it is clear that majority of the sampled 
countries have both lower per capita income and financial development measured by private 
credit reflecting their under–developed financial sectors on the back of lower per capita 
income. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Financial development and economic growth 
Source: Author‟s construct using WDI. 
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4.4.2    Empirical strategy 
4.4.2.1     Decomposing growth volatility 
As discussed earlier, extant studies have used standard deviation of GDP per capita to proxy 
volatility. However, the use of standard deviation does not distinguish among the different 
components of volatility. In other words, relying on the aggregate measure of volatility is far 
from being informative because financial development and shocks affect aggregate growth 
volatility via its different components. An improvement over this measure is the band-pass 
filter by Silva (2002) and Tharavanij (2007) to disaggregate the business cycle volatility 
component of the series. We decompose growth volatility into different components using the 
frequency domain approach by first calculating variance and its components relying on 
spectral method and by taking the square root to estimate volatility. By assuming a 
covariance stationary growth series, its variance is expressed as the integral of the spectrum 
of the series,  ( ), across all frequencies       . The implication is that a country 
with relatively lower growth variance would have a spectrum lying proportionally below the 
one for the country with relatively higher growth variance. Indeed, the distribution of these 
two spectra across the difference frequency range conveys crucial information about the 
relative volatility at the different frequency ranges. Mallick (2009) exploits this property. 
Two countries have similar structural features when they experience similar magnitude of 
shocks to volatility. With a varying extent of volatility to shocks, the spectrum of the one 
with lower volatility of shocks will lie below the other at all frequency levels. We leverage on 
the Wold‟s theorem which indicates that the covariance-stationary output growth has an 
infinite Moving Average process MA(∞). Given that the spectrum of any MA process is 
proportional to its corresponding innovation variance, the country with a higher volatility of 
shocks will experience a relatively higher innovation variance than the other although 
coefficients of the MA stay the same. We decompose volatility into different components 
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given that a particular component of the variance is the integral of the spectrum over the 
respective frequency ranges. For instance, our long run volatility is estimated as the integral 
of the spectrum over the long run frequency range. The business cycle component of the 
variance will also be estimated in the same fashion. Our spectrum is symmetric around zero 
such that only frequency range       is crucial. Thus, any variance component is 
orthogonal to other components when the covariance between the spectral estimates at the 
various frequency levels is zero. Given a covariance-stationary,   , the periodogram, a 
sample analog of the spectrum is given as: 
 ̂( )  
 
  
∑  ̂       
 
  
[ ̂   ∑  ̂     (  )
   
   
]                                 (   )
   
      
 
where  ̂  is the  -th order sample autocovariance given by: 
 ̂  
 
 
∑ (    ̅)(      ̅)
 
     
                                                                                 (   ) 
for   = 0, 1, 2, ……., (N – 1) where  ̅ is the sample mean given as 
 
 
∑   
 
   . Since our 
spectrum is symmetric around zero,  ̂   ̂   and the integrated periodogram for the 
frequency range (     ) is therefore given as: 
 ̂(     )   ∫  ̂( )   
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        (   ) 
It is imperative to note that equation (4.5) denotes the variance of the series   , attributed to 
the frequency range         where the frequency   is inversely related to periodicity 
or cycle length according to   
 
 
  . Since our interest is on decomposing the volatility 
components, the frequency ranges of the business cycle and long run are respectively given 
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as         and       .
20
 Given the annual series of our variables, we follow 
Mallick (2009) in choosing the values of    and    to respectively represent 0.79 and 2.09. 
Indeed, these threshold frequencies are chosen consistent with extant literature on business 
cycle (see for instance Baxter and King, 1999; Mallick; 2009) with the axiom that the long 
run comprise cycles of at least 8 years while business cycle correspond to 3 to 8 years (Baxter 
and King, 1999). Instructively, since our dependent variable variables – volatility and its 
components – are “generated”, measurement error can potentially to influence our estimates 
as it corrupts estimates at high frequency range. We avoid this by exclusively focusing on 
business cycle and long run components of the volatility on account of its exclusion of high 
frequency ranges. We first calculate variance (and its components) using spectral method, 
and then take the square root to calculate volatility. 
 
Figure 4.3: Business cycle and long run volatilities  
Source: Author‟s construct based on spectral extraction. 
                                                          
20
 Notice that low frequency is related to long run while high frequency corresponds to short run although 
periodogram at low frequencies is subject to greater sampling variation (Ahmed et al., 2004).  
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4.4.2.2      Dynamic panel estimations 
The primary aim of this study is to examine the effect of financial development and shocks 
on growth volatility components and how financial development play out in mitigating or 
otherwise propagating monetary and real shocks in the growth volatility process using a 
balanced panel sample of 23 countries (N = 23) over a 34–year period (T = 34). Indeed, 
studies of this nature involve invoking a panel models. However, standard panel estimations, 
such as the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed and random effects models pose 
fundamental challenges. For instance, the pooled OLS is often a highly restrictive model as it 
imposes and assumes homogenous intercept and slope parameters for all cross-sections with 
disregard to their individual heterogeneity thus allowing the error term to correlate with some 
regressors (Asteriou and Hall, 2011; Gujarati and Porter, 2009). On the other hand, the fixed 
effects model assumes common slope estimators and variance but country-specific intercepts. 
Both the cross-sectional and time effects can be observed with the introduction of dummy 
variables, especially in two-way fixed effects models. However, the fixed effect estimation 
approach is fraught with serious problem on account of the loss of degrees of freedom. And 
even for     ,  the fixed effect posses significant bias (Baltagi, 2008) especially when 
some regressors are endogenous and correlated with the error terms (Campos and Kinoshita, 
2008). Relative to the fixed effects model, the severity of the challenges eminent in random 
effects model is subtle in terms of degrees of freedom as it assumes common intercepts. This 
notwithstanding, the random effects models are time invariant suggesting that the error term 
at any period exhibits strict exogeneity and does not correlate with the past, present and 
future series (Arellano, 2003). This stringent and restrictive assumption is largely 
inapplicable in real life. Moreover, static panel estimators do not make use of the panel 
dimension of series by distinguishing between the short and long run relationships (Loayza 
and Ranciere, 2006). Additionally, conventional panel data models assume common 
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coefficients of the lagged dependent variable (Holly and Raissi, 2009) and this may 
potentially bias the estimators especially when the series are heterogeneous. 
 
These problems have been addressed by Pesaran et al., (1999). The authors note that while it 
is implausible that the dynamic model specification is homogeneous to all countries, it is at 
least conceivable that the long run estimators may be common. They therefore propose 
estimating the dynamic model by either averaging the individual country estimates – Mean 
Group (MG) – or by pooling the long run parameters – Pooled Mean Group (PMG). We 
adopt the PMG approach as it combines the efficiency of pooled estimation and at the same 
time avoids the inconsistency problem stemming from pooling heterogeneous dynamic 
relationships. This procedure fits an error correction model in an autoregressive distributed 
lag (ARDL) (p, q) technique of which we specify as: 
 (   )    [(   )    {         (  )   }]  ∑      (   )    
   
   
∑      (  )           (   )
   
   
 
  = 1, 2, ………, 23;   = 1, 2, ………, 34. 
where    is a vector of growth volatility components;    is a vector of regressors including 
financial development, shocks and other controls;   and   are the short run coefficients 
related to growth volatility and its drivers;   are long run coefficients;   is the speed of 
adjustment to long run equilibrium while   represents the time-varying disturbance with   and 
  denoting country and time indices respectively. 
 
Notice that the square bracket terms in equation (4.6) contains the long run growth volatility 
regression and serves as a forcing equilibrium condition: 
(   )           (  )       where        ( ) 
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The PMG estimator is particularly useful when the long run is given by conditions expected 
to be homogeneous (        ) across countries while the short run adjustment depends on 
country characteristics such as vulnerability to real and monetary shocks, volatile growth 
rates, financial and capital market imperfections. There are two key empirical estimations 
issues here: first is the need to separate and estimate short and long run effects and the need 
to directly decompose growth volatility components into business cycles and long run 
volatility. The second issue is the potentiality of the model parameters in the relationship 
between financial development, shocks and growth volatility to vary across the countries. To 
the extent that countries in SSA are affected by rapid credit growth and credit boom (see 
chapter one; IMF, 2015) make country–level heterogeneity particularly apt in the short run 
and may show some homogeneity in the long run due to convergence effect. 
 
Admittedly, Pesaran et al., (1999) contend that omitted group-specific drivers can potentially 
bias the estimates. Indeed, it is not uncommon in empirical estimations of this kind to reveal 
“poolability” failure due to group parameter restrictions (see for instance, Baltagi and Griffin, 
1997). Pesaran et al., (1999) therefore propose a Hausman test to examine the poolability 
assumption of the PMG and based on the result that an estimate of the long run parameters in 
the model derived from the average (mean group) of the country regressions. This test given 
in equation (4.7) below is consistent even under heterogeneity and more efficient in 
homogeneous parameter setting.  
 
   ̂ ,   ( ̂)-   ̂                                    
                                                                         (   )  
  
where  ̂  is (   )  vector of the difference between the MG and PMG estimates while 
   ( ̂) is the corresponding covariance matrix. This test is based on the null hypothesis that 
the two estimators are consistent but only one is efficient and if the poolability assumption is 
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invalid, then the PMG estimates will no longer be consistent and Hausman test fails (Asteriou 
and Hall, 2011). 
 
The PMG has several advantages over the dynamic panel estimations. Apart from restricting 
long run slope coefficients to homogeneity across countries while allowing short run 
parameters (including the error correction term) and the intercept to be country-specific, the 
PMG approach generates consistent estimates of the mean of short run coefficients across 
countries by taking the simple average of individual country coefficients. Moreover, Pesaran 
et al., (1999) show that this approach produces consistent and efficient estimates in a long run 
relationship between the integrated and stationary variables. Thus, our approach can as well 
be used whether the series are I(0) or I(1) downplaying the need for unit root testing. What is 
needed is a long run relationship among the series and a dynamic specification model 
sufficiently augmented allowing strictly exogenous regressors and uncorrelated residuals. 
Since we are dealing with macroeconomic variables for a number of countries over a 
relatively longer period, we test the stationarity properties of the series and long run 
relationships among the variables using panel unit roots and panel cointegration techniques 
respectively.  
 
4.4.2.3      Panel unit roots 
Analyzing the stationarity properties of the series is the first step in determining their 
cointegration level which requires analyzing the stationarity properties of the series using 
panel unit root tests. These are grouped into first generation tests which are the assumption of 
cross-sectional independence (Maddala and Wu, 1999; Choi, 2001, Levin et al. 2002; Im et 
al. 2003) and second generation tests which allow for some cross-sectional dependence 
(Pesaran, 2007). Consider an autoregressive (AR) process for panel data of the form: 
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                                                                                                                    (   ) 
 
where    is the coefficient of the AR process;    includes individual deterministic effects, 
such as constants (fixed effects) and linear time trends, which capture cross-sectional 
heterogeneity. 
 
Levine et al., (2002, LLC hereafter) extend the Dickey-Fuller test and propose a model that 
allows for two-way fixed effects of the form: 
                       ∑            
 
   
                                                  (   ) 
              = 1, 2, ………, 28;   = 1, 2, ………, 34. 
Indeed, LLC‟s model is general since it allows for separate deterministic trends in each series 
through     and for both country (  ) and time–specific (  ) effects with the latter (  ) 
allowing for heterogeneity since the coefficient of the lag dependent (   ) is typically 
restricted to homogeneity for all the series. The null hypothesis therefore assumes non-
stationary cross-sectional series (       ) against the alternative hypothesis (       ). 
Breitung and Pesaran (2008: 2) suggest that the appropriate conclusion when the null 
hypothesis is rejected is that “a significant proportion of the cross-section units is stationary 
or cointegrated”. 
 
The major weakness of the LLC test is that, it restricts   to assume homogeneity for all i 
(Asteriou and Hall, 2007) although there is no theory postulating that all the series have the 
same AR dynamics (Brooks, 2014). To overcome such weakness, Im et al., (2003, IPS 
hereafter) propose an alternative approach where, given equation (4.9) above, the null and 
alternative hypotheses are now respectively stated as              and          at least 
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for one  . IPS computes their test statistic ( ̅) as the average of the individual augmented 
Dickey–Fuller (ADF) t–test statistic for testing          as: 
 ̅  
 
 
∑   
 
   
 
IPS showed that, under specific assumptions,     converges to a statistic denoted as     
assumed to be independently and identically distributed. Under this assumption, IPS 
constructs a standardize statistic for testing panel unit roots given as: 
 
     
√ ( ̅  
 
 
∑  ,        -)
 
   
√   ,        -
 
 
Baltagi (2008) however argues that both the LLC and IPS tests require N to be small enough 
relative to T and at the same time requires a strongly balanced panel for the LLC test.  
 
Breitung (2000) develops a modified version of the IPS and LLC test which does not include 
the deterministic trend but standardises the residuals from the auxiliary regression using the 
Monte Carlo experiments. Breitung‟s (2000) test statistic assumes a common unit root 
process and is also shown to be asymptotically distributed as a standard normal.  
 
Based on Fisher‟s (1932) non-parametric test, Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) 
developed tests where unit root tests are separately conducted on each series in the panel and 
combined p-values associated with the test statistics instead of  averaging the test statistics 
and this is given as: 
    ∑   (  )     
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For a given       thus requiring a relatively large   to be able to perform this test. Like 
IPS, the Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) do not entail the same parameter,  , to 
apply to all the series because the ADF test is separately performed on each series in the 
panel (Brooks, 2014). However, the drawback of these Fisher–type tests entails deriving p–
values which takes time to bootstrap in cross-sectional dependence (Martins, 2011). 
 
 
Hadri (2000) proposes a residual-based Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, which is a panel 
generalisation of the KPSS test (Baltagi, 2008). Apart from assuming cross–section 
independence, the IPS and LLC tests are highly sensitive to the number of lag lengths in the 
ADF regression (Maddala and Wu, 1999). What is probable is the likelihood of obtaining 
misleading results particularly when these assumptions do not hold especially in empirical 
work. Hadri test therefore relies on the residuals from individual ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of     on deterministic components (constant and trend) to estimate the LM 
statistic given by: 
   
 
 ⁄ ∑
 
 ⁄ ∑    
  
   
 
   
 ̂  
 
 
In terms of stationarity test, Hadri LM test differs from the previous tests in that its null 
hypothesis assumes no unit root in any of the series (all panels stationary), against the 
alternative of non-stationarity for, at least, some cross-sections. Importantly, Hadri‟s LM test 
controls for a general form of dependence over time and allows a heteroskedastic disturbance 
across  . 
 
4.4.2.4      Panel cointegration tests 
 
The order of integration of the variables can be assessed by the panel unit root tests proposed 
above. Consequently, if the main variables are found to be integrated of order one, then we 
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should use panel cointegration tests to determine whether a long run equilibrium relationship 
exists among the non–stationary variables in level form. 
 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) provides cointegration tests for heterogeneous panels based on the two-
step cointegration approach of Engle and Granger (1987). Though the test allows for 
heterogeneity, there are different versions of the test and the within-group test assumes 
homogeneity. We use the between group test to allow for heterogeneity across the series. The 
test is done based on the following regression: 
 
                                                                                                           (    ) 
          where                
 
With this, Pedroni (1999, 2004) uses the residuals from the long run (static) regression and 
constructs seven panel cointegration test statistics of which four are based on pooling (within-
dimension or „panel statistics test‟). The “poolability” assumes homogeneity of the AR term. 
The remaining three are less stringent and restrictive and based on between-dimension or 
group statistics test‟ and allows for the AR term to vary. The assumption has important 
implications on the specification of the alternative hypothesis where the v-statistic is 
comparable to the long run variance ratio statistic for typical time series while the rho-
statistic is analogous to the semi-parametric „rho‟ statistic put forward by Phillips and Perron 
(1988). The other two tests – panel extensions of the non-parametric Phillips-Perron and the 
parametric ADF t-statistics – allow the slope coefficients to vary but contain the fixed effects 
and individual-specific deterministic trend. They are however valid only for I(1) series.  
 
 
Closely linked to Pedroni (1999, 2004) is Kao (1999) residual-based DF and ADF tests which 
specifies the initial regression with fixed effects (individual intercepts) and homogeneous 
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coefficients. However, this approach does not include deterministic trend and the testing is 
based on the following procedure: 
 
                                 (4.11) 
       where                
 
 
Baltagi (2008) notes that, Kao‟s tests converge to a standard normal distribution by sequential 
limit theory. 
 
Relying on multivariate framework of Johansen (1988), Maddala and Wu (1999) propose a 
Fisher cointegration test which combines the p–values of individual (system–based) 
cointegration tests in order to estimate a panel test statistic. A likelihood ratio statistic that 
averages individual rank trace statistics requires large number of temporal observations 
(Larsson et al, 2001). Importantly, these tests allow for a multiple cointegrating vectors in 
each cross-section. 
  
This study relies on the tests developed by Westerlund (2007) which are based on structural 
rather than residual dynamics and allow for a large degree of heterogeneity (for example, 
individual specific short run dynamics, intercepts, linear trends and slope parameters). All 
variables are assumed to be I(1). Suppose we have a data generating process of the form: 
 
      
      (       
      )  ∑          ∑             
  
   
  
   
                      (    ) 
where    1, 2, ………,  ;    = 1, 2, …………,   and denote the time-series and cross-
sectional units indices respectively. While    contains the deterministic components 
involving three possible cases. First,     , so that equation (4.12) does not have a 
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deterministic term. Second,      so that      is generated with a constant case while the 
third case,    (   )
  so that      is generated series with both constant and a trend. 
 
For easier exposition, we model the  -dimensional vector    as a pure random walk series 
such that     and     are completely independent. We will deal with any dependence across 
the cross-sectional units   by means of bootstrapping – which provides robust critical values 
in cases of cross-section dependence – and assume that there is no dependence of     across 
both the time series ( ) and cross-sectional units ( ). 
 
The parameter    in equation (4.12) measures the speed of adjustment and reveal the speed at 
which system fully revert to long run equilibrium following a shock. We require the 
parameter      to have a cointegration relationship among the series. If       then there 
is no cointegration hence no long run relationship. The Westerlund tests for cointegration 
using the null hypothesis of no cointegration while the alternative hypothesis depends on the 
assumption about the homogeneity of   . The Westerlund‟s test does not impose any 
common parameter constraint where the alternative hypothesis distinguishes between group-
mean tests and panel tests respectively computed as: 
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 ̂
  ( ̂)
      ̂ 
These tests assess the null hypothesis that the error correction term in a conditional error 
correction model is zero suggesting no cointegrating relationships among the series (Baltagi, 
2008). 
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4.5 Empirical results 
We start with our empirical analysis by providing findings on the panel unit root tests in order 
to establish the stationarity properties of the variables. Our findings on the stationarity 
properties are based on five different panel unit root tests: Levin-Lin-Chu‟s (LLC) t*, 
Breitung‟s t, Hadri‟s Z, Im-Pesaran-Shin‟s W-t-bar, and Maddala and Wu‟s    statistics. 
While we include deterministic time trend in all the tests, our choice for these tests is based 
on the fundamental construction of each test where the weakness of one test is potentially 
compensated for by the strength of the other. For instance, the LLC, Breitung and Hadri‟s 
tests are estimated on the assumption of common unit root process with identical 
autocorrelation coefficients of the tested series. Conversely, the IPS and ADF–Fisher    tests 
are based on individual unit root process on the assumption that the autocorrelation 
coefficients vary across cross-sections. The Hadri and Breitung tests allow for cross-sectional 
dependence. To minimise problems associated with cross-sectional dependence,
21
 we subtract 
the cross-sectional means in LLC, IPS and ADF–Fisher tests. 
 
We determine the country-specific lag length for the ADF tests based on the Schwarz-
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) where a maximum lag of 3 is selected for the LLC and 
IPS tests. We further employ the Bartlett kernel approach in estimating the long run variance 
in the LLC test with an automatic maximum lag length determined by the Newey–West 
bandwidth selection algorithm. Table 4.3 below presents results on the panel unit root tests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 For problems associated with cross-sectional dependence, see Pesaran (2004) and; Chudik and Pesaran 
(2015). 
132 
 
Table 4.3: Panel unit root tests 
Series 
Tests assuming a common unit root 
process 
Tests assuming 
individual unit root 
process 
LLC 
  -stat: 
H0: Unit 
root 
Breitung 
t-stat: 
H0: Unit 
root 
Hadri 
Z-stat: 
H0: No unit 
root 
IPS 
W-t-bar 
stat: 
H0: Unit 
root 
ADF-
Fisher 
  : 
H0: Unit 
root 
Trade openness 
5.132 
[0.391] 
2.111** 
[0.031] 
21.317* 
[0.000] 
1.811** 
[0.041] 
0.882 
[0.710] 
Government expenditure 
3.910 
[0.211] 
1.992*** 
[0.057] 
17.937* 
[0.000] 
–1.021 
[0.521] 
0.618 
[0.412] 
Foreign aid 
2.118 
[0.377] 
1.149 
[0.722] 
25.424* 
[0.000] 
0.912 
[0.701] 
0.725 
[0.188] 
Financial development 
0.923 
[0.192] 
0.321*** 
[0.071] 
31.514* 
[0.000] 
1.214 
[0.612] 
1.903** 
[0.041] 
Monetary shock 
0.163 
[0.221] 
0.044 
[0.801] 
19.642* 
[0.000] 
–1.731** 
[0.033] 
0.935 
[0.712] 
Real shock 
0.953 
[0.527] 
0.531 
[0.630] 
15.213* 
[0.000] 
0.189 
[0.422] 
2.013** 
[0.031] 
Business cycle volatility 
2.021 
[0.179] 
1.291 
[0.981] 
10.775** 
[0.012] 
–5.352 
[0.501] 
2.403*** 
[0.092] 
Long run volatility 
4.114 
[1.000] 
8.776 
[0.540] 
13.366*** 
[0.071] 
3.991 
[0.120] 
6.667 
[0.321] 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Values in [ ] are the p-values. 
 
 
Results from the LLC test provide strong evidence that none of the series is stationary as we 
fail to reject the null hypotheses of unit root given the high p-values. The IPS, ADF tests 
which assume individual unit root process and the Breitung test show mixed results although 
the Breitung and IPS test both reveal that trade openness is non-stationary. Apart from 
financial development, trade openness and government expenditure, the Breitung test 
indicates that all the variables are non-stationary. In the case of IPS test, trade openness and 
monetary shock are stationary while business cycle and long run volatilities are non-
stationary. However, relying on the Hadri test where the null hypotheses of no unit root are 
postulated presents strong evidence that all the series have unit root as the null hypotheses of 
no unit roots are flatly rejected for all the variables. Thus, our findings on the unit root 
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properties of the variables largely present evidence of non-stationary series. Economically, 
the non-stationarity of the series implies that shocks to the variables exhibit permanent 
impact with no possibility to return to their means. Thus, except in special cases where the 
variables are cointegrated with strict exogenous regressors, estimating OLS relying on 
nonstationary panel produces spurious results. Our choice of the ARDL framework is 
therefore apt as it does not impose strict exogeneity assumption and allows estimations 
whether the series is I(1) and I(0) process.  
 
Although the above unit roots tests present evidence of non-stationary panel, we further 
attempt to avoid the problem of spurious regression by conducting cointegration test in order 
to establish stable long run equilibrium relationships among the series. Table 4.4 below 
present results on three distinct panel cointegration tests: the Pedroni and Kao test 
automatically selects appropriate lag lengths for the estimations using the Bayesian 
information criterion. Specifically, a maximum lag length of 8 was selected. Our spectral 
estimations are conducted relying on the Bartlett kernel where the bandwidth is selected by 
Newey–West algorithm. Westerlund test as the third cointegration approach examines the 
significance or otherwise of the adjustment coefficient in the error correction model 
framework while Pedroni and Kao tests are both based on the residuals of the long run static 
regression. All tests are however conducted under the null hypothesis of no cointegration. We 
included deterministic time trends in all the specifications. 
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Table 4.4: Panel cointegration tests results 
Approach 
Panel 
Cointegration 
tests 
Dependent variable of cointegration regression 
Business cycle volatility Long run volatility 
Pedroni: Common 
AR coefficients 
(within dimension) 
Panel–v 
1.032 
[0.727] 
3.811** 
[0.043] 
Panel–rho 
0.721 
[0.263] 
1.320 
[0.962] 
Panel–PP 
–2.782 
[0.399] 
3.091 
[0.891] 
Panel–ADF 
3.367 
[1.000] 
5.229 
[0.510] 
Pedroni: Individual 
AR coefficients 
(between 
dimension) 
Group–rho 
–2.737 
[1.000] 
–6.503 
[0.557] 
Group–PP 
3.011 
[0.735] 
2.992 
[0.992] 
Group –ADF 
5.903** 
[0.035] 
–2.421*** 
[0.064] 
Kao T 
3.092 
[1.000] 
–4.955 
[0.998] 
Westerlund 
   
–4.332 
[0.710] 
–9.210** 
[0.036] 
   
–7.122*** 
[0.061] 
3.111 
[1.000] 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Pedroni‟s Panel statistics and that of 
Westerlund‟s are weighted. We do not bootstrap the critical values of the Westerlund. 
  
 
Results from Pedroni tests do not show any sign of cointegration between business cycle 
volatility and the regressors when we assume common autoregressive coefficients. However, 
the Panel-v test shows some level of cointegration among the variables and long run 
volatility. When individual autoregressive coefficients are assumed, only the Group–ADF test 
shows evidence of cointegration among volatility components and the variables. The Kao test 
on the other hand does not reveal any long run relationships given the high p-values. 
 
With regard to the Westerlund tests and with business cycle volatility as the dependent 
variable, while the    statistic show no evidence of cointegration between the dependent 
variable and its covariates, the    rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 10% 
significance level. Turning to long run volatility as distinct dependent variable, while    
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statistic do not show evidence of cointegration,    statistic strongly suggests that, long run 
volatility share common stochastic trend among the associated covariates as null hypotheses 
of no cointegration are both rejected. Thus, our results generally show evidence of 
cointegration among each volatility component and its associated covariates. 
 
4.5.1 Estimation and interpretation of the long and short run relationships 
 
We estimate the short and long run relationships between the volatility components and the 
regressors having established cointegration among the series considered. This is done relying 
on the PMG and MG with the latter being an alternative. While the PMG estimator relies on 
the panel extension of the single equation in ARDL framework, the MG allows heterogeneity 
among the long run parameters. As an advantage, the ARDL highlights information about the 
contemporaneous effects and the speed of adjustment towards long run equilibrium following 
a shock. While the short run coefficients are assumed to be heterogeneous and country-
specific, the long run parameters are taken as homogenous and identical across the panel. 
Table 4.5 presents results on the estimations of the PMG and MG. 
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Table 4.5: Financial development, shocks and volatility 
Variables 
Dependent variables: Components of volatility 
Business cycle volatility Long run volatility 
PMG MG PMG MG 
Long run coefficients:     
Trade openness 0.178* 
(2.910) 
0.194* 
(2.611) 
0.163* 
(3.171) 
0.219* 
(3.541) 
Government expenditure 0.114 
(1.310) 
0.215 
(1.516) 
0.098*** 
(1.993) 
0.137 
(1.621) 
Foreign aid 0.811 
(1.412) 
0.733 
(1.555) 
–0.219 
(–1.496) 
0.315 
(1.501) 
Financial development –0.217* 
(–5.374) 
–0.138* 
(–7.013) 
–0.331 
(–1.401) 
–0.271 
(–1.501) 
Financial development square 0.443** 
(2.202) 
0.392** 
(2.381) 
0.213 
(1.474) 
0.246 
(1.011) 
Shocks:     
Monetary shock 0.721** 
(2.531) 
0.815* 
(4.341) 
0.610* 
(4.521) 
0.774* 
(3.912) 
Real shock 0.221** 
(2.170) 
0.278** 
(3.013) 
0.437** 
(2.884) 
0.491* 
(3.714) 
Error correction term –0.745* 
(–4.118) 
–0.621* 
(–3.914) 
–0.687* 
(–3.701) 
–0.572* 
(–3.821) 
Short run coefficients:     
Δ Trade openness 0.221*** 
(1.987) 
0.277** 
(2.310) 
0.307 
(1.501) 
0.301 
(1.614) 
Δ Government expenditure 0.247 
(1.441) 
0.312 
(1.517) 
0.418 
(1.681) 
0.501 
(1.433) 
Δ Foreign aid 0.723 
(1.019) 
0.644 
(1.152) 
0.864 
(1.277) 
0.701 
(1.318) 
Δ Financial development –0.112 
(–1.371) 
–0.107 
(–1.533) 
–0.212 
(–1.349) 
–0.197 
(–1.276) 
Δ Financial development square 0.981 
(1.171) 
0.997 
(1.038) 
0.662 
(1.559) 
0.721 
(1.619) 
Shocks:     
Δ Monetary shock 0.317** 
(2.151) 
0.384*** 
(1.981) 
0.412 
(1.531) 
0.474 
(1.607) 
Δ Real shock 0.313*** 
(1.991) 
0.372** 
(2.011) 
0.218** 
(2.717) 
0.287** 
(2.510) 
Intercept –1.233 
(–3.781) 
–1.772 
(–3.922) 
–1.547 
(–3.792) 
–1.827 
(–4.018) 
Diagnostics:     
Hausman test (  )  2.113[0.945]  0.974[0.982] 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 
Number of observations 806 806 806 806 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Values in (  ) are the test statistic. All 
regressions include the full set of controls including country and time effects. Estimations are done using stata 
command xtpmg.  The lag structure is ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1). 
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We interpret the coefficients as elasticities since all the variables are in their natural 
logarithms. Starting with the long run effects of the regressors, results from Table 4.5 show 
that both the PMG and MG have robustly positive impact of trade openness on all the 
volatility components. Specifically, an increase in trade openness heightens volatility around 
its business cycle and so is the long run volatility although coefficients produced by MG are 
consistently higher. For instance, in the long run, findings from the PMG reveal that a 
percentage increase in trade openness significantly propagates business cycle volatility by 
0.178% compared to 0.194% from the MG. Long run volatilities are also consistent and 
generally reveal that, in SSA further increases in trade openness increases volatility. The 
implication is that reduction in barriers to trade perhaps increases countries‟ susceptibility to 
external shocks thus exacerbating growth vagaries. This finding is expected and consistent 
with Tharavanij (2007) whose finding shows a positive effect of openness on business cycle 
volatility in the pooled estimations. However, after controlling for country fixed effects, 
Tharavanij (2007) finds that increase in trade openness is associated with lower business 
cycle volatility. The results from the long run volatility also confirm Rodrik (1998) and 
Easterly et al. (2000) argument that, more open economies experience larger income shocks. 
Theory suggests that greater openness to trade might in principle provide a mechanism for 
smoothing consumption and production in the face of shocks, but at the same time could 
expose a country to greater volatility as exogenous shifts in trade disrupt economic activity. 
What is noted from our finding is that greater openness exposes economies to severe 
volatilities at all levels. To the extent that SSA countries have imperfect financial markets it 
also exposes the economies to external shocks and greater output volatility. 
 
Turning to the effect of shocks on volatility components, our results suggest that both 
monetary and real shocks are important sources of volatility both at the business cycle and 
long run component of macroeconomic volatility. These findings are robust to estimation 
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approach although the MG provides higher estimates. Specifically and following from the 
PMG, our findings reveal that a percentage rise in inflation fluctuations heightens business 
cycle and long run volatilities by 0.72 and 0.61% respectively. While monetary shock 
magnifies growth vagaries, its effect on business cycle volatility component is consistently 
higher than the long run component. Our finding is in synch with the monetarist view of 
destabilizing intervention: volatile monetary shock is associated with more pronounced 
business cycle. Theory postulates that whether output fluctuation is enhanced or dampened 
by inflation volatility depends on the source of shock to the economy: inflation volatility is 
expected to stem the tide of macroeconomic volatility when shock emanates from wage-
setting but not when originating in aggregate demand (see De Long and Summers, 1986; 
Driskill and Sheffrin, 1986). To the extent that monetary shock proxied by inflation 
variability destabilises volatility components highlights aggregate demand as an important 
source of volatility in SSA.  Indeed, rising aggregate demand can be associated with higher 
inflation especially when demand is not proportionally accompanied by higher output and 
productivity. Our finding is consistent with Karras and Song (1996) and Beck et al., (2006). 
The authors find that increase in inflation volatility is associated with higher macroeconomic 
volatility. 
 
The effect of real shocks is not different from the monetary shocks in term of direction. Its 
coefficients are robustly positive suggesting that increases in real shocks magnify volatilities. 
Indeed, variations in commodity prices are an important source of external shocks. As far as 
the PMG estimator is concerned, at the business cycle, a percentage increase in real shock 
significantly increases fluctuation by 0.221% compared to 0.278% of the MG estimates 
although monetary shocks appear to be an important source of growth fluctuations than 
external shocks given their relative elasticities. This notwithstanding, the contribution to real 
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shocks to both business cycle and long run volatilities cannot be taken for granted. Changes 
in the terms of trade affect the economy via relative price movements of imported input and 
exported output. As such, shocks to terms of trade should directly affect the tradable sector of 
an economy with and indirectly impacts on the non–tradable sector. Hence, economies with 
large non-tradable sector will be relatively less pruned to fluctuations in the terms of trade. 
What is perceptible from our finding is a significant effect of external shock on volatility with 
much higher impact on persistence. To the extent that majority of the countries under 
consideration are dependent on primary commodities, our finding on real shock–volatility 
nexus is expected and consistent with Kose and Riezman (2001) and Raddatz (2007). 
 
Government expenditure does not significantly affect business cycle volatility although its 
coefficient is positive. Our finding is inconsistent the notion that government plays as 
stabilizing role in the macroeconomy with its spending as espoused by Keynessian 
economics. While output volatility may decrease with government size in developed 
economies (see for instance Karras and Song, 1996), what is apparent from our results is that, 
in the case of SSA, government spending does not have any significant impact on business 
cycle volatility and even if government expenditure matter in volatility, its role is rather a 
destabilizing one particularly at the long run growth volatility component. This is noticeable 
given the positive and significant (at 10%) coefficient when estimated with the PMG. This 
evidence reveals that in the long run, effect of government‟s fiscal policy is benign at the 
business cycle but not the long run component as pro-cyclical fiscal policies and unbridled 
spending tend to magnify volatility persistence. The differences in direction of effect may 
largely emanate from the quality of spending rather than size. There is evidence that 
government expenditure in SSA is often on bad investments and boondoggles with potential 
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deleterious effect on growth. More importantly, discretionary fiscal policy when subject to 
long time lags may well end up magnifying fluctuations. 
 
The coefficients of foreign aid are positive except the PMG estimator in the long run 
volatility component. However, none of these effects are significant suggesting that foreign 
aid does not explain any component of growth volatility whether we assume homogeneous 
coefficients or we allow them to vary. Consistent with our hypothesis, while the coefficients 
of financial development are negative in all the estimations, only its impact on business cycle 
volatility is significant. The implication is that higher financial development is only 
associated with lower volatility at the business cycle component. Well-functioning financial 
markets should facilitate a closer match between savers and investors and help absorb 
exogenous shocks in the real sector, promote diversification and potentially reducing risks 
and cyclical fluctuations. Given that volatility changes respond to the propagation mechanism 
via financial development, economies with relatively higher level of financial sector 
development will have disproportionately lower volatility around their business cycle 
component relative to those with underdeveloped financial market. Thus, volatility at only the 
business cycle component will by far be dampened by financial development. Silva (2002) 
and Denizer et al., (2002) have shown that financial development lowers the volatility of the 
fluctuations in output during business cycles. Our findings are akin to Beck et al., (2014) who 
find that financial intermediation stabilizes developing economies. In financially 
underdeveloped economies like those in SSA, firms may rely entirely on retained earnings for 
investment due to credit constraints exacerbating volatility. As private credit increases in 
response to growth in the financial sector, funds available to entrepreneurs increase thus 
dampening business cycle volatility. More specifically, firms with higher liquidity needs 
experience higher volatility at the business cycle. Our finding therefore opines that the 
development of financial system reduces volatility as it provides distress firms with cash flow 
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for increase investment. This finding is particularly consistent with Raddatz (2003) who 
examines how financial development interacts with volatility on the basis of firms‟ 
differences in sensitivity to financial conditions. Does financial development always mitigate 
volatility? We include a quadratic term of financial development to capture threshold effects 
and our evidence reveals that while deeper financial system is significantly associated with 
less volatility at the business cycle, such relationship appears to be intrinsically nonlinear. 
The squared term of financial development is positive and statistically significant at 5%. 
Consistent with Dabla-Norris and Srivisal (2013), this finding implies that, while developed 
financial systems provide opportunities for stabilizing business cycle volatility, they may also 
imply higher leverage of firms and thus more risk and less stability. As the financial system 
continues to grow relative to GDP, the increase in risk becomes more crucial and acts to 
reduce stability. The coefficient estimates indicate that this threshold is 24.49% of GDP for 
PMG and 17.60% for MG estimators. Countries where financial development exceeded these 
thresholds included Mauritius, Mauritania, Senegal and South Africa. Above these levels, 
business cycle volatility increases with the level of financial development. This is perhaps 
evident when economies like those in SSA experience rapid credit growth relative to real 
sector needs. In fact, our previous chapter one presents evidence that unbalanced growth in 
finance and real sector destroys investment rates potentially magnifying macroeconomic 
volatility.  
 
With regard to short run dynamics, all the coefficients maintain their signs except the level of 
significance. Our findings show that only international trade openness and shocks are 
significant. And even so, trade openness is significant at only the business cycle component 
of growth volatility. Consistent with the long run finding, deregulating trade restrictions 
magnify business cycle fluctuation. What is clear from the result is the higher short run 
elasticities relative to long run. For instance, estimations from the PMG reveal that in the 
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short term, a percentage increase in trade openness significantly increases business cycle 
volatility by 0.221% compared to the long run coefficient of 0.178%. Indeed, economies‟ 
vulnerability is largely driven by either their structure or their level of economic 
development. Developing countries like those in SSA by their nature are more exposed to 
shocks and they do not always have the necessary and sufficient mechanisms and/or internal 
conditions to enable them to absorb the shocks. This perhaps explains why the impact of 
trade openness at the business cycle component is more pronounced in the short run as its 
long run effect appears to fade perhaps as economies begin to adjust and develop some 
mitigating force. 
 
Government expenditure and foreign aid do not influence short term fluctuations in growth 
components although their coefficients are positive and consistent with long run finding. 
While the coefficient of financial development is negative at all components, none of the 
effects is significant suggesting that, in the short run development of financial sector does not 
dampen macroeconomic volatility.  
 
In the long run, while monetary shock aggravates business cycle and long run volatilities, in 
the short run, its effect on long run volatility is only imaginary given the insignificant 
coefficients. Importantly, the magnitudes of effect suggest that short run monetary shock has 
a less magnifying impact on economic volatility compared to its long term effect. More 
specifically, variations in business cycle volatility increases between 0.317 to 0.384% for 
every 1% rise in monetary shock. Further results reveal that while monetary shock only 
affects business cycle, in the short run real shock affects both business cycle and volatility 
persistence. Specifically, the coefficients of monetary shock are robustly positive and 
significant consistent with the long run finding: increases in terms of trade shock magnify 
macroeconomic volatility. However, the elasticity of business cycle volatility to short run 
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fluctuations in external shock is greater than its long run effects reflecting the importance of 
terms of trade shock in fuelling short term fluctuations at the business cycle. The reverse is 
true for the long run volatility. The error correction term which measures the speed of 
adjustment to long run equilibrium is correctly signed and robustly significant at 1% under 
the two estimators. The significance of the error correction terms indicate that the models 
instantaneously return to their equilibrium levels following a shock to the system resulting 
from deviation of the long run path from its steady state.  
 
So far our evidence presented above suggests that well-developed financial sector 
significantly dampens macroeconomic volatility via various components but silent on the 
transmission channels. In this next section, we empirically examine the channels through 
which financial development mitigates the effects of volatility. We hypothesize that the 
development of efficient financial system impacts on volatility through its effect on shocks. 
We examine this by including interaction terms of private credit, monetary and real shocks in 
the volatility equation while controlling for covariates and findings are shown in Table 4.6 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
Table 4.6:   Transmission channels, shocks and growth volatility 
Variables 
Dependent variables: Components of volatility 
Business cycle volatility Long run volatility 
PMG MG PMG MG 
Long run coefficients:     
Trade openness 
0.112** 
(2.018) 
0.142*** 
(1.998) 
0.329** 
(2.318) 
0.391** 
(2.720) 
Government expenditure 
0.210 
(1.009) 
0.414 
(1.256) 
0.253 
(1.811) 
0.119 
(1.721) 
Foreign aid 
0.552 
(1.669) 
0.420 
(1.821) 
0.192 
(1.591) 
0.217 
(1.681) 
Financial development 
–0.196** 
(–2.036) 
–0.119** 
(–2.112) 
–0.215 
(–1.700) 
–0.171 
(–1.605) 
Financial development square 
0.312* 
(3.502) 
0.163* 
(3.409) 
0.271 
(1.515) 
0.222 
(1.049) 
Shocks:     
Monetary shock 
0.551** 
(2.190) 
0.793*** 
(1.985) 
0.561** 
(2.810) 
0.772** 
(2.601) 
Real shock 
0.208** 
(2.099) 
0.211** 
(2.633) 
0.314** 
(2.191) 
0.403* 
(3.182) 
Transmission channels:     
FD   Monetary shock 
0.191** 
(2.823) 
0.214** 
(2.511) 
0.256** 
(2.501) 
0.428** 
(2.577) 
FD   Real shock 
–0.199** 
(–2.513) 
–0.201** 
(–2.790) 
–0.291*** 
(–1.968) 
–0.312** 
(–2.701) 
Error correction term 
–0.612** 
(–2.914) 
–0.559** 
(–2.700) 
–0.591** 
(–2.930) 
–0.495* 
(–3.161) 
Short run coefficients:     
Δ Trade openness 
0.201*** 
(1.974) 
0.213** 
(2.001) 
0.371*** 
(1.981) 
0.309 
(1.801) 
Δ Government expenditure 
0.523 
(1.023) 
0.412 
(1.554) 
–0.701 
(1.765) 
0.611 
(1.621) 
Δ Foreign aid 
0.332 
(1.221) 
0.341 
(1.033) 
0.500 
(1.473) 
0.552 
(1.691) 
Δ Financial development 
–0.852*** 
(–1.981) 
–0.741 
(–1.715) 
–0.633 
(–1.577) 
–0.602 
(–1.617) 
Δ Financial development square 
0.331 
(1.503) 
0.282 
(1.299) 
0.292 
(1.777) 
0.310 
(1.672) 
Shocks:     
Δ Monetary shock 
0.299** 
(2.033) 
0.332** 
(2.501) 
0.360 
(1.771) 
0.299 
(1.632) 
Δ Real shock 
0.341* 
(3.910) 
0.339** 
(2.881) 
0.312** 
(2.766) 
0.290*** 
(1.920) 
Transmission channels:     
Δ FD   Monetary shock 
0.319* 
(4.011) 
0.401* 
(3.061) 
0.399** 
(2.810) 
0.290** 
(2.511) 
Δ FD   Real shock 
–0.381** 
(–2.610) 
–0.396** 
(–2.901) 
–0.419** 
(–2.111) 
–0.398*** 
(–1.998) 
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Intercept 
–1.251** 
(–2.803) 
–1.411** 
(–2.912) 
–1.802*** 
(–1.970) 
–1.771** 
(–2.004) 
Diagnostics:     
Hausman test (  )  1.952[0.791]  1.821[0.822] 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 
Number of observations 806 806 806 806 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Values in (  ) are the test statistic. All 
variables are in logs. 
 
As regards to the controls, in the long run the effect of trade openness in exacerbating both 
business cycle and long run volatilities is robust confirming earlier finding that de-restriction 
of trade barriers can be associated with severe volatility albeit varying magnitude owing to 
the estimation technique. While this holds, the long run impact of increase in trade openness 
on volatility persistence is enormous in both estimations with effect on long run volatility 
measuring three times higher than that of business cycle volatility.  
 
Fiscal policy measured by government expenditure is positive in all the models suggesting 
some magnifying effect in the long term. However, none of the coefficients is significant at 
conventional levels consistent with majority of the baseline findings that government‟s use of 
fiscal policy as a tool to tame long run economic fluctuations may not be effective based on 
our sample evidence. 
 
Both real and monetary shocks amplify fluctuations given their positive coefficients with 
estimates under the MG for the business cycle being slightly significant. While the effect of 
monetary shock appears critical, these findings confirm that terms of trade shock and 
persistent inflation fluctuation are both unhealthy for internal stability. As regards to relative 
strength in the propagating effect, our findings reveal that the long run effect of inflation 
shock on business cycle volatility is at least twice as the real shock and the relative effect 
produced by the MG is exceedingly higher.  
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Consistent with our earlier finding, the coefficient of financial development is negative and 
only significant at the business cycle volatility indicating that even when channels of 
manifestation are controlled for, well-developed financial system is associated with reduced 
volatility. The coefficient of the square term is however negative and significant at 1%.  The 
difference signs reveal the existence of long run U-shaped nexus in finance-volatility 
affirming the need to include quadratic term of private credit to reflect the threshold effect 
that too much finance has painful consequence for internal stability. Sahay et al.,‟s (2015) 
study in SSA also documents that financial development impacts on growth volatility in a 
non-linear fashion.  In terms of manifestation, our evidence reveal that financial development 
magnify the effect of monetary shock on both business cycle and long run volatilities. 
However, its magnifying effect on the latter is higher. More specifically, an increase in 
private credit from its 25
th
 percentile (9.23%) to the median (15.03%) exacerbates business 
cycle and long run volatilities by 0.21 and 0.16 percentage-points respectively.
22
 By 
investigating whether financial system dampens or exacerbates monetary shocks to the 
economy relying on cross-sectional data on 88 countries, Lensink and Scholtens (2004) find 
that financial development smoothes the negative impact of inflation uncertainty on 
macroeconomic volatility thus contrasting our findings. Perhaps the relationship between 
inflation shock and volatility as highlighted in their study is largely driven by the low (high) 
inflation (financial development) experienced by the developed countries contained in their 
sample.  
 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient of the interaction term of private credit and 
terms of trade shock enters with a negative sign suggesting a dampening effect on 
macroeconomic volatility. Specifically, we find that in the long term while trade openness 
                                                          
22
 This is estimated first by calculating the percentage increase from the 25
th
 percentile to the median value and 
multiplying the result by the coefficient of the interaction term at the respective volatility component. 
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increases macroeconomic fluctuations, developed financial sector reduces the impact of terms 
of trade shocks on both business cycle and volatility persistence in more open economies. 
Given the coefficient of the interaction terms and relying on the PMG estimates, increase in 
financial development from its 25
th
 percentile (9.23%) to the median (15.03%) dampens 
business cycle and long run volatilities by 0.125 and 0.183 percentage-points respectively. 
All these results taken together imply that financial development helps mitigate 
macroeconomic volatility even after controlling for monetary and real shocks, thus providing 
support for the role of financial sector in fostering risk diversification and providing liquidity 
within an economy. These finding are akin to Beck et al., (2006) and Mallick (2009). 
 
 
The short run coefficients are consistent with the earlier findings. Business cycle volatility 
and volatility persistence are responsive to trade openness given the positive elasticities 
although estimates under the PMG are slightly significant at 10%. Government expenditure 
and foreign aid do not matter in macroeconomic fluctuations in both the short and long run. 
While short run coefficient of private credit is negative in all the models, interestingly, it is 
only significant at the business cycle volatility under the PMG estimation. Darrat et al., 
(2005) find that short run effects on growth volatility from financial development are 
statistically insignificant. Further findings from our study reveal no short run threshold effect 
on finance-volatility nexus when we control for shocks. Thus, in the short term excessive 
development of the financial sector does not have attendant magnifying effect on volatility. A 
possible conjectural explanation for this is that in the short term, firms may be below their 
(optimal) solvency level and further increase in credit does not come at a cost to stability. 
 
Consistent with long run finding, both shocks to inflation and terms of trade have amplifying 
business cycle volatility in the short run. While real shock also significantly increases long 
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run volatility, the effect of monetary shock on short term volatility persistence is insignificant 
at conventional levels suggesting in the short run, shocks to inflation do not matter in 
volatility persistence. As regards to their respective elasticities, while both shocks propagate 
short run business cycle volatility, the coefficients of real shocks are larger. There is evidence 
that volatility driven by external factors and terms of trade in particular, generates internal 
volatility, especially in developing countries (see for instance Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007; 
Loayza et al, 2007). 
 
 
Juxtaposing with the long run evidence proposes that, while monetary shocks have large 
magnifying effect on volatility at the long run business cycle their effect in the short run is 
minuscule. More specifically, the impact of inflation fluctuation on the long run business 
cycle volatility is almost twice as the short run gleaning from the PMG estimation. The 
reverse however holds for real shocks. In other words, external shocks have higher 
propagating effect on short run volatility at the business cycle relative to the long run where 
the latter effect is 1.6 times greater than the former.  
 
 
Findings on the effect of financial development on volatility remain robust to model 
specification. We turn to the channels through which financial sector impact on volatility. 
Consistent with earlier evidence, our findings reveal that even in the short term, financial 
development dampens (magnifies) the effect of real shocks (monetary shocks) on the 
components of volatility. Relative to the MG where the effect is almost 1:1, the PMG 
estimation shows that the dampening effects of financial sector are consistently higher than 
its propagation effect in the short run. Overall, the findings reveal that improvement 
(deterioration) in terms of trade allays (amplifies) both volatility components. 
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As expected, the error correction terms are negative and significant in the estimation 
approaches suggesting convergence. More specifically, the coefficients reveal that, the 
system instantaneously reverts to its long run equilibrium following a shock that diverts its 
path away from steady state. The validity of the long run homogeneity restriction across 
countries, and hence the efficiency of the PMG estimator over the MG, is assessed by the 
Hausman test. While the MG allows the long run coefficients to vary across countries, the 
PMG estimator on the other hand equates the long run elasticities by assuming homogenous 
effects across the countries under consideration. Indeed, the “pooling” as espoused by the 
PMG across countries produces efficient and consistent estimates only when the restrictions 
are true and the PMG estimators are relied on. And if the true model is however 
heterogeneous, estimates under the PMG are inefficient and inconsistent and the MG 
estimators are used. Our Hausman tests of model difference accept the null hypotheses of the 
homogeneity restriction on the regressors in the long run given the low (high) chi-square (p-
values) test statistics. This evidence projects the PMG as a more efficient and consistent 
estimator relative to the MG. 
 
4.5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we determine the robustness of the results using (i) different measure of 
financial development and (ii) estimation approach. Specifically, we proxy financial 
development using domestic credit to the private sector which refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector by financial corporations, such as through loans, purchases of 
non–equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim 
for repayment. Relative to private credit, domestic credit to the private credit is a broader 
measure of financial development and extend to capture credit provided by non–bank 
institutions. With regard to the estimation approach, we use the system generalised methods 
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of methods (GMM) to examine the relationships among financial development, shocks and 
growth volatility components by estimating the following general model: 
 
                                                         (4.13) 
 
where     and       is the vector of volatility components and their one-period lag 
respectively;      is financial development;       is a vector of control while 
      represents the shock variables (real and monetary shocks);       denotes the 
transmission channels derived by interacting      and      . We also include the square 
term of      to capture the threshold effects.     is country–specific fixed effects;    is time 
effects while     is the idiosyncratic error term. i and t respectively denote country and time 
indices. 
 
We estimate equation (4.13) above by employing the system GMM dynamic pooled 
estimator as it resolves the econometric problems inspired by endogeneity of the lagged 
dependent and the unobserved    eminent in growth models. From equation (4.13), we 
specify our general system GMM framework as: 
         ∑                                                                           (    )
 
   
 
                        
                
 
where    through to    are the parameters associated with each explanatory variable while   
is the maximum lag in the model.  
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Estimating equation (4.14) above requires the error term to be uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables and can be written by allowing an arbitrary time period T for a random 
country i as: 
                                                                                                                       (    ) 
 
where   is a vector of   ‟s and   ‟s;    is a vector containing the lagged volatility 
components and all the explanatory variables while    is a T × 1 vectors of unity. 
 
We exploit the pooled cross–country and time series properties and estimating equation 
(4.15) above using the system GMM since the first difference GMM has poor finite sample 
properties  inspired by persistent explanatory variables rendering their lagged values weak as 
instruments necessitating the use of extra moment conditions that rely on stationarity property 
of the variables (Blundell and Bond (1998). Efficiency of the GMM estimates is contingent 
on the validity of the instruments which we examine using serial correlation and Sargan‟s 
tests for over–identifying restriction. Table 4.7 presents findings on the relationships among 
financial development, shocks and volatility components relying on a panel dataset spanning 
1980–2014. 
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Table 4.7: Financial development, shocks, volatility and transmission channels 
Variables 
Levels Transmission channels 
Business cycle 
volatility 
[Column 1] 
Long run 
volatility 
[Column 2] 
Business 
cycle 
volatility 
[Column 3] 
Long run 
volatility 
[Column 4] 
Lagged dependent 
–1.501** 
(2.111) 
–1.984* 
(0.005) 
–3.673** 
(0.039) 
–3.807* 
(0.002) 
Trade openness 
0.092** 
(2.149) 
0.077* 
(3.104) 
0.064** 
(2.301) 
0.059*** 
(1.910) 
Government expenditure 
0.051 
(1.422) 
0.025 
(1.333) 
0.040*** 
(1.921) 
0.037 
(1.600) 
Foreign aid 
0.094 
(1.115) 
0.101 
(1.410) 
0.077 
(1.094) 
0.071 
(1.251) 
Financial development 
–0.056** 
(2.017) 
–0.043** 
(2.281) 
–0.045** 
(2.173) 
–0.017* 
(3.744) 
Financial development square 
0.084* 
(3.901) 
0.061* 
(3.102) 
0.059** 
(2.321) 
0.021** 
(2.001) 
Shocks:     
Monetary shock 
0.066*** 
(1.968) 
0.056** 
(2.110) 
0.049** 
(2.091) 
0.029** 
(2.311) 
Real shock 
0.041* 
(3.620) 
0.031** 
(2.362) 
0.046** 
(2.210) 
0.027*** 
(1.980) 
Transmission channels:     
FD   Monetary shock – – 
0.093** 
(2.227) 
0.063* 
(3.340) 
FD   Real shock – – 
–0.023* 
(3.901) 
–0.019* 
(3.411) 
Diagnostics:     
Observations 806 806 806 806 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Time effects YES YES YES YES 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 
AR(1) z–value [p–value] –3.584 [0.000] –2.952 [0.001] –3.266 [0.000] –2.113 [0.000] 
AR(2) z–value [p–value] –1.793 [0.410] –1.012 [0.318] –1.827 [0.251] –1.146[0.409] 
Threshold value 33.33% 35.25% 38.14% 40.48% 
Sagan chi-square [p-value] 16.321[0.280] 21.544[0.271] 17.901[0.209] 22.535[0.233] 
Wald chi-square [p-value] 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Values in (  ) are the test statistic. All variables are in 
logs. The threshold value is the value after which financial development exacerbates volatility.  
 
Results from the Table above show that the respective lagged dependent volatility component 
is included as an explanatory variable and coefficients of the initial volatilities are negative 
and significant suggesting that the countries eventually converge over time towards a 
common level volatility. 
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Our findings are qualitatively similar to those from the PMG and MG estimations in terms of 
direction of effect but not the level of magnitude and significance. For instance, trade 
openness positively and significantly influence both business cycle and long run volatilities 
although the former effect is larger. This finding is consistent with our earlier evidence and 
suggest that a percentage-point increase in international openness magnifies volatility at the 
business cycle and long run component by 9.2 and 7.7% respectively (Columns 1 and 2). 
These findings remain robust to controlling for transmissions as trade openness amplifies 
volatilities albeit reduced magnitudes and impact on long run volatility is slightly significant 
at 10%. This is consistent with the finding of Easterly and Kraay (1999) that small economies 
are more volatile when they are more open. Government expenditure does not influence 
volatility (Columns 1 and 2). However, its effect on business cycle volatility is positive and 
slightly significant in the model containing the transmission channels (Column 3) suggesting 
that impact of fiscal policy on macroeconomic fluctuations is not robust and model-specific. 
Foreign aid does not appear to matter in volatility. Consistent with our earlier findings, the 
coefficient of financial development – proxied by domestic credit to GDP ratio – is robustly 
negative and significant revealing that higher development of the financial sector is 
associated with reduced volatilities at both the business cycle and long run components 
whether or not we control for pass-through effect of finance to volatility. Easterly et al., 
(2000) find that the amount of domestic credit available is necessary prerequisite for 
reduction in economic fluctuations. Our further findings suggest such effect is intrinsically 
non-linear. For instance, the quadratic term of financial development is also robust and 
positive confirming threshold effect in finance–volatility nexus. These thresholds are 
estimated to range between 33.33 to 40.48% and are relatively higher compared to the PMG 
and MG estimations. The conclusion drawn from this finding is that financial development 
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dampens business cycle fluctuations up to a point where domestic credit to GDP ratio ranges 
between 33.33 to 38.14% and begins to magnify volatility at the business cycle when 
domestic credit exceeds these thresholds. The inflection point at which further increases in 
financial development exacerbates volatility persistence is relatively higher and estimated at 
35.25 to 40.48%. Countries where these thresholds were exceeded over the sample period 
1980–2014 were South Africa and Mauritius. 
 
The effect of monetary and real shocks in volatility process is positive and robust albeit 
reduced coefficients at the long run components. Specifically, a percentage rise in shock to 
inflation magnifies business cycle and long run volatilities by 6.6 and 5.6% respectively. 
These effects remain significant when transmission channels are controlled for although 
coefficients produced here are relatively smaller. The results reported are similarly to real 
shock–volatility nexus where shock to terms of trade amplifies both volatility components. 
However, elasticity of volatility components to changes in shock is higher when the economy 
is hit by monetary shock relative to real shock. Even under real shock, effects are subdued 
when we include transmissions. These findings collaborate with our earlier findings and 
imply a magnifying impact of real and monetary shocks thus revealing the importance of 
inflation and terms of trade fluctuations in the volatility process. Controlling for channels 
does not alter the results. Specifically, we found that financial development even when 
proxied by domestic credit reduces both volatility at the business cycle and persistence by 
dampening the positive effect of terms of trade shock while heightening the pass-through 
effect of monetary shock to growth fluctuations (Column 3 and 4).  More specifically, an 
improvement in financial development from its 25
th
 percentile (9.77%) to the median value 
(15.34%) exacerbates business cycle and long run fluctuations by 0.053 and 0.036 
percentage-points respectively through its effect on inflation shock. Conversely, when 
domestic credit to GDP ratio increases from the 25
th
 percentile to the median, volatilities at 
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the business cycle and long run decreases by 0.013 and 0.011 percentage-points respectively 
via terms of trade. 
 
4.6 Policy implications and recommendations 
The results herein are of crucial importance to policy makers in terms of highlighting the 
optimal level of financial development to ensure that minimal growth fluctuations are 
maintained through the financial sector. We discuss key policy implications arising from the 
findings. We have found that while financial development dampens business cycle volatility, 
its effect on the long run volatility is insignificant.   
 
International trade policies are also often linked to the economic fluctuations although it is 
generally difficult to assess the overall contribution of an economy‟s openness to its business 
cycle and long run volatilities. On one hand, by lowering barriers to trade, economies become 
more susceptible to shocks. However, trade with other countries can also potentially decrease 
the effect of domestic shocks by “exporting” some of their destabilizing effects to the 
economy‟s trading partners. Our findings however document the latter effect as output 
fluctuations rise following de-restrictions on trade. In fact, the magnifying role of trade 
openness is more pronounced in the short run business cycle component. Perhaps in the long 
run, economies are better able to develop strong mitigating effects.  
 
The standard Keynesian view highlights government‟s consumption expenditure as critical 
antidote to fluctuations. We however do not find the role of fiscal policy in smoothening 
volatility in the case of SSA as effects of government size are largely insignificant suggesting 
that using fiscal policy to stabilize the economy will be ineffective. Our evidence highlights 
the role of financial sector in economic fluctuations given the negative relationship between 
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financial development and business cycle volatility. The implication is that, developed 
financial systems are more capable of screening potential borrowers, which should reduce the 
likelihood that projects with greater probability of failure are financed. Thus, smoother 
business cycle is associated with financial systems characterized by reduced credit markets 
imperfections. From a theoretical perspective, the “balance sheet view” postulates that 
developed financial sectors improves the ability of financial institutions to gather, process 
and screen information about debtors thus reducing agency costs and minimizing credit 
market imperfections. Because external shocks to economic activity are magnified by 
asymmetric information, lowering the level of market imperfections is therefore expected to 
reduce volatility at the business cycle (see Hubbard, 1997; and Bernanke et al., 1998).  
 
In other words, financial development indicators may reveal the level and effects of financial 
imperfections arising from information asymmetries and/or other structural bottlenecks. 
Thus, an adverse relationship between volatility and financial development is generally 
consistent with the hypothesized impact of asymmetric information in amplifying business 
cycles. Indeed, the idea is that factors motivating the growth–enhancing effects of financial 
development should also lead to smoother fluctuations. As financial systems become more 
capable of cream-skimming, the likelihood of financing bad projects is reduced thus taming 
economic activity fluctuations. The overall result emerging from the cross-country 
regressions is that economic fluctuations are less volatile with developed financial sector. 
However, unbridled financial development associated with over developed financial sector is 
not healthy for growth as financial development–volatility nexus is nonlinear. Specifically, 
financial development decreases business cycle volatility up to a point beyond which further 
increases in financial sector size magnifies volatility. While developed financial systems tend 
to be more efficient in identifying those firms that wrongly overstate the extent of their 
liquidity, over developed financial sector is often associated with excessive credit growth to 
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the private sector thus permitting the financing of unsustainable projects magnifying business 
cycle volatility. Thus, knowledge of firms‟ solvency needs and proper supervision is 
therefore needed to ensure that credit advanced is consistent with the solvency needs of firms 
because in the end, the behaviour of those firms are constrained by the financial sectors‟ 
unwillingness to lend. Business cycles will therefore be smoother following financial 
institutions‟ effective use of available information about potential borrowers and cash flow 
needs. Encouraging financial development for its own sake may be counter-productive. 
Policy makers should rather seek to strengthen the appropriate size and quality of finance 
rather than expanding the financial sector. 
 
 
Our cross–country evidence suggests that large fluctuations in commodity prices have non-
trivial quantitative effects that warrant some attention. However, the general notion is that 
although real shocks have magnifying effect on real activity via business cycle of developing 
economies, they account for only a small proportion of the volatility of these countries that 
emanate from monetary shock. Put differently, volatility caused by monetary shocks is more 
important and persistent than that caused by real shocks and financial underdevelopment of 
SSA. If domestic output fluctuations were primarily driven by external shocks, then our 
evidence would have supported the real business cycle view that economic fluctuations are 
largely influenced by world productivity disturbances. Rather, our findings show that factors 
driving fluctuations are largely internal. More importantly, the rather high inflationary 
pressures as experienced in majority of the countries under consideration exacerbates 
macroeconomic instability and volatility. Thus, the belief that stabilizing exogenous shocks 
would significantly dampen SSA‟s long run macroeconomic volatility is not borne out by 
current data. 
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With regard to transmission channels, higher levels of financial development magnify the 
impact of monetary shocks proxied by shock to inflation. Rising inflation reduces consumers‟ 
spending as this erodes purchasing power thus lowering firms‟ revenues, net worth and 
creditworthiness. These increases the agency costs and the external financing premium 
magnifies shocks to economic activity by amplifying spending, borrowing and investment 
vagaries. The magnifying effect of financial sector is however higher at the short run business 
cycle relative to the long run. This notwithstanding, financial development dampens the 
positive effect of real shocks on volatility components. Apart from relaxing credit constraints 
for firms, deepening the financial sector may also help mitigate real shock to economic 
activity as it promotes diversification thereby lowering risk. 
 
 
The large role played by internal factors signifies that exogenous contingencies may not have 
substantial power to smooth macroeconomic volatilities. Even without controlling for the 
pass-through effects of finance to volatility, the relatively sizable external shocks raise some 
critical issues regarding the best response to shocks. Thus, irrespective of the nature of shock, 
structural changes may be an important prerequisite for taming volatility as these ensure 
strong domestic institutions necessary for maintaining macroeconomic stability and sound 
position in the international economy.  
 
At the policy front, strengthening supervision, including cross-border oversight is crucial in 
examining the right levels of finance necessary to falter economic fluctuations. Because 
enforcement of prudential standards remains lax, providing supervisors with more 
enforcement power and strengthening the capacity of Central Banks should be the core in 
financial sector development process. Moreover, leveraging on the importance of monetary 
shocks in propagating volatility, it is important for Central Banks like those in SSA to adopt 
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inflation targeting approach as it sets institutional commitment to price stability as the 
primary long run goal of monetary policy. A major perceived challenge will be on managing 
Central Bank and government‟s relationship. While granting Central Banks‟ autonomy and 
depersonalizing the conduct of monetary policy, setting inflation targets with direct 
involvement of government coupled with a more active and transparent role of the Central 
Bank in communicating targets to government and the public is crucial in managing 
relationships. Our evidence suggest that, monetary policy that targets inflation is likely to 
produce better outcomes for both output and inflation volatilities. Cecchetti and Ehrmann 
(2000) provide evidence that Central Banks‟ aversion to inflation shocks is stronger with the 
adoption of inflation targeting. However, increased uncertainty in developing economies 
particularly makes it tedious to predict inflation movement as required by the forward-
looking nature of inflation targeting. Improving transparency by regularly communicating 
inflation targets and policy commitments to the public reduces speculations fuelling 
inflation.
23
 And given the obvious likelihood that countries in SSA are frequently hit by 
shocks that could distort inflation from its long run path, missing the inflation targets may be 
untenable. What is needed by policy makers is to focus on short to medium term to ensure 
that deviations are brought on track and inflation converges to a trajectory consistent with 
price stability and financial sector development.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to examine the role of financial sector development in 
volatility as well as channels through which finance impacts on volatility relying on annual 
data for 23 countries in SSA spanning 1980–2014. Earlier studies attempting to assess 
finance-growth volatility nexus have not been informative as they fail to decompose the 
                                                          
23
 There is evidence that South Africa adopted the inflation targeting approach in February, 2000 but does not 
publish inflation forecasts limiting the transparency and accountability of the Central Bank (see Mishkin, 2007). 
160 
 
various components of volatility understanding that financial development affects volatility 
through its different components. This paper quantified the relative importance of a monetary 
and real shocks and the how finance affects business cycle and long run volatilities through 
its interaction with broad set of shocks. Our overall finding supports the salutary effect of 
finance reducing business cycle volatility in SSA albeit not monotonically. The implication is 
that while well-developed financial sector dampens volatility at the business cycle, unbridled 
financial development may also magnify fluctuations. However, effect of financial 
development on long run fluctuation is only imaginary. Further findings show that while 
monetary shocks have large magnifying effect on volatility at the long run business cycle, 
their effect in the short run is minuscule. The reverse however holds for real shocks. Our 
main conclusion is that irrespective of the component, volatility caused by monetary shocks 
is more persistent than those caused by real shocks and financial underdevelopment. This 
notwithstanding, our evidence reveals that irrespective of the time horizon, financial 
development dampens (magnifies) the effect of real shocks (monetary shocks) on the 
components of volatility although the dampening effects are huge in the short run. These 
findings are robust to financial development proxy and estimation approach and reaffirm our 
evidence on finance–volatility nexus. To smooth volatility, the study recommends Central 
Banks to strengthen their supervision role in aligning financial development towards a path 
consistent with long run growth while adopting an inflation targeting approach to falter 
monetary shocks. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, VOLATILITY AND INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRY: DOES LAW MATTER? 
5.1 Introduction 
A growing body of literature highlights financial development as a key factor in promoting 
economic growth (Levine, 1997; Beck et al., 2000; Hassan et al., 2011) and reducing 
economic volatility (Denizer et al., 2000; Ibrahim and Alagidede, 2017). Recent studies 
identify legal origin as important factor influencing cross–country differences in financial 
development and growth (Beck et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998a; Levine, 1998). More 
importantly, the law–finance theory suggests that common law countries have better 
prospects for financial development than civil law countries. The reasons are that common 
laws are more likely to protect the private property rights relative to the State, and they tend 
to be dynamic to changing country landscape (La Porta et al., 1998a; Beck and Levine, 
2003). 
 
There is literature proffering that limited access to finance has been on account of higher 
information asymmetry (Triki and Gajiko, 2014; Asongu et al., 2015). Consequently, the 
desire to increase financial access and financial development has led to the establishment of 
information sharing offices notably the Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) across sub–Saharan 
Africa (SSA) countries with the intent of reducing information asymmetry between 
borrowers and lenders in the financial markets. Indeed, some authors (Batuo and Kupukile, 
2010; Allen et al., 2011) have argued that the establishment of information sharing offices is 
based on the premise that, the limited access to finance (and financial development more 
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generally) by prospective borrowers is constrained by such factors (namely eligibility of bank 
lending, physical access and affordability) that can be explained by information asymmetry. 
 
 
Theoretically, information sharing offices are expected to serve as agents of financial 
intermediation by narrowing information gap between borrowers and lenders. According to 
Jappelli and Pagano (2012), by reducing information asymmetry, these information sharing 
bureaus are able to increase competition and reduce bottlenecks in access to finance thus 
aiding in efficient capital allocation. However, recent literature on information asymmetry 
(see Asongu et al., 2015) has doubted the ability of these information sharing offices to 
inspire competition in the financial sector for increased financial access.  
 
 
For most part, studies on information asymmetry and financial development (Ivashina, 2009; 
Houston et al., 2010; Tanjung et al., 2010) have failed to (i) engage the crucial role of law in 
financial development in the light of evolving legal systems in SSA, (ii) incorporate the 
concept of finance given the role of banking institutions in transforming mobilised deposits 
into credit for productive investment. On the other hand, the law–finance theory literature in 
Africa (see for instance Asongu, 2011) has been situated around its implications for economic 
growth and welfare without examining how legal origin explains cross–country differences in 
economic volatility. More tellingly, how effective law shapes and/or limits information 
sharing in growth volatility remains an unexplored area of research in SSA. 
 
The current literature has therefore left much space for engagement in at least three areas: (i) 
re–positioning the debate where the issue of financial development and banking system 
efficiency is lower (ii) examining the role of legal origin in influencing information sharing 
for both financial system activity and the fundamental role of financial institutions to 
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transform mobilised deposits into credit for economic agents and (iii) examining the 
moderation role of legal origin in information asymmetry–economic volatility nexus. Given 
the evolving legal systems in the sub–region on the back of narrow financial markets, shocks 
and volatility, we engage the literature by re–examining the law–finance theory and the 
fundamental role of information sharing in financial development measured in terms of 
financial activity and efficiency. We also examine how legal origin interacts with information 
asymmetry in explaining cross–country differences in economic volatility in SSA. This study 
therefore presents a case for the imperative of introducing the previously missing links into 
the law–finance literature. 
 
Our evidence suggests that legal origin significantly explains cross–country differences in 
financial development and economic volatility. More importantly, English common law 
countries have higher financial sector development both in terms of activity and efficiency 
accompanied by low growth volatility. Not only is the relationship between the interaction 
term of legal origin and private credit bureau (PCB) on volatility negative and statistically 
significant, it is economically large for the English legal legacy countries. Specifically, 
volatility–reducing effect of the English common law is greater than Portuguese legal origin 
while countries with the French civil law origins are within the two. Although the effect of 
PCB is negative and significant, juxtaposing the impact of PCB on volatility on one hand and 
that of transmission channel on the other suggests that, the establishment of information 
sharing offices per se may be insufficient in taming growth vagaries. We argue that it is the 
effectiveness of law that is exceedingly relevant in faltering economic volatility. Thus, 
relative to countries with lax legal systems, those that enforce contracts effectively, protects 
private property and lender rights have better information sharing and reduced information 
asymmetry which are essential in smoothening fluctuations. 
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The rest of the chapter is as follows: the next section draws the linkages among legal origin, 
financial sector development and information asymmetry. Section 5.3 reviews a body of 
empirical literature on these nexuses. Section 5.4 outlines the data and empirical strategy 
while section 5.5 presents the findings. We highlight the policy implications and 
recommendations in section 5.6 and section 5.7 concludes the study.  
 
5.2 Legal origin, finance and information asymmetry: Drawing the linkages 
According to Beck and Levine (2003), legal origins have been argued to influence financial 
development through (i) the political and (ii) adaptability channels. The former is built on 
two tenets: first, legal legacy vary regarding its emphasis on protecting the rights of private 
investors compared with that of the State. Second, private property rights protection forms 
the bedrock of financial development. Thus, primitively, differences in legal traditions may 
predicate prior variations in the level of financial development (La Porta et al., 1998a). 
Hence, the extent to which legal origin enhances or hampers the financial sector depends on 
whether it supports the right of private property rights relative to the State or vice versa. 
Where the prevailing legal framework supports the State, then private property rights tend to 
suffer and the reverse also holds. Arguably, relative to the common laws, the political 
mechanism contends that civil laws are more inclined to protecting the rights of the State as 
opposed to property rights which has consequential dire implications for financial 
development (Beck and Levine, 2003). La Porta et al., (2003) note that States are more likely 
to intervene in the judicial system by hesitating judges‟ permission, offering courts‟ 
jurisdiction over cases involving the government or allowing judicial review of the laws 
governing the country which may lower its powers. La Porta et al., (1999) therefore likens 
civil legal origin to the intent of building institutions to further confer powers to the State. In 
this case, a more powerful State is progressively inclined to misappropriate society‟s 
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resources to its favour which is detrimental to competitive financial market systems. 
Moreover, a relatively powerful State is more likely to interfere in the operations of the 
financial sector by directing the flow of financial resources to cronies and ultimately 
increasing non–performing loans of the financial institutions. The law and finance theory 
therefore suggests that civil law countries have feeble private property rights protection and a 
lower financial sector development relative to other legal legacies. 
 
 
Conversely, the common law has historically been projected to uphold the rights of private 
property owners against the State. In fact, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that compared to 
civil law countries, governments in common law countries were ineffective in expanding the 
role of the government at the expense of financial sector development during the interwar 
period 1919–1939 largely on account of the stronger role of the judiciary. Thus, the law and 
finance theory contends that the English common law supports financial sector development 
to a larger extent compared to civil law systems where powers of the State are weakly 
checked. 
 
 
Similarly, the second channel – adaptability mechanism – linking legal origin with financial 
development is also constructed around two areas: First, legal systems vary in their ability to 
adjust to changing landscapes. Second, if a country‟s legal system sluggishly adapts to 
changing circumstances, then large gaps will exist between the economy‟s financial needs 
and the ability of the legal system to support those needs (Beck and Levine, 2003). 
 
Posner (1973) has long argued that legal systems that support case law and judicial discretion 
are more responsive to different financial conditions than legal systems that rigidly embrace 
formalistic procedures relying more strictly on judgments based on shallow statutory laws. 
Indeed, there is possibility of challenging inefficient and rigid laws in courts to improve 
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efficiency to allow for flexibility of the laws. In this course however, statutory laws appear 
exceptional. For instance, Bailey and Rubin (1994) note that statutory laws are slow and 
costly to amend, so that the absence of jurisprudence negatively impacts on the efficiency 
with which laws instantaneously change to different market conditions including the financial 
markets. 
 
The adaptability channel therefore predicts that English common law countries have higher 
proclivity of instituting well developed and functional financial sector than civil law 
countries. More importantly, the adaptability mechanism affirms that common laws are 
intrinsically dynamic and responds to the changing needs of countries thus constantly 
narrowing agents‟ demands and provisions of the law. 
  
 
Djankov et al., (2003) note that differences in legal formalism also influences the adaptability 
of the law. The authors find that common law countries have relatively lesser legal formalism 
regarding the regulation, collection and presentation of evidence, while requiring extensive 
procedures throughout the judicial processes. However, in the case of the French law 
countries, the Napoleonic doctrine‟s wariness in judges promoted the reliance on judicial 
formalism thus inhibiting the flexibility of the legal system with dire implications on 
financial development. 
 
Asongu (2011) provide a brief historical note arguing that, the partitioning of SSA into 
French and British colonies in the 19th century led to the implementation of two distinct 
colonial policies: while the French imposed a highly centralized bureaucratic system that 
clearly elevated empire–building, the British on the other hand pursued pragmatic 
decentralized and flexible policies, economic and business aspirations subsequently 
dominated the British colonial activities who sought to turn–around their colonies into 
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commercially viable trading economies through the indirect-rule. The French on their part 
pursued imperial ambitions through the policy of assimilation.  
 
Indeed, the balkanization and subsequent colonisation of Africa by the Europeans resulted in 
the transplant of their legal doctrines into the host countries. Beyond classifying countries 
into various colonies (such as the British, French, Portuguese or Belgian), Berkowitz et al., 
(2002) stress that the transplant process also established legal systems in colonised countries 
consistent with the colonial legacy. Thus, when the common and civil laws were transplanted 
in the sub-region, both the rules and legal ideologies were also transplanted. In fact, Zweigert 
and Kötz (1998: 72) note that, “the style of a legal system maybe marked by an ideology, that 
is, a religious or political conception of how economic and social life should be organized”.  
 
 
On the macroeconomic management, Mundell (1972) notes that the French monetary 
tradition, which emphasizes on the automaticity within a fixed exchange rate framework 
achieved stability at the expense of institutional development while the British opted for 
monetary discretion, sacrificing stability for experience and relatively more developed 
financial sector institutions. Mundell (1972) therefore conjectures that Anglophone countries 
in SSA inspired by British common law would naturally register higher levels of financial 
development than their Francophone counterparts whose legal frameworks are inclined to the 
French civil law. 
 
Beyond the political and adaptability channels, legal frameworks must also be capable of 
propelling agents to disclose full information on their qualities for the usage of other 
interested parties. In other words, well–functional legal systems ought to be able to ensure 
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“perfect information” in the financial sector by propelling the disclosure of all relevant 
information to information sharing offices to allow for efficient financial intermediation.  
 
Tchamyou and Asongu (2016: 3) define these information sharing offices also known as 
„credit reference agencies‟ “as institutions that collect information on an individual or 
commercial borrowers‟ obligations from multiple sources, namely: retails lenders, credit card 
companies and banks (for individuals) and supplies, direct investigation and public sources 
(for businesses)”. Information gathered is used to write a report on credit history and used by 
prospective lenders. Reports generated details both positive (consisting of details on all 
closed and opened credit amounts, closed credit accounts, repayment behaviour and plan) and 
negative (information on default and bad investment history for most part) outlook of agents. 
 
Mylenko (2008) notes that, the rising demand for information by financial institutions to 
improve on risk management practices culminated in the establishment of credit bureaus in 
Africa. Apart from South Africa, only few countries in the sub–region had well–functional 
credit reporting offices prior to 2008. Important legal adjustments were made to enable 
private credit bureaus operate in a number of countries including Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, 
Tanzania and Zambia.  
 
Indeed, the rising establishment of private credit bureaus is unsurprising given their key role 
in financial development as they remove information bottlenecks restricting lenders from 
investigating and accessing risk registry of borrowers. With this, they play a very critical role 
in addressing adverse selection from the part of lenders and alleviate moral hazard by 
addressing the unappealing financial behaviour of borrowers. Ultimately, the financial sector 
is able to shape and monitor investment choices of agents both in terms of the nature of 
projects that get funded and their overall contribution to economic growth. Following from 
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the political and adaptability routes, we can presuppose that the extent to which agents 
disclose information to information sharing bureaus crucially depends on the form of legal 
origin and this should be higher among British common law countries relative to the French 
civil law. 
 
In the next section, we review a body of empirical literature on legal origins and their 
association with finance, growth and information asymmetry.  
 
5.3 Literature review 
Diamond and Dybvig‟s (1983) theoretical work posits that ex ante information asymmetry 
arises when lenders are unable to categorize borrowers according to their credit risks 
culminating in adverse selection. On the other hand, ex post information asymmetry occurs 
when only borrowers are able to observe actual returns from a funded investment. Potentially, 
this may lead to moral hazard if borrowers resort to constraining compliance of their financial 
obligation with the lenders. The impulse of Diamond and Dybvig‟s (1983) model is based on 
the premise that, the key intent of financial intermediaries is to decrease cost of transaction 
and information owing to information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Other 
studies have highlighted the importance of reducing information asymmetry for increased 
financial intermediation largely through diversification with financial intermediaries 
(Diamond, 1984) and communication by banks to investors on potential borrowers (Leland 
and Pyle, 1977). Thus, the establishment of private credit bureau is a genuine channel of 
increasing (decreasing) information sharing (information asymmetry) to boost (dampen) 
financial development (growth volatility). 
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Some studies have argued that effective legal institutions permits knowledgeable market 
participants in the design and review of contractual agreements aimed at reducing complex 
agency problems (Coase, 1960; Stigler, 1964; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991) caused by 
asymmetric information. The substantial empirical literature on information asymmetry–
finance nexus have been on assessing how reduced information asymmetry propels financial 
access (Triki and Gajigo, 2014; Brown et al., 2009); reduces default rates (Jappelli and 
Pagano, 2002); mitigates cost of credit (Brown et al., 2009); influences syndicated bank loans 
(Ivashina, 2009) and affects corruption in lending (Barth et al., 2009). Using firm-level data, 
Love and Mylenko (2000) examine linkages between enhanced financial sharing by 
perception managers and banks, public credit registry and private credit bureau and financing 
credit constraints. Findings from their study reveal that, while public credit registry do not 
significantly influence financing constraints, private credit bureau are associated with higher 
banks financing and lower constraints in credit financing. Similarly, Triki and Gajigo‟s 
(2014) study on the impact of information sharing on access to finance have established that, 
access to finance is higher in countries with private credit bureau relative to those with only 
public credit registry or no information sharing office. More recently, Asongu et al., (2015) 
have examined the information sharing threshold for financial development in Africa. 
Evidence from their study shows that, while private credit bureau negatively affects banking 
system efficiency, the impact of public credit registry is insignificant. On the information 
sharing–private credit nexus, the authors have established that both public credit registry and 
private credit bureau are associated with reduced financial activity with the private credit 
bureau having a huge magnitude. 
 
The broad spectrum of the literature suggests that political (Pagano and Volpin, 2001; Haber 
et al., 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Haber, 2004), cultural (Guiso et al., 2004), religion 
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(Stulz and Williamson, 2003) and even geographical (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002), 
Acemoglu et al., 2001; Beck et al., 2003a; Easterly and Levine, 2003) factors influence the 
financial system and that much more work is required to better understand the role of law in 
the financial development process of countries. La Porta et al.‟s (1998b, 1999) study find that 
countries that adopts the French civil law have the lowest levels of financial development. 
Specifically, French civil law countries have narrow stock markets, less active initial public 
offering markets, and relatively lower levels of bank credit. Levine (1998, 1999) and Levine 
et al. (2000) empirically examine the legal origin–financial development–economic growth 
nexus and find that legal origin importantly explains cross–country differences in the 
development of bank and stock markets and that the level of finance accounts for the 
international differences in long run growth.
24
  
 
Beyond explaining the overall levels of financial development, legal institutions also 
influence the ability of firms to raise capital thus determining the extent to which domestic 
firms operate at financially constrained levels. Beck et al., (2002) find that countries with 
legal institutions that effectively protect property rights tend to have larger firms as firms are 
less constrained by retained earnings thus operating at more efficient levels. This finding is 
consistent with Kumar et al., (2001). Closely linked to this is the impact of well–functioning 
legal institutions in shaping the efficiency with which financial systems re–allocate capital 
across firms and industries (see Wurgler, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2002). 
 
On the relationship between legal institutions and the efficiency of equity markets, Morck et 
al., (2000) investigate the interaction among law, availability and precision of information on 
firms and the efficiency of the stock prices. They find that the extent to which legal 
                                                          
24
 However, countervailing evidence challenges the law and finance theory (Pagano and Volpin, 2001; Rajan 
and Zingales, 2003). Some studies (see for instance Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Klerman et al., 2008) suggest 
that legal origin cannot explain economic growth performance. 
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frameworks protect private property rights and that of minority shareholders help explain the 
cross-country variations in stock market synchronicity. 
 
Beck et al., (2003b) empirically examine the political and adaptability channels – respectively 
proxied by Supreme Court power and case law – in accounting for international differences in 
stock market, financial intermediary and private property rights development. As espoused by 
the political channel, it is expected that less State control of the judiciary will result in higher 
financial development thus hypothesizing a positive coefficient of the political channel proxy. 
However, the authors find support for the adaptability channel but not the political channel as 
the case law is positively associated with stronger private property rights protection, higher 
stock market and bank development. Similarly, Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) assess the 
impact of legal formalism on financial sector development. They find that, while legal 
formalism is not linked with banking sector development, greater legal formalism lowers 
stock market development, which is akin to the adaptability mechanism. 
 
 
Beyond the effect of legal origin on finance, Agbor (2011) examines how colonial origin 
affects economic growth performance in SSA. Findings from the study suggest that the 
indirect influence of colonial educational policies matter more for post-colonial growth rather 
than the direct effect of colonisation. More importantly, Agbor‟s (2011) evidence shows that 
former British SSA colonies have grown marginally faster relative to former French colonies 
largely attributable to the favourable contribution of the indirect influence of the legacy of 
British colonization on education. 
 
Arguably, none of these studies have examined the connection between legal institutions, 
availability and precision of information on borrower, the efficiency of banks, quality of 
financial development and growth volatility. Given the role of financial intermediaries, when 
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information on borrower quality is symmetric, default rate is minimized as financial 
intermediaries effectively monitor resources provided to the financial sector hence 
dampening growth volatility. Indeed, lenders are most often left with issues of adverse 
selection on account of their lack of information on borrower quality particularly on risks 
associated with investment needing the borrower to mobilize financial resources. This 
concern is even more pronounced when lenders are intrinsically unable to control the 
direction of borrowers in post–credit grant. Given this understanding, a borrower may 
conceal returns from an underlying investment in order to reduce the possibility of default or 
amount of repayment at agreed times. This behaviour of borrower is paramount and evident 
in countries with weak information sharing and legal systems leading to sub-optimal resource 
allocation, financing of unproductive projects thus exacerbating growth volatility. Levine 
(1997) argues that financial development affects long run growth by reducing information 
and transaction costs which in turn influences savings and investment choices and 
technological innovations. However, its long run volatility effect is unclear. Cross–country 
evidence on the financial depth and macroeconomic stability suggests that well–developed 
financial sectors do protect countries against certain types of shocks (Easterly et. al., 2002; 
Beck et. al., 2006; Ibrahim and Alagidede, 2017). Caprio and Honohan (2001) argue that 
regulatory and supervisory framework have an impact on the extent to which financial 
intermediaries absorbs or propagates exogenous shocks. 
 
Conceivably, countries in SSA are prone to economic volatility due to their nature and 
financial underdevelopment (Ibrahim and Alagidede, 2017). For this reason, financial sector 
development, premised on effective legal systems, is viewed as essential factor influencing 
both the level of finance and volatility. Indeed, our focus on the market–supporting 
institutions including law, information sharing office and financial systems, in explaining 
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long run economic volatility has by far come to the fore as important factors for SSA, a clear 
niche for the sub–region that has become a major puzzle necessitating further research efforts 
to shed light on both its growth vagaries and legal trajectory; and uncover any potential 
lessons for other developing economies.  
 
Admittedly, very scanty literature pertains to SSA and those existing ones does not 
particularly show how the evolving legal origins in the sub–region play out in information 
asymmetry–volatility nexus apart from their interaction with finance. We address this gap in 
the literature by first discussing our methodology in the next section. 
 
 
5.4 Data and methodology 
5.4.1 Data 
Annual data for the study is gleaned from 33 SSA countries comprising 13 English common 
law origins. The civil law countries consist of 14 French, 4 Portuguese and 2 Belgian. Our 
sample covers the period 2004–2011. Details of the countries are in Appendix 2. The choice 
of these countries is exclusively based on data availability. For instance, data on information 
sharing bureaus is only available from 2004 to 2011. The fundamental object of increasing 
information sharing and/or reducing information asymmetry is to improve financial 
intermediation efficiency, lower default rate which has the potential of improving returns on 
investment and growth. Following Triki and Gajigo (2014), we measure information 
sharing/asymmetry with the private credit bureaus. Our choice for this proxy is guided around 
five indicators: access, data sources, ownership, coverage and purpose. Access to private 
credit bureaus is opened to all lenders and not restricted to only information providers. Data 
on private credit bureaus is extensive and largely obtained from the public credit registry, 
courts and tax authorities. On the ownership, beyond Central Banks and government, 
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ownership of private credit bureaus encapsulates lenders, independent third parties and lender 
group. In terms of coverage, apart from the large corporations, private credit bureaus also 
focus on small and medium scale entrepreneurs often with richer data set. Finally, in terms of 
purpose, the private credit bureaus are established on account of the increasing demand for 
and need of information on borrowers in the financial sector. Therefore data on the private 
credit bureaus provide crucial information of borrower quality and is therefore used to proxy 
the level of information sharing or asymmetry in the domestic financial markets. We used 
credit to the private sector as percentage of GDP to proxy the quality of financial 
development. This measure, which accounts for credit advanced to the private sector thus 
propelling the utilization and allocation of funds to more efficient and productive activities 
has been extensively researched in the finance literature (Arcand et al., 2012; Levine et al., 
2000; King and Levine, 1993a). While this proxy‟s financial access, as robustness checks, we 
used the banking system credit‟ on „banking system deposits‟ to measure the efficiency of the 
banking system in financial development. The legal origin variables are the English common 
law, French, Portuguese and Belgian civil laws. Our main dependent variable is growth 
volatility where data on GDP growth rates are used to construct the fluctuations using the 
generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) developed by Bollerslev 
(1986). Real and monetary shocks proxied by terms of trade and inflation shocks respectively 
are similarly constructed using the GARCH (1, 1) process. The inflation variable is the 
annual percentage change in the consumer price index while terms of trade is the net barter 
terms of trade computed as the ratio of export to import price. Trade openness is taken as the 
ratio of sum of exports and imports to GDP. While data on the legal origin is taken from La 
Porta et al. (2008) and Asongu (2011), data on private credit bureau is sourced from African 
Development Bank. Data on all the remaining variables are gleaned from the World 
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Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. Table 5.1 below presents the summary 
statistics of the variables. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary statistics 
Variables Mean 
Stand
ard 
Dev 
CV Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Observati
ons 
Growth 
volatility 
13.75 10.88 0.79 7.96 26.01 1.20 1.83 256 
English 0.40 0.50 1.22 0.00 1.00 0.48 –1.73 256 
French 0.42 0.49 1.04 0.00 1.00 0.32 –1.81 256 
Portuguese 0.12 0.33 2.75 0.00 1.00 1.67 2.00 256 
Belgian 0.06 0.21 3.50 0.00 1.00 0.42 1.07 256 
Private credit 22.02 18.35 0.83 0.41 128.43 1.95 7.01 251 
Bank credit 43.49 25.11 0.58 15.30 98.21 2.33 9.75 244 
PCB 3.98 12.87 3.23 0 64.80 1.02 4.77 256 
Terms of trade 
shock 
1.93 0.22 0.11 0.31 3.01 –0.42 10.32 256 
Inflation shock 3.96 0.95 0.24 1.33 6.70 –1.21 118.13 242 
Trade openness 74.11 72.63 0.98 14.55 255.00 0.98 3.12 251 
Notes: PCB, CV, Min. and Max. respectively denote public credit bureau, coefficient of variation, minimum and 
maximum. 
 
 
Preliminary findings reveal that out of the sampled 33 countries, majority (42%) align with 
the French civil law relative to 40% of the English common law. While 12% are of the 
Portuguese legal origin where legal issues are adjudicated leveraging from the Portuguese 
civil laws, only 6% are Belgian legal origin which is aligned to the civil law. All variables are 
averaged over the sample period and suggest that private credit to GDP is 22% relative to the 
bank credit of 43.49%. To allow for inter-series comparison of variability, we compute the 
coefficient of variation (CV) as the ratio of standard deviation to mean. Values from the CV 
show a higher volatility of private credit proportional to bank credit. These taken together 
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may imply higher banking system efficiency relative to the financial system activity. The 
mean trade openness is 74.11% and has a reasonably large variability. Interestingly, all the 
series are positively skewed except the shock variables (inflation and terms of trade) which 
are skewed to the left. We report the correlation coefficients which reveal the level of 
association between the variables (see Table 5.2 below). 
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Table 5.2: Correlation coefficients 
Variables 
Economic 
volatility 
Legal origins 
Financial 
development 
Info. 
sharing 
Controls 
Volatility 
(GARCH) 
English French Portuguese Belgian 
Private 
credit 
Bank 
credit 
Public 
credit 
bureau 
Terms of 
trade 
shock 
Inflation 
shock 
Trade 
openness 
Volatility 
GARCH 
1.00           
English 
–0.242* 
(0.082) 
1.00          
French 
0.181 
(0.200) 
–0.831* 
(0.075) 
1.00         
Portuguese 
–0.133 
(0.101) 
–0.140** 
(0.046) 
–0.512* 
(0.070) 
1.00        
Belgian 
–0.142 
(0.111) 
–0.201* 
(–0.081) 
–0.132* 
(0.092) 
–0.240** 
(0.041) 
1.00       
Private 
credit 
–0.164*** 
(0.001) 
0.231** 
(0.017) 
–0.564* 
(0.069) 
0.631** 
(0.033) 
0.431* 
(0.060) 
1.00      
Bank credit 
–0.210** 
(0.041) 
0.363*** 
(0.002) 
0.721** 
(0.040) 
0.694* 
(0.060) 
0.333* 
(0.051) 
0.873*** 
(0.003) 
1.00     
Private 
credit bureau 
0.188 
(0.217) 
0.118 
(0.102) 
0.320 
(0.447) 
0.450 
(0.200) 
0.400 
(0.142) 
0.531** 
(0.034) 
0.621* 
(0.086) 
1.00    
Terms of 
trade shock 
0.473** 
(0.026) 
–0.555 
(0.121) 
–0.409* 
(0.084) 
–0.592** 
(0.041) 
–0.671** 
(0.037) 
–0.502* 
(0.070) 
–
0.651** 
(0.027) 
–0.211 
(0.111) 
1.00   
Inflation 
shock 
0.221 
(0.132) 
0.692 
(0.103) 
0.723 
(0.146) 
0.620 
(0.229) 
0.542 
(0.194) 
0.522 
(0.140) 
0.631 
(0.228) 
–0.532* 
(0.060) 
0.578* 
(0.051) 
1.00  
Trade 
openness 
–0.530*** 
(0.004) 
0.761* 
(0.082) 
0.663** 
(0.030) 
–0.751* 
(0.059) 
–0.667** 
(0.030) 
0.771** 
(0.041) 
0.231* 
(0.062) 
–0.422* 
(0.055) 
–0.612** 
(0.043) 
0.612 
(0.173) 
1.00 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Values in (  ) are the p–values. 
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The correlation coefficient reveals a positive and significant association between private 
credit, English, Belgian and Portuguese legal origins while negatively and significantly 
related with the French legal origin. However, bank credit is positively and significantly 
correlated with all the legal origins although its relationship with the French civil law 
countries is higher and lowest among the English common law. While bank credit and private 
credit have a very high correlation, their relationships with economic volatility are 
significantly negative. Interestingly, private credit bureau is positively correlated with all the 
variables although its relationship is only significant with the financial development proxies. 
While inflation shock is positively correlated with terms of trade shock, the relationship with 
private credit bureau is negative and slightly significant at 10%. 
 
5.4.2 Empirical strategy 
The objective of this chapter is to examine whether legal origins explain cross–country 
differences in financial development and volatility and how legal legacy interact with 
information sharing in economic fluctuations in SSA.  Indeed, estimating such relationships 
using OLS pose endogeneity problems rendering the estimates biased and inconsistent. For 
instance, existence of robust legal environment shapes information sharing thus determining 
the quality of financial development and its impact on growth volatility. This is in synch with 
the law and finance literature. 
 
It is imperative to note that, two main problems may occur in assessing the impact of 
financial development on growth volatility: endogeneity bias and reverse causality. Thus a 
more general antidote to the endogeneity is the use of instrumental variables where the 
current chapter adopts the two-stage least squares (2SLS) with heteroskedasticity–consistent 
standard errors. This approach which is also used by Beck et al., (2003b) relies on the 
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identification of structural system of equations with instruments that are weakly correlated 
with the endogenous regressor.  
 
We consider a structural equation of the form: 
                                                                                       (   ) 
where  ( )   ;                 (    )                        1, 2, 3, ………..,     
 
While the explanatory variables       , …….,      are exogenous,    is potentially 
endogenous in the structural equation (5.1) above necessitating the use of instrumental 
variables (IV). With    endogenous, we select an observable variable    that satisfies two 
conditions: first    must not be correlated with   such that    (    )   . The second 
condition requires the linear projection of    onto all the exogenous variables. Thus, the 
linear relationship between the instrumented variable and the IVs is given in its reduced form 
in equation (5.2) below: 
 
                                                            (   ) 
 
where   are the parameters of the IVs;    which is the error term with  (  )   , is 
uncorrelated with each of the variables on the right hand side of the equation where    . 
The implication is that    is partially correlated with    once the other exogenous variables 
  ,   , ……….,      have been netted out (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
From the structural equation (5.1) and the reduced form for   , we derive a reduced form for 
  by putting equation (5.2) into equation (5.1) and rearranging produces equation (5.3) 
below: 
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                                                              (   ) 
 
 
where          is the reduced form error;            and        . We show that 
the assumptions made on the IV   solve the identification problem for    in equation (5.4) by 
specifying a matrix form equation to be estimated as: 
 
    
                                                                                                                                         (   ) 
With ith row where   is an     matrix with   denoting the number of observations;   is the 
error term which is independently and identically distributed with zero mean and variance–
covariance     represented by     matrix Ω. The intercept is subsumed in   such that 
  (           ) . In this form, the 2SLS selects a matrix of exogenous variables 
denoted by   (                            ) which is an 1   matrix. 
 
From equation (5.4), the explanatory variables   are not correlated with the error term   and 
we select the IV                which are exogenous and uncorrelated with      
   [      ]                   Indeed, these assumptions imply the   population 
orthogonality conditions   (    )   . By multiplying equation (5.4) through by    and 
taking expectations together with the orthogonality condition produces: 
 
[ (   )]   (   )                                                                                                                 (   ) 
 
where  (   ) is     and  (   ) is      
 
Equation (5.5) is a system of   linear equations in the   unknowns   ,   , …….,   . In the 
presence of full rank, equation (5.5) yields a unique solution as: 
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  [ (   )]
  
 (   )                                                                                                                (   ) 
 
where expectations [ (   )] and  (   ) can be consistently estimated relying on a random 
sample on (      ). With a random sample *(           )                + from 
the population, the IV estimator of   is therefore estimated as: 
 
 ̂  (   ∑  
 
  
 
   
)
  
(   ∑  
 
  
 
   
)  (   )
  
                                                        (   ) 
where   and   are     matrices and   is the     vector on the   . 
 
When the order condition of the above equation (5.7) is met, the IV estimator  ̂ can be found 
under the condition that there are as many instruments as the endogenous variables. There is 
exact identification if the number of instruments is equal to the number of endogenous 
regressors. However, where these are unequal, there is under-identification when the number 
of instruments is less than that of the exogenous regressors otherwise our equation is over-
identified. 
 
The lose IV estimation is under the presumption that the error matrix is homoskedastic 
   (   )     . However, what is evident in empirics is heteroskedasticity with 
   (   )      
  . 
 
Although the IV estimations are consistent notwithstanding, the estimation of the standard 
errors are inconsistent, which leads to diagnostic tests for endogeneity and over–identifying 
restrictions. We therefore use the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in the 
estimation. 
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Given the overarching aim of this study, we address the issues of whether the exogenous 
legal origins explain financial development and the propensity of the exogenous components 
of finance to account to cross–country differences in growth volatility besides the financial 
development. We examine this by specifying our first stage regression as: 
 
            ,        -    ,       -    ,           -    ,      -       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            (   )  
In the second stage, we estimate the following regression: 
                          ,       -                                                                     (   )  
 
In both regressions,        is a set of the regional blocs while   denotes a vector of the 
exogenous variables that are included in the second stage regression. We include an 
interaction term,      , of legal origin and private credit bureau to account for the indirect 
influence of law on volatility through information sharing. The error terms in the first and 
second stage regressions are   and  , respectively. 
 
Following Levine at al. (2000) and Beck et al., (2003b), we use a set of dummy variables 
representing differences in legal systems and origins as instruments for financial 
development. Our instruments are legal origin dummies comprising English (= 1 for British 
legal origin and = 0 otherwise), French (= 1 for French legal origin and = 0 otherwise) and 
Portuguese (= 1 for Portuguese legal origin and = 0 otherwise) and Belgian (= 1 for Belgian 
legal origin and = 0 otherwise). Of course, only three of the legal origin dummies (English, 
French and Portuguese) enter the regression while the Belgian legal origin serves as 
reference. 
 
 
184 
 
Once determined, legal origins stay the same by their nature and may be uncorrelated with 
growth volatility beyond their relationship with financial development and information 
sharing. La Porta et al., (1998a) show that legal origin crucially shapes national approaches to 
laws concerning borrowers and lenders and the efficiency with which those laws are broadly 
applied. Indeed, beyond effective enforcement, since finance is based on contracts, legal 
origins that produce laws that protect the rights of external investors and lenders will perform 
a correspondingly better job at increasing (reducing) information sharing (asymmetry). By 
recognizing that concealing vital information with regard to borrower traits and credit 
worthiness is punishable by law, borrowers reveal their “true” qualities to lenders. With this, 
legal origin promotes financial development. By considering legal origins as not affected by 
the growth volatility, it satisfies only one of the two requirements for a set of instruments to 
be regarded as valid. The second requirement is the correlation between the set of instruments 
and the endogenous regressor. We empirically assess whether our choice of instruments 
satisfies the exogeneity requirement by conducting the over–identifying restrictions (OIR) 
test.
25
 Relative to the number of the endogenous explaining variables and an attempt to 
mitigate the constraints of the Sargan‟s OIR test, we include three additional dummies 
principally used as instruments. Our additional instruments are the regional blocs comprising 
Western Africa (= 1 for Western African country and = 0 otherwise), Southern African (= 1 
for Southern African country and = 0 otherwise) and Eastern Africa (= 1 for Eastern African 
country and = 0 otherwise) and Central Africa (= 1 for Central Africa and = 0 otherwise). 
Similarly, only three of the blocs dummies (Western, Southern and Eastern) enter the 
regression while the Central Africa bloc is used as the base group.  
 
                                                          
25
 It is imperative to note that the Sargan OIR test for instrument validity is feasible only in case of over–
identification (where the instruments must be higher than the endogenous explaining variables by at least one 
degree of freedom). 
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5.5 Findings and discussions 
We examine the importance of legal origin in explaining cross-country differences in growth 
volatility. In other words, we assess the ability of legal origins to explain the cross-country 
variations in information sharing and financial development, and the propensity of the 
exogenous components of finance and information sharing channels to account for the 
differences in country‟s growth volatility. In Table 5.3, we regress financial development 
both in terms of financial activity and banking efficiency on English, French and Portuguese 
legal origin dummies. This is done first at two levels: without (Columns 1 and 3) and with 
control variables (Columns 2 and 4). Our joint significance test with the Fisher test reveals 
that legal origins jointly and significantly influence growth volatility suggesting that 
disaggregating countries by their legal origin reveals the cross-country differences in growth 
volatility. 
 
In the proceeding section, we examine by OLS the importance of legal origin in explaining 
cross-country differences in financial development. In other words, we assess the ability of 
legal origins to explain the variations in financial system activity as well as the banking 
system efficiency. We regress the former (private credit) and the latter (bank credit on bank 
deposit) on the legal traditions both with and without controls. Imperatively, the regression of 
financial development on the instruments is a crucial precondition in the estimation of the 
2SLS. Indeed, these first stage regressions provided in Table 5.3 below provide opportunity 
for testing the strength of the instruments. Our results provide ample evidence that the set of 
instruments significantly determine the endogenous regressors of both financial system 
activity (private credit–to–GDP) and banking system efficiency (bank credit on bank 
deposits). The values of the F–statistics suggest that legal origins importantly explain the 
differences in financial development among countries in SSA.  
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Table 5.3: Legal origins, financial development and information asymmetry 
Variables 
First stage regressions 
Financial system activity 
(Private credit–to–GDP) 
Banking system efficiency 
(Bank credit on bank 
deposits) 
1 2 3 4 
Legal origin:     
English 
0.371** 
(2.902) 
0.402*** 
(3.101) 
0.391** 
(2.757) 
0.442** 
(2.751) 
French 
0.194*** 
(3.812) 
0.200*** 
(2.915) 
0.291*** 
(3.713) 
0.296*** 
(3.812) 
Portuguese 
0.228** 
(2.011) 
0.293*** 
(3.152) 
0.301*** 
(3.910) 
0.321** 
(2.750) 
Regional blocs:     
Western Africa 
0.201** 
(2.370) 
0.228*** 
(3.072) 
0.232*** 
(4.094) 
0.259** 
(2.610) 
Southern Africa 
0.337*** 
(4.901) 
0.3500** 
(2.011) 
0.341*** 
(3.523) 
0.372** 
(2.341) 
Eastern Africa 
0.177* 
(1.955) 
0.195** 
(2.315) 
0.180** 
(2.097) 
0.197** 
(2.160) 
Controls:     
Private credit bureau  
0.271** 
(2.111) 
 
0.114*** 
(1.982) 
Term of trade shock  
0.159** 
(2.730) 
 
0.311*** 
(3.015) 
Inflation shock  
–0.221*** 
(–4.012) 
 
–0.301 
(–2.731) 
Trade openness  
0.092*** 
(5.011) 
 
0.271*** 
(3.301) 
Diagnostics:     
F–test (instruments) 24.11 16.01 25.24 18.90 
Adjusted R
2
 0.35 0.47 0.33 0.42 
No. of observations 184 184 173 173 
Notes: *, ** and *** respectively denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% level.  
 
More specifically, with regard to Column 1 and 3, our evidence shows that, British common 
law countries have significantly higher levels of financial system activity and banking system 
efficiency than the French civil law countries which have relatively lower private credit. 
Countries that have adopted the Portuguese civil law have significantly higher financial 
system activity and lies in between the English and French civil law countries. Further 
finding reveals higher banking system efficiency in all the legal origin dummies relative to 
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the financial system activity. We include the control variables in Columns 2 and 4 and our 
findings on legal origin–financial development nexuses are robustly positive and significant. 
Consistently with the earlier finding, English common law countries dominate in the banking 
efficiency followed by the Portuguese civil laws which has higher bank credit on bank 
deposits relative to the French civil laws. 
 
With regard to the regional blocs, relative to Central Africa, our findings reveal higher 
financial activity and efficiency among Southern African countries compared to Western and 
Eastern Africa. Eastern African countries have the lowest financial development while 
Western African is between the two blocs. For both financial development indicators, 
coefficients of the regional dummies are higher when we include the controls although 
banking system efficiency is consistently higher relative to the financial sector activity. To 
the extent that about 62% of the Southern African countries fall under the English legal origin 
confirms our earlier evidence that financial development is higher among countries that 
adopts the English legal doctrines. Moreover, based on our sample, 50% of the Western 
African countries follow the French legal legacy which is relatively lower compared to the 
English common law countries in relation to the levels of financial sector development. Our 
sample evidence by far confirms Mundell‟s (1972) conjecture that financial development is 
higher among Anglophone countries relative to the Francophone countries. 
 
Turning to the controls, terms of trade shock is associated with higher financial activity given 
the sign of the coefficient. As economies are hit by real external shocks, agents in the large 
tradable sector recalibrate their investment and consumption choices resulting in higher 
demand for financial resources. However, an increase in monetary shock reduces the amount 
of private credit available. Our evidence suggests that economies with higher inflation 
variability are likely to have less active financial activity and less efficient banking systems. 
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A standard elucidation is that higher inflation volatility is associated with greater uncertainty.  
In the face of information asymmetry, the problem is particularly exacerbated when collateral 
is required for the efficient functioning of borrowing and lending markets. With low returns 
on capital during inflationary episodes, the disincentive to save due to high monetary shock 
inhibits the accumulation of collateral and thereby militating against financial intermediation 
(Altig, 2003). The negative relationship between monetary shock and financial sector 
development may also be an indication of financial repression (see Rousseau and Wachtel, 
2001; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Moreover, a percentage increase in trade openness 
significantly improves financial system activity by 0.092 percentage points. With more 
openness, there is demand for both external and internal finance hence higher financial 
activity and efficiency. Indeed, de–restricting international trade allows the entry of efficient 
financial sector institutions from abroad with a positive spill–over into the domestic financial 
system which increases both in terms of size and quality. Undoubtedly, openness may 
potentially be associated with greater risks, including exposure to external real shocks and 
foreign competition consequently encouraging the development of financial markets largely 
through the rising demand for finance that can be used to diversify such risks and allow firms 
to surmount short term liquidity constraints or adverse shocks. Thus, openness enhances 
financial sector development through the demand side (Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2002). 
 
As regards to the impact of the covariates on the banking system efficiency, our evidence 
reveals that only the effects of private credit bureau, terms of trade shock and openness are 
significant. The coefficients of private credit bureau are positive suggesting that higher 
information sharing is associated with higher financial development. More specifically, a 
percentage increase in information sharing significantly spurs financial system activity – 
private credit to GDP – by 0.271 percentage–points. In the case of efficiency of the banking 
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system, higher private credit bureau increases bank credit on bank deposits by 0.114 
percentage points clearly highlighting the importance of reducing information asymmetry in 
the financial sector. Information sharing bureaus are primarily designed to reduce information 
gap between lenders and borrowers thus increasing financial access in the formal financial 
sector. Specifically, it does this by mitigating moral hazard on the part of borrowers and 
adverse selection on the part of lenders. This finding is particularly consistent with Tchamyou 
and Asongu (2016). 
 
 
What is also noticeable is that, while terms of trade shock improves financial development, 
its impact is higher in the banking system efficiency than the financial system activity. In the 
same view, the impact of openness on efficiency is almost three times higher compared to the 
financial system activity. Relative to the private credit, inflation shock does not have any 
influence on bank credit on deposits although it enters with a negative sign. 
 
 
In the next section, we assess whether the exogenous components of financial development 
explain volatility and whether legal framework explains economic volatility through some 
other sources apart from finance. We do this using the 2SLS with heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors. This is done first at two levels: first without and 
second with control variables. We flatly reject the null hypothesis of the Hausman tests in all 
the models suggesting the presence of endogeneity/simultaneity bias thus justifying our use 
of the 2SLS approach.  
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Table 5.4: Legal origins, growth volatility and information asymmetry 
Variables 
Second stage regressions 
Economic Volatility (GARCH) 
Economic Volatility (Standard 
deviation) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Legal origin:       
English 
–3.781*** 
(–5.022) 
–3.979*** 
(–5.771) 
–3.981*** 
(–4.310) 
–5.021*** 
(–3.781) 
–5.754*** 
(–4.731) 
–4.012*** 
(–3.117) 
French 
–2.803*** 
(–3.755) 
–1.934** 
(–2.017) 
–2.111** 
(–2.312) 
–2.016** 
(–2.751) 
–4.481** 
(–2.750) 
–3.230** 
(–2.021) 
Portuguese 
–2.019*** 
(–4.663) 
–1.681** 
(–2.925) 
–1.995* 
(–1.961) 
–1.992*** 
(–3.217) 
–0.981** 
(–2.045) 
–0.182** 
(–2.399) 
Regional blocs:       
Western Africa 
–3.012** 
(–2.042) 
–3.191*** 
(–3.401) 
–3.211** 
(–2.630) 
–3.312*** 
(–3.753) 
–3.379** 
(–2.601) 
–3.441*** 
(–3.991) 
Southern Africa 
–4.022** 
(–2.310) 
–4.190** 
(–2.281) 
–4.201*** 
(–4.049) 
–4.311** 
(–2.710) 
–4.471*** 
(–3.231) 
–4.801*** 
(–4.113) 
Eastern Africa 
–1.878** 
(–2.511) 
–1.993** 
(–2.403) 
–2.151** 
(–2.620) 
–1.902** 
(–2.351) 
–2.120*** 
(–3.710) 
–2.190** 
(–2.117) 
Controls:       
PCB  
–0.301** 
(–2.104) 
–  
–0.198** 
(–2.156) 
– 
Private credit to 
GDP 
 
–0.721** 
(–2.055) 
–0.588** 
(–2.731) 
 
–0.201*** 
(–3.040) 
–0.141** 
(–2.903) 
Bank credit on 
bank deposits 
 
–0.511** 
(–2.034) 
–0.500** 
(–2.722) 
 
–0.432*** 
(–3.281) 
–0.250*** 
(–3.099) 
Terms of trade 
shock 
 
0.055*** 
(2.214) 
–  
0.041* 
(1.971) 
– 
Inflation shock  
0.097** 
(2.751) 
–  
0.028*** 
(3.771) 
– 
Transmission:       
English and PCB   
–0.921*** 
(–4.925) 
  
–0.840** 
(–2.351) 
French and PCB   
–0.601** 
(–2.891) 
  
–0.520*** 
(–3.053) 
Portuguese and 
PCB 
  
–0.442* 
(–1.901) 
  
–0.372** 
(–2.055) 
Diagnostics:       
Hausman test 25.78 32.01 41.87 21.88 38.92 46.35 
OIR (Sargan) test 
[p–value] 
9.21 
[0.002] 
11.55 
[0.000] 
12.58 
[0.000] 
8.37 
[0.003] 
9.61 
[0.001] 
10.69 
[0.000] 
Cragg–Donald 
Wald F–test 
22.45 19.01 17.34 25.87 21.98 19.51 
Number of obs. 162 162 162 155 155 155 
Notes: *, ** and *** respectively denote significance at 10, 5 and 1%. Values in the parentheses ( ) are the robust t–
statistic. PCB refers to private credit bureau. 
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Overall, our findings show that legal origins dampen growth volatility. More specifically, 
growth volatility reduction is higher (lower) among countries with the English (Portuguese) 
while French legal origin lies between the English and Portuguese civil laws (Column 1). The 
implication is that countries with the English common laws are faster in faltering growth 
vagaries while those with Portuguese legal origin are slower. In Column 2, we estimate legal 
origin–volatility by including our controls. Our findings show robust and overwhelming 
evidence that legal origin matter in growth fluctuations. More specifically, the rate at which 
economic volatility is dampened is faster in English common law countries than those with 
the French civil laws. Countries with the Portuguese legal origin are however between the 
English and French legal origins. By including our covariates, what is apparent from the 
finding is that, while the coefficient of English common law decreased suggesting a further 
dampening of vagaries, inclusion of the controls marginally exacerbates volatility among the 
French and Portuguese legal origins although the direction of effect is negative. 
 
With regard to the regional blocs, relative to Central Africa, our findings reveal negative 
relationship between the regional blocs and growth volatility among Southern African 
countries compared to Western and Eastern Africa. The coefficients of Southern Africa are 
more negative hence experience lowest economic volatility. Moreover, the coefficients of 
Eastern Africa denote higher volatility since the coefficients are relatively less negative.  
Relative to Central Africa, countries in Western Africa have relatively lower volatility and 
effects fall within the Southern and Eastern African countries. Interestingly, for all the blocs, 
volatility is lower when measured with the GARCH compared to the standard deviation 
measure (Columns 4 and 6). This notwithstanding, whether measured with conditional or 
unconditional volatility, the dampening effect is higher when controls and transmission 
channels are successively introduced given the more negative coefficients.  
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Turning to the impact of the controls on growth volatility, the coefficients of private credit 
bureau are negative suggesting that higher (lower) information sharing (asymmetry) dampens 
growth volatility albeit insignificantly. The implication is that the mere existence of private 
credit bureau does not translate into reduced volatility.  
 
On the effects of the control variables on growth volatility, the coefficients of private credit 
bureau are negative suggesting that higher (lower) information sharing (asymmetry) dampens 
growth volatility and significantly. The implication is that existence of private credit bureau 
appears useful for reducing volatility. Our evidence suggests that financial sector 
development is associated with reduced economic fluctuations although the elasticity effect 
of financial system activity is huge relative to the banking system efficiency. Specifically, the 
elasticity effect of private credit to GDP is at least 1.4 times larger than the banking system 
efficiency (Column 2). Thus, although efficiency in the banking sector dampens growth, the 
drive to do this is subdued in the face of financial sector activity. The implication is that 
higher financial development is associated with lower volatility. More importantly, improved 
financial systems should facilitate a closer match between savers and investors, promotes 
diversification and potentially reducing risks and fluctuations. Thus, financially 
underdeveloped economies are expected to experience higher economic volatility thus 
projecting the beneficial effect of financial activity and banking system efficiency in 
smoothing growth volatility in countries with well–developed financial sector. 
 
The coefficients of terms of trade shock are robustly positive suggesting that increases in 
terms of trade shocks heighten volatilities. Terms of trade shock however magnifies growth 
volatility by 0.055% following a 1% real external shock. Arguably, variations in the terms of 
trade affect the economy through relative price fluctuations of imported input and exported 
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output. As such, shock to terms of trade is expected to directly affect the tradable sector and 
indirectly impacts on the non-tradable sector. It therefore presupposes that, economies with 
huge non-tradable sector will be relatively immune to real shocks. Our finding therefore 
highlights the dependency nature on primary commodities of our sampled countries hence the 
relationship between the terms of trade shock and economic fluctuation is unsurprising. 
 
Growth volatility is also positively associated with monetary shock proxied by inflation 
shock. Our finding shows that, a percentage rise in monetary shock heightens fluctuations by 
0.097 percentage–points. Monetary shock amplifies economic volatility. In fact, theory 
suggests that whether economic fluctuation is magnified or dampened by inflation volatility 
well depends on the source of the shock. Monetary shock is expected to stem the tide of 
macroeconomic volatility when shock originates from wage-setting but not when emanating 
from aggregate demand (see De Long and Summers, 1986; Driskill and Sheffrin, 1986). To 
the extent that monetary shock proxied by inflation fluctuation amplifies volatility underlines 
the key contribution of aggregate demand in the region‟s economic volatility. And as argued 
by Ibrahim and Alagidede (2017), higher aggregate demand can be associated with higher 
inflation especially when the growing demand does not follow a higher productivity and 
output. 
 
Consistent with the instrumental variable estimation techniques, we test for the OIR using the 
Sargan‟s test. The null hypothesis of the test shows that our set of instruments does not suffer 
from endogeneity as the exogenous components are uncorrelated with the error terms in the 
second stage regressions. These findings therefore suggest legal origins explain economic 
volatility via other transmission channels beyond financial system activity and banking 
efficiency. 
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From a theoretical point of view legal origin may negatively affect growth volatility in 
several ways. Direct negative effects could come through improvement in institutional 
framework, improved regulation, corporate governance and efficiency in doing business due 
to the protection of investor and/or shareholder rights. Apart from the direct dampening effect 
of legal origin on volatility, existence of efficient legal systems may improve the allocation of 
capital. Moreover, the legal tradition indirectly falters growth volatility through its effect on 
information sharing. Without information sharing, lenders are unable to monitor and advice 
on the investment decision of borrowers. In this case, borrowers may end up using the 
borrowed funds to finance unproductive investments thereby increase economic volatility. 
However, with the existence of efficient laws and with the fear of being prosecuted for 
concealing information on their credit worthiness and investment choices, borrowers are 
compelled to disclose these information leading to less volatility. We examine this indirect 
channel by introducing interaction terms of the legal origins and private credit bureau, our 
proxy for information asymmetry. In Column 3, our findings are consistent with our 
hypothesis and show that apart from the direct effect, legal origin dampens growth volatility 
by reducing information asymmetry. The coefficients of the interaction terms are negative 
and statistically significant at conventional levels.
26
 The indirect effect of the legal traditions 
is higher in English common law countries followed by the French civil law tradition. The 
impact of the Portuguese civil law regimes on volatility through the private credit bureau is 
lower and slightly significant at 10%. The lower intrinsic characteristic of the Portuguese 
civil law to exert large dampening effect on volatility can be attributed to its weak deterrent 
nature in compelling borrowers to succumb to full disclosure. The marginal effect of English, 
French and Portuguese legal origins on private credit bureau for growth volatility is –0.921, –
0.601 and –0.442 respectively with a corresponding net effect of –0.679, –0.583 and –
                                                          
26
 Here, we do not include the real and monetary shocks as exogenous variables as their inclusion will make the 
Sargan‟s OIR impossible due to over–identification. Specifically, the number of exogenous variables will 
exceed that of the instruments. 
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0.354.
27
 These findings are far reaching implying that, information about corporations and 
borrowers is critical for exerting corporate governance and identifying the best investments. 
Not only is the relationship between the interaction term of legal origin and private credit 
bureau and volatility negative and statistically significant, it is economically large for the 
English legal legacy. Thus, countries that enforce contracts effectively, protects shareholder 
and lender rights have better information sharing and reduced information asymmetry than 
countries with lax legal system. Invariably, what is apparent from the finding is that, higher 
information sharing interacted with legal origin by far falters volatility.  
 
Apart from OIR test, we test for the strength or otherwise the weakness of instruments using 
Cragg–Donald Wald F–test. For each regression, Wald F–test statistic exceeded the critical 
values at 5% significance level implying a rejection of the weak instruments. Thus, our 
instruments are not only valid but are sufficiently strong. Indeed, our results are robust even 
after including the transmission channels. The coefficients of the legal origins remain 
negative and statistically significant and so are the financial development indicators. 
However, the ability of both financial system activity (private credit–to–GDP) and banking 
system efficiency (bank credit on bank deposit) to tame volatility following their individual 
rise is lower relative to the model without the interaction term (Column 2). The effects of 
legal origin and regional blocs are robustly negative and statistically even after controlling for 
the transmission channels (Column 3). Here, both indicators of financial sector development 
are also negative and significant at 5% although the volatility–dampening effect of private 
credit is higher. With regard to the transmission channels, the coefficients of the interaction 
terms are negative and statistically significant. The implication is that legal origin 
significantly dampens growth volatility through information sharing proxied by the private 
                                                          
27
 This is computed as [(Mean value of the respective legal origin)   coefficient of transmission channel)   
coefficient of private credit bureau]. 
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credit bureau. Given this, we note the volatility elasticity is higher in English common law 
countries and lower in Portuguese civil law countries. Specifically, the volatility–reducing 
effect of the English common law is greater and averages at least 2.1 times higher than 
Portuguese legal origin while countries with the French civil law origins are within the 
English and Portuguese legal tradition effects (Column 3). 
 
In Columns 4 through to 6, we provide a sensitivity checks by regressing economic volatility 
using standard deviation of growth rates on the exogenous variables. In Column 4, the 
coefficients of legal traditions are negative and statistically significant at conventional levels 
with huge impact registered in the English common law countries relative to the Portuguese 
civil law. Countries with the French civil law doctrines fall between the English and French 
legal origins. The value of the F–test statistic is consistent with the earlier finding suggesting 
that grouping countries by their legal procedure provides an important conduit for explaining 
the variations in growth volatility in SSA. Even after including covariates, volatility is 
negatively associated with legal origins. Interestingly, while the dampening volatility effect 
of the English common laws and French civil laws increased, there is reduced volatility 
elasticity effect of the Portuguese legal origin.  
 
Although both real and monetary shocks heighten volatility, what is clear from the finding is 
that, relative to real shocks, monetary shocks appear to be an important driver of economic 
fluctuations. In the last Column, we include the interaction term of legal origins and 
information asymmetry to examine how it affects volatility proxied by the standard deviation 
of growth rates. Consistent with the earlier finding, the coefficients of the interaction terms 
are negative and statistically significant albeit varying magnitudes. For instance, volatility–
reducing effect of the English common law is greater and averages at least 2.3 times higher 
than Portuguese legal origin while countries with the French civil law origins are within the 
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English and Portuguese legal tradition effects. Although the effect of private credit bureau is 
negative and significant, juxtaposing the impact of private credit bureau on volatility on one 
hand (Columns 2 and 5) and that of transmission channel on the other (Columns 3 and 6) 
suggests that, the establishment of information sharing office per se may be insufficient but 
the effectiveness of the law is relevant in faltering economic volatility. In other words, our 
findings reaffirm the hypothesis that effectiveness of the legal origin reduces information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders culminating in smoother growth volatility. In this 
model, the coefficients of legal origin are still robustly negative evidencing their dampening 
volatility effects. Indeed, effectiveness of the prevailing legal system propels economic 
agents to disclose key borrower information to information sharing bureaus which are 
subsequently accessed by financial institutions in pursuing their intermediation roles. Thus, 
improvement of the informational efficiency permitted by effective legal regime by far 
improves the production of ex ante and ex post information about possible investment and 
delegated monitoring thereby taming volatility. 
 
5.6 Policy implications and recommendations  
We discuss key policy implications arising from the study. We have found that legal origins 
matter in explaining cross–country differences in financial development. More importantly, 
countries with English common laws experience higher levels of financial activity and 
banking system efficiency since their legal legacy largely champion private property rights on 
the back of its responsiveness to changing country‟s economic and social environment.  
Indeed, the financial needs of the economy continue to change so that more flexible legal 
frameworks are better placed at advancing financial development relative to more rigid 
systems. Undoubtedly, these conditions are fertile grounds for financial sector development. 
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One important finding documented is the finance–enhancing role of private credit bureau. 
Theory suggests that information sharing bureaus are expected to facilitate efficient resource 
allocation in financial intermediation by reducing information asymmetry between borrowers 
and lenders. Difficulty in accessing corporate records compels financial institutions to rely on 
local market and community knowledge. While this may appear a norm, it inhibits the 
financial sector‟s role in intermediation that supports efficient resource allocation for 
increased economic growth. Admittedly, fuzzy information investor creditworthiness does 
not ensure reliable underwriting thus exposing banks to fraud. Apart from their vulnerability 
to fraud, financial institutions are unable to monitor projects that get funded paving the way 
for investors to invest in projects with no or low returns thus exacerbating economic 
volatility. Thus, the establishment of information sharing office may therefore aid in 
smoothening fluctuations. While this holds, our finding further shows that the efficiency of 
the information sharing office and the volatility–reducing effect of private credit bureaus by 
far depends on how effective the transplanted legal system is in forcing economic agents 
(such as borrowers and investors) to disclose accurate information in promoting effective 
capital allocation consistent with long run growth. Thus, countries that grant excessive power 
to State, and those laws that sluggishly respond to the changing financial needs will 
experience lower financial sector development and higher volatility. Conclusively, apart from 
the direct effect of the legal origin, the ineffective prevailing legal systems may be unable to 
commit agents to fully disclose key information on their credit risk and investment choice. 
Consequently, bad projects get funded exacerbating growth volatility owing to moral hazards 
on the part of borrowers. 
 
 
At the policy level, the relatively sizable effect of private credit bureau highlights some 
critical issues as regards the best approaches to improve on information sharing. Structural 
changes in the economy may be an important requirement for arresting volatility as these 
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ensures stronger domestic institutions necessary for maintaining macroeconomic stability. On 
the back of this is the need for the judicial system to maintain more agile and effective legal 
systems that are responsive to changing financial landscape while forcing economic agents to 
full information disclosure. Developing information sharing bureaus in SSA may present vital 
space for facilitating the efficient resource allocation role of the financial sector. Once 
established, information sharing offices should affect the operations of lenders and every 
economically active individual or firm within country borders. Irrespective of the legal origin, 
financial institutions may be restricted to ensuring confidentiality in terms of disclosing 
customer information to third parties. Following from the need to reduce (promote) 
information asymmetry (sharing) aimed at efficient capital allocations and hence stable 
macro-economy, it is important for legal frameworks to confer rights on financial institutions 
to share key information with credit bureaus under their credit contractual agreements. This 
has imperative implications for credit culture and changing the overall economic behaviour of 
agents. However, improving information infrastructure for efficient resource allocation is 
conditioned on the existence of well–functional legal and regulatory systems. 
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
Previous studies on law–finance literature have failed to (i) engage the crucial role of law in 
financial development in the light of evolving legal systems in SSA as well as (ii) examine 
how legal origin explain cross–country differences in economic volatility. In addition, how 
effectiveness of law shape or limit information sharing in growth volatility is not thoroughly 
explored. The aim of this study has therefore been to (i) examine whether cross-country 
differences in financial development and economic volatility can be explained by differences 
in legal origins in SSA and (ii) how legal origin interact with information sharing in 
influencing growth volatility. 
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Our evidence suggests that legal origin significantly explains cross–country differences in 
financial development and economic volatility. More importantly, English common law 
countries and those in Southern Africa have higher financial sector development both in 
terms of activity and efficiency on the back of lower volatility. Specifically, volatility–
reducing effect of the English common law is higher than Portuguese legal origin while 
countries with the French civil law origins are within the two. While private credit bureau 
positively (negatively) impact on financial sector development (economic volatility), the 
latter effect is conditioned on the form of legal origin suggesting that, the establishment of 
information sharing offices per se may be insufficient in taming growth vagaries but the 
effectiveness of law is exceedingly relevant. At the policy front, maintaining more agile and 
effective legal systems that are responsive to changing financial landscape while forcing 
economic agents to improve informational infrastructure is healthy for both financial sector 
development and macroeconomic stability. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This final chapter is divided into four sections. This section introduces the chapter while the 
next section summarizes and concludes the study. Key policy recommendations are proffered 
in section 3 with the last section providing areas necessitating further research efforts. 
 
6.2 Summary and conclusions 
 
This study re–examined the linkages between financial sector development and economic 
growth in sub–Saharan Africa (SSA) with regard to some critical themes previously missing 
in the literature. Specifically, the study took a new dimension through its examination of the 
economic growth effect of relative speed of growth in financial and real sectors. The study 
also examined whether the finance–growth nexus is mediated by important threshold 
variables. Beyond these, the current study also investigated the channels through which 
financial development affects growth volatility and how legal origin interacts with 
information asymmetry in growth volatility. This thesis thus focused on salient areas in 
finance–growth nexus that have not seen much attention in the literature. Specifically, the 
study provided answers to the following research questions:  
1. Is the effect of financial development on economic growth contingent on the relative 
speed of growth in finance and real sector? 
2. To what extent is the overall impact of finance on growth threshold specific? 
3. What is the nature and channels through which financial development affects growth 
volatility? 
202 
 
4.  How do the legal system and information asymmetry play out in financial 
development and volatility?  
 
6.2.1 Finance–economic growth relationship under unbalanced sectoral growth 
By employing the generalized methods of moments (GMM), the study examined the effect on 
economic growth when financial sector growth outstrips the solvency needs of the real sector. 
Our overall findings reveal that while financial development supports economic growth, the 
extent to which finance helps growth depends crucially on the simultaneous growth of real 
and financial sectors as excess finance hurts growth. The elasticity of growth to changes in 
either size of the real sector or financial sector is higher under balanced sectoral growth. We 
also show that rapid and unbridled credit growth comes at a huge cost to economic growth 
with consequences stemming from financing of risky and unsustainable investments coupled 
with superfluous consumption fuelling inflation. However, the pass–through excess finance–
economic growth effect via the investment channel is stronger.  
 
6.2.2 Thresholds in financial development and economic growth nexus 
Investigating whether the impact of finance on growth is conditioned on the mediating 
variables namely initial levels of countries‟ income per capita, human capital and financial 
development, findings from the sample splitting and threshold estimations showed that while 
financial development is positively and significantly associated with economic growth, our 
evidence suggests that, in almost all the threshold variables, below a certain estimated 
threshold, financial sector development is positively and insignificantly related to growth. In 
other words, below the threshold level of per capita income, human capital and the level of 
finance, economic growth is largely insensitive to financial development while significantly 
influencing economic activity for countries above the thresholds. The main conclusion drawn 
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is that higher level of finance is a necessary condition in long run growth and so are the 
overall level of income and human capital. 
 
6.2.3 Effect and channels through which finance affects economic volatility 
We disaggregated volatility into its various components relying on the spectral approach in 
studying the effect of financial development on volatility as well as channels through which 
finance affects these volatility components by invoking dynamic panel estimation techniques. 
The study found that while financial sector development affects business cycle volatility in a 
non–linear fashion, its impact on long run fluctuation is imaginary. More specifically, well–
developed financial sectors dampen volatility. The findings also revealed that while monetary 
shocks have large magnifying effect on volatility, their effect in the short run is minuscule. 
The reverse, however, holds for real shocks. The channels of manifestation shows that 
financial development dampens (magnifies) the effect of real shocks (monetary shocks) on 
the components of volatility with the dampening effects consistently larger only in the short 
run. 
 
6.2.4 Finance–legal origin–volatility linkages and the role of information sharing  
The study re–interrogated the role of law in financial development in the light of evolving 
legal systems in SSA as well as how legal origin explain cross–country differences in 
economic volatility through its effect on information asymmetry relying on two–stage–least–
squares (2SLS). Our evidence suggests that legal origin significantly explains cross–country 
differences in financial development and economic volatility. More importantly, relative to 
civil law, English common law countries and those in Southern Africa have higher financial 
sector development both in terms of financial activity and banking efficiency on the back of 
lower volatility. While private credit bureau positively (negatively) affects financial 
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development (economic volatility) with economically large impact for English legal legacy 
countries, the latter effect is contingent on the form of legal origin suggesting that, the 
establishment of information sharing offices per se may be insufficient in taming growth 
vagaries. The effectiveness of law is exceedingly relevant. 
 
6.3 Policy implications and recommendations 
In an attempt to improve their growth performance through the financial sector, countries in 
SSA implemented some financial reform measures with view to eliminating financial 
repression and increasing financial deepening. Majority of the credit boom occurred during 
the financial reforms period that many SSA countries embarked on. The differences in boom 
incidence across our sample suggest that local structural, institutional and domestic policy 
paths are crucial. 
 
The level of financial sector supervision has a bearing on the enforcement of bank regulation 
and the effectiveness with which supervisory discretion is applied to deal with hypertrophic 
finance and early symptoms of credit boom. Central Banks are best placed to act as lender of 
last resort and supplying adequate liquidity to the financial and real sectors of the economy 
through the use of the open market operations and direct application of the reserve 
requirement. What is needed here is a good understanding of the optimal level of credit 
consistent with long run economic growth. There is the need for policy makers to 
continuously conduct needs assessment of real sector credit demand and leverage 
sustainability levels, both in order to prevent excess finance and to identify those firms or 
sectors of the economy that need to undergo a deleveraging exercise.  
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Apart from developing a legal framework to guide the extension of credit, Central Banks in 
SSA need to aggressively comply with the Basel III framework which establishes tougher 
capital standards through more restrictive and stringent capital definitions, higher risk-
weighted assets, additional capital buffers and higher requirements for minimum capital 
ratios. A broader macro–prudential goal of sound financial system that supports real sector 
growth can be achieved when a clear approach that progressively imposes a capital buffer for 
the financial sector during periods of credit boom reflected in private sector credit exceeding 
its long term trend is identified. 
 
Given the threshold effects mediated by the initial conditions, it is important for countries to 
first improve their income levels as a way of increasing growth through the financial sector. 
As long as a country‟s per capita income is above the threshold, finance drives growth. This 
is rightly so because as income levels increase, agents begin to demand for more financial 
services thus improving financial intermediation thereby increasing the impact of finance on 
growth. It therefore suggests that policies aimed at reducing the rather high rates of poverty in 
the sub–region potentially improve the finance–growth linkage. Building the human capital is 
also crucial in mediating the overall impact of finance on economic growth. Our evidence 
follows that, as human capital accumulation increase, agents‟ risk taking behaviour increases 
which enhances investment and credit demand and may eventually expands the financial 
system. More so, higher human capital permits innovation and use of technology thus 
improving financial sector efficiency which is crucial for accelerating faster economic 
growth. Following from this finding, it is imperative for countries in SSA to encourage 
school enrolment while reducing the pupil teacher ratios. In all these, it is important for 
education policy makers to improve on the curricular in such a way that guarantee teacher 
motivation and inspires ingenuity.  
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To the extent that economic fluctuations are less volatile with developed financial sector, 
uncontrolled financial development associated with over developed financial sector is not 
healthy given the nonlinear relationship between financial development and volatility. While 
developed financial systems tend to be more efficient in identifying those firms that wrongly 
overstate the extent of their liquidity, over developed financial sector is often associated with 
excessive credit growth to the private sector thus permitting the financing of unsustainable 
projects magnifying business cycle volatility. Thus, knowledge of firms‟ solvency needs and 
proper supervision is therefore needed to ensure that credit advanced is consistent with the 
needs of firms because in the end, the behaviour of those firms are inhibited by the financial 
sectors‟ unwillingness to lend. It is expected that, business cycles will smoother following 
financial institutions‟ effective use of available information about potential borrowers and 
cash flow needs. Encouraging financial development for its own sake may be counter-
productive. Policy makers should rather seek to strengthen the appropriate size and quality of 
finance rather than expanding the financial sector. 
 
 
Another crucial finding is that volatility caused by monetary shocks is more imperative and 
persistent than that caused by real shocks and financial underdevelopment of SSA. To the 
extent that factors influencing fluctuations are largely internal suggests that stabilizing 
exogenous shocks to control the sub–regions long run macroeconomic volatility may be 
ineffective. Thus, irrespective of the nature of shock, domestic structural changes may be an 
important prerequisite for reducing volatility. 
 
We therefore recommend that, strengthening supervision, including cross-border oversight is 
important in examining the right levels of finance necessary to falter economic fluctuations. 
Because enforcement of prudential standards remains lax, providing supervisors with more 
enforcement power and strengthening the capacity of Central Banks should be the core in 
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financial sector development process. Moreover, leveraging on the importance of monetary 
shocks in propagating volatility, it is important for Central Banks like those in SSA to adopt 
inflation targeting approach as it sets institutional commitment to price stability as the 
primary long run goal of monetary policy. And given the obvious possibility that countries in 
SSA are frequently hit by shocks that could distort inflation from its long run path, missing 
the inflation targets may be untenable. What is needed by policy makers is to focus on short 
to medium term to ensure that deviations are brought on track and inflation converges to a 
trajectory consistent with price stability and financial sector development.  
 
 
One important finding documented is the finance–enhancing role of private credit bureau. 
Admittedly, fuzzy information investor creditworthiness does not ensure reliable 
underwriting thus exposing banks to fraud. Apart from their vulnerability to fraud, financial 
institutions are unable to monitor projects that get funded paving the way for investors to 
invest in projects with no or low returns thus exacerbating economic volatility. Thus, the 
establishment of information sharing office may therefore aid in smoothening fluctuations. 
However, the efficiency of the information sharing office and the volatility–reducing effect of 
private credit bureaus by far depend on the effectiveness of the transplanted legal system.  
 
 
At the policy level, the relatively sizable effect of private credit bureau highlights some 
critical issues as regards the best approaches to improve on information sharing. Structural 
changes in the economy may be an important requirement for arresting volatility as these 
ensures stronger domestic institutions necessary for maintaining macroeconomic stability. On 
the back of this is the need for the judicial systems to maintain more agile and effective legal 
systems that are responsive to changing financial landscape while forcing economic agents to 
full information disclosure. Developing information sharing bureaus in SSA may present vital 
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space for facilitating the efficient resource allocation role of the financial sector. Once 
established, information sharing offices should affect the operations of lenders and every 
economically active individual or firm within country borders. Irrespective of the legal origin, 
financial institutions may be restricted to ensuring confidentiality in terms of disclosing 
customer information to third parties. Following from the need to reduce (promote) 
information asymmetry (sharing) aimed at efficient capital allocations and hence stable 
macro-economy, it is important for legal frameworks to confer rights on financial institutions 
to share key information with credit bureaus under their credit contractual agreements. This 
has imperative implications for credit culture and changing the overall economic behaviour of 
agents. However, improving information infrastructure for efficient resource allocation is 
conditioned on the existence of well–functional legal and regulatory systems. 
 
6.4 Areas necessitating further research efforts 
Our evidence based on the findings of this study leads us to call for further research efforts in 
re–examining the finance–growth linkages in contemporary economic systems. The present 
study presents important implications for conducting macro–prudential policy and uncovers 
clear avenues for future research in five key areas. First, it would be interesting to explicitly 
model credit boom in examining real and financial sector interdependence in finance–growth 
nexus. Second, it would also be laudable to study how the real and financial sectors interact 
in the growth process disaggregating the data into pre– and post–Global Financial Crisis. 
 
Third, while our sample splitting and threshold technique estimates the various thresholds 
below or above which finance–growth relationship changes signs or significance, this 
approach does not control for endogeneity emanating from a possible lead–lag/feedback 
effects well documented in the empirical literature. It is important for future studies to 
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employ sound threshold methodologies capable of addressing potential endogeneity in 
finance–growth relationship and at the same time examining the impact of finance on 
economic activity in the presence of mediating variables. It will be interesting to validate our 
findings controlling for endogeneity using valid instruments. 
 
Fourth, our legal indicators are relatively time–invariant and therefore empirical evidence are 
weakly able to explain dynamic influences of effectiveness of law on both financial sector 
development and growth volatility. Constructing a new legal index capable of monitoring the 
adaptability mechanism and their implications for macroeconomic stability is particularly apt 
given the evolving legal systems and narrow financial sector in SSA. 
 
Fifth, it will also be interesting to examine the linkages of law and information sharing 
throughout the conditional distribution of financial sector development and growth volatility 
components. Perhaps the role of law and information sharing on finance may well depend on 
the level of financial sector development and type of volatility. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: List of countries, legal origin and credit boom 
List of Countries 
Legal 
origin 
Number 
of credit 
boom 
incidence 
Year(s) of 
Incidence 
Peak of 
credit 
boom 
from 
multiple 
incidence 
1. Benin French 0 No credit boom 
 
2. Botswana English 2 1992, 1993 1992 
3. Burkina Faso French 1 1997 
 
4. Cameroon French 1 1991 
 
5. Central Afr. Rep. French 2 1991, 2013 2013 
6. Chad French 0 No credit boom 
 
7. Congo, Dem. Rep. French 1 1993 
 
8. Congo, Rep French 0 No credit boom 
 
9. Cote d'Ivoire French 2 1992, 1993 1992 
10. Ethiopia French 0 No credit boom 
 
11. Gabon English 0 No credit boom 
 
12. Gambia English 3 1984, 1985, 2003 1985 
13. Ghana English 2 1987, 2000 2000 
14. Kenya English 1 1995 
 
15. Lesotho English 1 1997 
 
16. Madagascar English 2 1993, 2003 1993 
17. Malawi English 2 1992, 1994 1994 
18. Mali French 1 1983 
 
19. Mauritania French 2 2005, 2009 2005 
20. Mauritius English 1 1985 
 
21. Mozambique Portuguese 0 No credit boom 
 
22. Niger French 1 2004 
 
23. Nigeria English 2 1994, 2009 2009 
24. Rwanda French 1 1994 
 
25. Senegal French 2 1988, 1993 1988 
26. Sierra Leone English 1 1994 
 
27. South Africa English 1 2001 
 
28. Swaziland English 0 No credit boom 
 
29. Togo French 1 1993 
 
 
 
 
 
237 
 
Appendix 2: List of countries and legal origin 
Legal origin Countries Number 
English 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania and Zambia. 
13 
French 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo 
Republic, Cote d‟ Ivoire, Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, 
Senegal and Togo. 
14 
Portuguese 
Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea–Bissau 
and Mozambique. 
4 
Belgian 
Burundi and Democratic Republic of 
Congo (formerly Zaire) 
2 
Total 33 
Western Africa 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote 
d‟ Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea–Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone 
and Togo. 
12 
Southern Africa 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and 
Zambia. 
10 
Central Africa 
Angola, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Congo Republic and Gabon. 
7 
Eastern Africa Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Sudan. 4 
Total 33 
 
